RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION AND/OR RUFO MAURICIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Rufo Mauricio Construction versus Intermediate Appellate Court

The Case

This is a petition brought by Rufo Mauricio Construction and Rufo Mauricio, the employer of a truck driver, against the Intermediate Appellate Court and the People of the Philippines. The employer resists a subsidiary writ of execution issued to enforce, against him, the damages awarded in a criminal case for homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence. The driver was convicted, appealed, and then died before his conviction became final. The case matters because it fixes the fate of the employer's liability when the accused employee dies during the pendency of his appeal, and it defines the employer's right to be heard before damages are enforced against him.

Procedural History

Illustre Cabiliza, the driver of an Isuzu dump truck owned by Rufo Mauricio Construction, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the Fifth Judicial Region, Branch Two, in Legaspi City with homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence. After arraignment and trial, the trial court convicted him and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased judge and to pay actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages. The judgment was promulgated, and Cabiliza filed a notice of appeal. He died before he could pursue the appeal, and his counsel filed a notice of death, manifesting the intention of Rufo Mauricio, as employer, to proceed with the appeal as one subsidiarily liable.

The trial court ordered the heirs of Cabiliza to substitute him as appellant with respect to the civil aspect. On motion of the victim's heirs, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, which was returned unsatisfied because Cabiliza was insolvent. The victim's widow then moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the employer, which the trial court granted. Rufo Mauricio moved to quash the subsidiary writ, and resolution of that motion was held in abeyance. Meanwhile, Rufo Mauricio pursued the driver's appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court, assigning errors on the finding of negligence, the award of damages, the effect of the driver's death, and the denial of his day in court.

The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the judgment, modifying only the amount of damages for loss of earning capacity. Rufo Mauricio's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then brought this petition to the Supreme Court.

Facts

On or about the twentieth day of September 1979, in Legaspi City, Cabiliza drove an Isuzu dump truck owned by Rufo Mauricio Construction. He was accused of driving recklessly and imprudently, without regard to traffic rules, causing the truck to sideswipe and hit a Colt Gallant driven and owned by Judge Arsenio Solidum. The collision inflicted injuries on the judge which caused his death, damaged his car, and damaged a house owned by Pablo Navarra.

After trial, the trial court convicted Cabiliza and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty, and ordered him to pay the heirs of the deceased judge actual and compensatory damages, damages for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, plus the costs. Cabiliza filed a notice of appeal, but he died before he could pursue it. His counsel filed a notice of death, and in the same notice manifested the intention of Rufo Mauricio, as employer, to proceed with the case on appeal under his right as an employer subsidiarily liable.

The trial court ordered the heirs of Cabiliza to substitute him as appellant on the civil aspect. On motion of the victim's heirs, the trial court ordered execution, but the writ was returned unsatisfied because Cabiliza was insolvent, as shown by a certificate of insolvency. The victim's widow then moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the employer, which the trial court granted. Rufo Mauricio moved to quash the subsidiary writ, and that motion was held in abeyance while the appeal proceeded.

Issues

• Whether or not the death of the accused employee during the pendency of his appeal wipes out not only his primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability.
• Whether or not exemplary damages may be imposed upon an employer who was not present in the vehicle at the time of the incident.
• Whether or not the employer may be condemned to pay damages without being given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to adduce evidence to resist the claim.
• Whether or not the appellate court misapplied the facts contrary to the physical evidence in finding the driver negligent.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

This is the source of the employer's liability when the obligation arises not from a crime but from a quasi-delict.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

This confirms that the civil liability arising from a quasi-delict stands independently of the criminal liability.

The eighth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

This is the basis for holding the employer liable, solidarily with the driver, unless he proves due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver.

Article 2194 of the Civil Code provides:

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

This makes the employer's liability solidary, not subsidiary, with that of his driver.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal, or before the judgment of conviction became final and executory, extinguished his criminal liability, meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his civil liability where that liability arises not from a crime but from a quasi-delict. The Court reasoned that no crime was committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment and therefore still regarded as innocent. The employer's liability, the Court said, would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver, unless the employer could prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he could prove due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver.

On the second issue, the Court addressed the imposition of exemplary damages upon an employer who was not present in the vehicle at the time of the incident.

On the third issue, the Court held that because the employer was not a party in the criminal case, he must be given his day in court for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's alleged negligence and on the amount of damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense. The hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must therefore be reopened precisely for that purpose.

On the fourth issue, the Court resolved the assigned error on the finding of negligence in light of the foregoing, setting aside the assailed decision and remanding the case to the trial court for the hearing adverted to.

Doctrine

The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal, or before the judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, extinguishes his criminal liability, meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his civil liability where that liability arises from a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the employer's liability is not subsidiary but solidary with his driver, unless the employer proves that there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, that he exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver, as provided in the eighth paragraph of Article 2180 and Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Because the employer was not a party in the criminal case, he must be given his day in court to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on the driver's alleged negligence and on the amount of damages, and to introduce evidence in his defense, before damages may be enforced against him.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the assailed decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the trial court for the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution, so that the employer could be given his day in court.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the death of the accused before final conviction extinguishes his criminal liability but not his civil liability arising from a quasi-delict, and the employer's liability is then solidary, not subsidiary, unless he proves due diligence in selection and supervision. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code and solidary liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, and the employer's right to due process before damages are enforced against him.