SEVERO M. PUCAN, ROBERT A. JEREZ, JR. AND ALFREDO C. ANTONIO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EDUARDO R. BENGZON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL…

Pucan versus Bengzon

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Director Severo M. Pucan, hearing officer Robert A. Jerez, Jr., and Acting Deputy Sheriff Alfredo C. Antonio, Jr. against Judge Eduardo R. Bengzon of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The public officials challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court over a petition for damages and prohibition that Saulog Transit, Inc. had filed to stop them from enforcing an alias writ of execution issued by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The case matters because it draws the boundary between the regular courts and the labor agencies: acts done in the execution of a final labor decision, even when dressed up as an action for damages, remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor department, and no court may enjoin them.

Procedural History

The dispute began with a resolution of then Minister of Labor and Employment Blas F. Ople in favor of the drivers, conductors, and mechanics of Saulog Transit, Inc. On motion for reconsideration, the Minister modified his resolution. Saulog Transit appealed to the Office of the President, which affirmed the Minister. Saulog Transit then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari, and the Court affirmed both the Minister's decision and that of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs.

When execution began, Saulog Transit filed a motion to quash the writ of execution before the Ministry. After the hearing officer set the motion for hearing, the hearing was not conducted. Director Pucan then issued another writ of execution. Saulog Transit filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition for damages and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The trial court restrained the sheriff, and after hearing and upon posting of a bond, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The public officials moved to dismiss on three grounds: lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the prohibition on injunctions in labor disputes. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The public officials then came to the Supreme Court on certiorari and prohibition, raising the same grounds.

Facts

On April 1, 1981, Minister Ople issued a resolution in the labor case filed by the Drivers, Conductors and Mechanics of Saulog Transit, represented by their leader Robert Arevalo. On motion for reconsideration, the Minister rendered a decision on January 20, 1982, ordering Saulog Transit to pay thirteenth month pay to certain employees, to pay emergency cost of living allowances under several presidential decrees to drivers and conductors paid on purely commission basis whose earnings did not exceed the salary ceilings, to share with drivers and conductors the cost of cleaning and washing the buses, to comply with the wage rates in the Supplemental Collective Bargaining Agreement, and to readmit strikers who had reported for work but were refused admission.

On December 18, 1984, Director Pucan issued an alias writ of execution directing the sheriff to require Saulog Transit to pay the complaining drivers and conductors the amount of 3,702,672 pesos representing their emergency cost of living allowance. Acting Deputy Sheriff Antonio tried to garnish and levy the company's office equipment and properties, but desisted after the personnel manager asked him to specify who the complainants were and how much each was entitled to receive, considering that the judgment had already been satisfied as to some complainants. Saulog Transit filed an urgent motion to quash or recall the writ, arguing among others that the decision was conditional, vague, and indefinite, and that the writ was issued without notice and hearing.

In his order of February 12, 1985, Director Pucan stated that Saulog Transit was not afforded procedural due process with respect to the computation of the monetary award, and directed it to produce documentary evidence to contest the claims. Saulog Transit filed a motion for clarification with a prayer for thirty days from receipt of the computation within which to submit evidence. Without acting on the motion, Director Pucan issued another writ of execution on March 1, 1985. On the strength of that writ, Sheriff Antonio served notices of garnishment on the company's bank deposits and publicly announced that he would take possession of the buses the following week. Three days later, Saulog Transit filed the petition for damages and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the petition for damages and prohibition arising from the enforcement of the alias writ of execution issued by the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
• Whether or not the petition stated a cause of action, considering that Saulog Transit had not exhausted administrative remedies before the Minister of Labor.
• Whether or not the proceedings were barred by the prohibition against injunctions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes.

Applicable Provisions

Article 255 of the Labor Code provides:

Article 255. Injunction prohibited. No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.

This provision bars the trial court from issuing the preliminary injunction and from taking cognizance of a case growing out of a labor dispute.

Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Article 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority: x x x [e] To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts in any labor dispute, which if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party x x x

This provision vests in the labor agencies the power to restrain acts in labor disputes, to the exclusion of the regular courts.

Article 244 of the Labor Code provides:

The Secretary of Labor, the Commission and the Director of Labor Relations may appoint sheriffs and take any measure under existing laws, decrees and general orders as may be necessary to ensure compliance with their decisions, orders or awards x x x

This provision shows that the Minister retained control over the execution of his decision, so that irregularities in execution should be referred to him and not to the regular courts.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction. What Saulog Transit was really questioning was the legality of the alias writ of execution and the acts of the Ministry officials in implementing it. In substance, the petition was a motion to quash the writ, and as to the acts of the officials, a case growing out of a labor dispute, because the acts complained of were perpetrated during the execution of a decision of the Minister of Labor. Jurisdiction pertained to the Labor Ministry, not the regular courts. The Court relied on Article 244 of the Labor Code, which shows that the Minister retained control over the execution of his decision despite its finality, so that resort to a court of co-equal rank was untenable. The prayer for damages did not change the complexion of the case, because the acts complained of were mere incidents of a labor dispute. The Court laid down the criterion: whether the acts complained of arose out of, or are connected or interwoven with, cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter or the National Labor Relations Commission.

On the second issue, the Court held that Saulog Transit should have referred whatever irregularities attended the alias writ to the same administrative official or tribunal which rendered the decision being executed, following the procedure it had used in its earlier motion to quash. Its failure to do so meant the petition stated no cause of action.

On the third issue, the Court held that the proceedings were barred by Article 255 of the Labor Code, which categorically prohibits any court from issuing a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264. The trial court therefore had no power to issue the writ of preliminary injunction.

Doctrine

The regular courts have no jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with, or relating to labor disputes. The broad powers granted to the Labor Department and the National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 224 and 218 of the Labor Code vest in those agencies exclusive jurisdiction over such incidents. A petition questioning the legality of a writ of execution issued by the Minister of Labor, and the acts of Ministry officials in implementing it, is in the nature of a motion to quash the writ and must be filed with the labor agency that rendered the decision, not with the regular courts. A prayer for damages does not convert the action into a regular civil action cognizable by the courts, because the acts complained of remain incidents of a labor dispute. Finally, under Article 255, no court may issue a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264.

Disposition

The petition was granted. The trial court was permanently enjoined from acting on the petition for damages and prohibition, and the Department of Labor and Employment was directed to immediately recompute the monetary awards and execute the decision in accordance with law, without prejudice to Saulog Transit's right to file administrative, civil, or criminal charges against the erring officials.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: acts done in the execution of a final labor decision are incidents of a labor dispute, and no court may enjoin them. Examiners use this case to test jurisdiction over execution incidents and the statutory prohibition on injunctions in labor disputes.