G.R. No. 70403. July 07, 1989
SANTIAGO SYJUCO, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH LXXXV, QUEZON CITY, TH…
NARVASA, J.:
This case may well serve as
a textbook example of how judicial
processes, designed to promote
the swift and efficient disposition of disputes at law, can be so grossly
abused and manipulated as to produce precisely the opposite result; how they
can be utilized by parties with small scruples to forestall for an
unconscionably long time so essentially simple a matter as making the security
given for a just debt answer for its payment.
The records of the present proceedings and of two other cases
already decided by this Court expose how indeed the routine procedure of an
extrajudicial foreclosure came — by dint of brazen forum shopping and other
devious maneuvering — to grow into a veritable thicket of litigation from
which the mortgagee has been trying to extricate itself for the last twenty
years.
Back in November 1964, Eugenio Lim, for
and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of his mother, the widow Maria
Moreno (now deceased) and of his brother Lorenzo, together with his other
brothers, Aramis, Mario and Paulino,
and his sister, Nila, all hereinafter collectively
called the Lims, borrowed from petitioner Santiago Syjuco, Inc. (hereinafter, Syjuco
only) the sum of P800,000.00. The loan
was given on the security of a first mortgage on property registered in the names of said borrowers as owners in
common under Transfer Certificates of Title Numbered 75413 and 75415 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila. Thereafter
additional loans on the same security were obtained by the Lims
from Syjuco, so that as of May 8, 1967, the aggregate
of the loans stood at P2,460,000.00, exclusive of interest, and the security
had been augmented by bringing into the mortgage other property, also
registered as owned pro indiviso
by the Lims under two titles: TCT Nos. 75416 and 75418 of the Manila
Registry.
There is no dispute about these facts, nor about the additional
circumstance that as stipulated in the mortgage deed the obligation matured on
November 8, 1967; that the Lims failed
to pay it despite demands therefor; that Syjuco
consequently caused extra-judicial proceedings for the foreclosure of the
mortgage to be commenced by the Sheriff of Manila; and that the latter
scheduled the auction sale of the mortgaged property on December 27, 1968.[1]
The attempt to foreclose triggered off a legal battle that has dragged on for
more than twenty years now, fought through five (5) cases in the trial courts,[2]
two (2) in the Court of Appeals,[3]
and three (3) more in this Court,[4]
with the end only now in sight.
1. CIVIL CASE NO.
75180, CFI MANILA, BR. 5; CA-G.R.
NO. 00242-R; G.R. NO. L-34683
To stop the foreclosure, the Lims —
through Atty. Marcial G. Mendiola,
who was later joined by Atty. Raul Correa — filed Civil Case No. 75180 on December 24, 1968 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Branch 5). In
their complaint they alleged that their mortgage was void, being usurious for
stipulating interest of 23% on top of 11% that they had been required to pay as
“kickback.” An order restraining the auction sale was issued two days
later, on December 26, 1968,
premised inter alia on the Lims‘
express waiver of “their
rights to the notice and re-publication of the notice of sale which may be
conducted at some future date.”[5]
On November 25, 1970, the Court of First Instance (then presided
over by Judge Conrado M. Vasquez[6])
rendered judgment finding that usury tainted
the mortgage without, however, rendering it void, declaring the amount
due to be only P1,136,235.00 and
allowing the foreclosure to proceed for satisfaction
of the obligation reckoned at only said amount.[7]
Syjuco moved for new trial to enable it
to present additional evidence to overthrow the finding of usury, and the Court
ordered the case reopened for that purpose.
The Lims tried to negate that order of
reopening in the Court of Appeals, the proceedings being docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 00242-R. They failed. The Court of Appeals upheld the Trial
Court. The Lims
then sought to nullify this action of the Appellate Court; towards that end,
they filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. L-34683. But here, too, they failed;
their petition was dismissed.[8]
Thereafter, and on the basis of the additional evidence adduced
by Syjuco on remand of the case from this Court, the Trial Court
promulgated an amended decision on August
16, 1972, reversing its previous
holding that usury had flawed the Lims‘ loan
obligation. It declared that the
principal of said obligation indeed amounted to P2,460,000.00, exclusive of interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from November 8, 1967, and, that
obligation being already due, the defendants (Syjuco
and the Sheriff of Manila) could proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage given to secure its
satisfaction.[9]
2. APPEAL FROM CIVIL CASE NO.
75180; CA-G. R. NO. 51752; G. R.
NO. L-45752
On September 9, 1972,
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas
entered his appearance in Civil Case No. 75180
as counsel for the Lims in collaboration with
Atty. Raul Correa, and on the same date appealed to the Court of Appeals from
the amended decision of August 16,
1972.[10]
In that appeal, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 51752, Messrs. Canlas and Correa prayed that the loans be declared
usurious; that the principal of the loans be found to be in the total amount of P1,269,505.00 only, and the
interest thereon fixed at only 6% per annum from the filing of the complaint;
and that the mortgage be also pronounced void ab
initio.[11]
The appeal met with no success.
In a decision promulgated on October
25, 1976, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the Trial Court’s
amended decision.[12]
The Lims came to this Court seeking
reversal of the appellate Court’s decision.
However, their petition for review — filed in their behalf by Canlas, and Atty. Pio R. Marcos,
and docketed as G.R. No. L-45752 — was denied for lack of merit in a minute
resolution dated August 5, 1977. The Lims‘ motion
for reconsideration was denied and entry of judgment was made on September 24, 1977.[13]
Here the matter should have ended; it marked only the beginning of Syjuco’s travails.
3. CIVIL CASE
NO. 112762, CFI MANILA BRANCH 9
Syjuco then resumed its efforts to
proceed with the foreclosure. It caused
the auction sale of the mortgaged property to be scheduled on December 20, 1977, only to be
frustrated again by another action filed by the Lims
on December 19, 1977,
docketed as Civil Case No. 112762 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila.[14]
The action sought to stop the sale on the ground that the notice of foreclosure
had not been republished; this, notwithstanding that as earlier stressed, the restraining order of December 26,
1968 issued in Civil Case No. 75180 explicitly declared itself to be predicated
on the Lims‘ waiver of “their rights to the
notice and republication of the
notice of sale which may be conducted at some future date.”[15]
An order restraining the sale issued in the case, although the petition for
preliminary injunction was subsequently denied.
A supplemental complaint was also filed by the Lims
seeking recovery of some P1
million in damages allegedly suffered by reason of said lack of republication.[16]
4. CIVIL CASE NO. 75180
That very same claim — that there had been no republication
of the notice of sale,
which was the foundation of the Lims’ action in Civil
Case No. 112762 as aforesaid — was made by the Lims
the basis of an urgent motion filed on December 15, 1977 in Civil Case No.
75180, in which, as earlier narrated, the judgment authorizing the foreclosure
had been affirmed by both the
Court of Appeals and this Court, and had become final and executory. And that motion sought exactly the same
remedy prayed for in Civil Case No. 112762 (filed by the Lims
four [4] days later, on December 19,
1977), i.e., the prevention of the auction sale. The Court — Branch 5, then presided over by
Judge Jose H. Tecson — granted the restraining order
on December 19, 1977,[17]
the very same day that the Lims commenced Civil Case
No. 112762 in the same Court and in which subsequent action they asked for and obtained a similar restraining
order.
The Lims‘
counsel thus brought about the anomalous situation of two (2) restraining
orders directed against the same auction sale, based on the same ground, issued by different courts
having cognizance of two (2) separate proceedings instituted for identical objectives. This situation lasted for all of three (3)
years, despite the republication of the notice of sale caused by Syjuco in January, 1978 in an
effort to end all dispute about the matter, and despite
Judge Tecson’s having been made aware of Civil Case
No. 112762. It should have been apparent
to Judge Tecson that there was nothing more to be
done in Civil Case No. 75180 except to enforce the judgment, already final and executory, authorizing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage, a judgment sanctioned, to repeat, by both the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court; that there was in
truth no need for another
publication of the notice since the Lims had
precisely waived such republication, this waiver having been the condition
under which they had earlier obtained an order restraining the
first scheduled sale; that, in any event, the republication
effected by Syjuco had removed the only asserted impediment to the holding of the same; and that, finally, the Lims
were acting in bad faith: they were maintaining proceedings in two (2) different courts for essentially the
same relief.[18] Incredibly, not only did Judge Tecson refuse to allow the holding of the auction sale, as
was the only just and lawful course indicated by the circumstances,[19]
he authorized the Lims to sell the mortgaged property in a private sale,[20] with
the evident intention that the proceeds of the sale, which he directed
to be deposited in court, would be divided between Syjuco
and the Lims;
this, in line with the patently
specious theory advocated by the Lims‘ counsel that the bond filed by them
for the postponement of the sale, set at
P6 million by the Court (later increased by P3 million) had superseded and caused novation
of the mortgage.[21]
The case lay fallow for a year, certain other incidents arising and remaining
unresolved on account of numerous postponements.
5. G.R. No. L-56014
Finally, on January 28, 1981, Syjuco
betook itself to this Court, presumably no longer disposed to await Judge Tecson’s
pleasure or the Lims‘ convenience. It filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
L-56014, alleging that in Civil Case No. 75180, Judge Tecson
had gravely abused discretion in:
(1) unreasonably delaying
the foreclosure of the mortgage;
(2) entertaining the Lims‘ motion to discharge said mortgage grounded on the
theory that it had been superseded and novated by the
Lims‘ act of filing the bond required by Judge Tecson in connection with the postponement of the
foreclosure sale, and unreasonably delaying resolution of the issue; and
(3) authorizing the Lims
to negotiate and consummate the private sale of the mortgaged property and motu proprio extending
the period granted the Lims for the purpose, in disregard of the final and executory judgment rendered in the case.
By judgment rendered on
September 21, 1982, after
due proceedings, this Court[22]
issued the writ prayed for and nullified the orders and actuations of Judge Tecson
in Civil Case No. 75180. The judgment
declared that:
(1) the republication by Syjuco of the notice of foreclosure sale
rendered the to complaint in Civil Case No. 112762 moot and academic; hence, said case could not operate to bar the sale;
(2) the Lims’ bonds (of P6 million and P3 Million), having by the
terms thereof been given to
guarantee payment damages to Syjuco and the Sheriff
of Manila resulting from the suspension of the auction sale, could not in any
sense and from any aspect have the effect of superseding the mortgage or novating it;
(3) in fact, the bonds
had become worthless when, as shown by the record, the bondsman’s authority to
transact non-life insurance business in the Philippines
was not renewed, for cause, as of July
1, 1981.
The decision consequently
decreed that the Sheriff of Manila should proceed with the mortgage sale, there
being no further impediment thereto.[23]
Notice of the decision
was served on the Lims, through Atty. Canlas, on October 2, 1982. A
motion for reconsideration was filed,[24] but the same was denied with finality for
lack of merit and entry of final judgment was made on March 22, 1983.[25]
6. THE SECRET
ACTION: CIVIL CASE NO. Q-36845 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY,
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, PRESIDING
Twelve (12) days after the
Lims were served, as above mentioned, with notice of this Court’s judgment in G.R. No. 56014, or on
October 14, 1982, they caused the filing with the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City of still another action, the third, also designed. Like the first two, to preclude enforcement
of the mortgage held by Syjuco.
This time the complaint was presented, not in their individual
names, but in the name of a partnership of which they themselves were the only
partners: “Heirs of Hugo Lim.”
The complaint advocated the theory that the mortgage which they, together with
their mother, had individually constituted (and thereafter amended during the
period from 1964 to 1967) over lands standing in their names in the Property
Registry as owners pro indiviso, in fact no
longer belonged to them at that time, having been earlier deeded over by them
to the partnership, “Heirs of Hugo Lim,” more precisely, on March 30,
1959, hence, said mortgage was void because executed by them without authority
from the partnership.
The complaint was signed by a lawyer other than Atty. Canlas, but the records disclose that Atty. Canlas took over as counsel as of November 4, 1982.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-39295, was assigned to Branch 35
of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, then
presided over by Judge Jose P. Castro.
Judge Castro issued a restraining order on October 15, 1982. Then, Sheriff Perfecto G. Dalangin
submitted a return of summons to the effect that on December 6, 1982 he –
“* * served personally and left a copy of summons
together with a copy of Complaint and its annexes * * upon defendant’s office
formerly at 313 Quirino Ave., Paranaque,
Metro-Manila and now at 407 Doña Felisa
Syjuco Building, Remedios
St., corner Taft Avenue, Manila, through the Manager, a person of sufficient
age and discretion, duly, authorized to receive service of such nature, but who
refused to accept service and signed receipt thereof.”[26]
A vaguer return will be hard to
find. It is impossible to discern from
it where precisely the summons was served, whether at Quirino
Avenue, Paranaque, or Taft Avenue, Manila; and it is
inexplicable that the name of the person that the sheriff had been able to
identify as the manager is not stated, the latter being described merely as “a
person of sufficient age and
discretion.” In any event, as it was to claim later, Syjuco
asserts that it was never so served with summons, or with any other notice,
pleading, or motion relative to the case, for that matter.
On February 10, 1983,
Atty. Canlas filed an ex parte motion to declare Syjuco
in default. The order of default issued
the next day, also directing the plaintiff partnership to present evidence ex
parte within three (3) days. On February
22, 1983, judgment by default was rendered, declaring void the
mortgage in question because executed by the Lims
without authority from the partnership which was and had been since March 30, 1959 the exclusive owner of
the mortgaged property, and making permanent an injunction against the
foreclosure sale that had issued on January
14, 1983.[27]
Service of notice of the default judgment was, according to the return of the
same Sheriff Perfecto Dalangin, effected on the
following day, February 23, 1983. His return is a virtual copy of his earlier
one regarding service of summons: it
also states the place of service as the defendant’s office, either at its
former location, 313 Quirino Avenue, Paranaque, or at the later address, 407 Dona Felisa, Syjuco Building, Taft
Avenue, Manila; and it also
fails to identify the person on whom service was made, describing him only as
“the clerk or person in charge” of the office.[28]
Unaccountably, and contrary to what might be expected from the
rapidity with which it was decided — twelve (12) days from February 10, 1983, when the motion to
declare defendant Syjuco in default was filed — the case was afterwards allowed by Atty. Canlas to remain dormant for seventeen (17) months.
He made no effort to have the judgment executed, or to avail of it in
other actions instituted by him against Syjuco. The judgment was not to be invoked until
sometime in or after July, 1984, again to stop the extrajudicial mortgage sale
scheduled at or about that time at the instance of Syjuco,
as shall presently be recounted.
7. Other Actions in the Interim:
a. CIVIL CASE NO. 83-19018, RTC
MANILA
While the Lims, through their
partnership (“Heirs of Hugo Lim”), were prosecuting their action in
the sala of Judge Castro, as above narrated, Syjuco
once again tried to proceed with the foreclosure after entry of judgment had
been made in G.R. No. 56014 on March
22, 1983. It scheduled the
auction sale on July 30, 1983. But once again it was frustrated. Another obstacle was put up by the Lims and their counsel, Atty. Canlas. This was Civil Case No. 83-19018 of the Manila Regional Trial Court. The case was filed to stop the sale on the
theory that what was sought to be realized from the sale was much in excess of the judgment in Civil Case No.
75180, and that there was absence of the requisite notice. It is significant that the judgment by
default rendered by Judge Castro in Civil Case No. Q-36485 was not asserted as
additional ground to support the cause of action. Be this as it may, a restraining order was
issued on July 20, 1983 in said Civil Case No. 83-19018.[29]
b. CIVIL CASE NO. Q-32924, RTC QUEZON CITY
What the outcome of this case, No. 83-19018, is not clear. What is certain is (1) that the auction sale
was re-scheduled for September 20,
1983, (2) that it was aborted because the Lims
managed to obtain still another restraining order in another case commenced by
their lawyer, Atty. Canlas: Civil Case No. Q-32924 of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City, grounded on the
proposition that the publication of the notice of sale was defective; and (3)
that the action was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on February 3, 1984.[30]
No other salient details about these two (2) cases are available
in the voluminous records before the Court, except that it was Atty. Canlas who had filed them.
He admits having done so unequivocally:
“Thus, the undersigned counsel filed injunction cases in Civil
Case No. 83-19018 and Civil Case No. 39294, Regional Trial Courts of
Manila and Quezon City. * *”[31]
7. REACTIVATION
OF CIVIL CASE NO. Q-36485, RTC, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XXXV
Upon the dismissal of Civil Case No. 39294, Syjuco
once more resumed its efforts to effect the mortgage sale which had already
been stymied for more than fifteen (15) years.
At its instance, the sheriff once again set a date for the auction
sale. But on the date of the sale, a letter of Atty. Canlas
was handed to the sheriff drawing attention to the permanent injunction of the
sale embodied in the judgment by default rendered by Judge Castro in Civil Case No. Q-36485.[32]
Syjuco lost no time in inquiring about Civil Case No.
Q-36485, and was very quickly made aware of the judgment by default therein
promulgated and the antecedent events leading thereto. It was also made known that on July 9, 1984,
Judge Castro had ordered execution of the judgment; that Judge Castro had on
July 16, 1984 granted Atty. Canlas‘ motion to declare
cancelled the titles to the Lims‘ mortgaged
properties and as null and void the annotation of the mortgage and its
amendments on said titles, and to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to
issue new titles, in lieu of the old, in the name of the partnership,
“Heirs of Hugo Lim.”[33]
On July 17, 1984,
Syjuco filed in said Civil Case No. Q-36485 a motion
for reconsideration of the decision and for dismissal of the action, alleging
that it had never been served with summons; that granting arguendo
that service had somehow been made, it had never received notice of the
decision and therefore the same had not and could not have become final; and that the action should be dismissed on
the ground of bar by prior judgment premised on the final decisions of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-45752 and G.R. No. 56014.
Two other motions by Syjuco quickly
followed. The first, dated July 20, 1984, prayed for abatement
of Judge Castro’s order decreeing the issuance of new certificates of title
over the mortgaged lands in the name of the plaintiff partnership.[34]
The second, filed on July 24, 1984, was a supplement to the motion to dismiss
earlier filed, asserting another ground for the dismissal of the action, i.e.,
failure to state a cause of action, it appearing that the mortgaged property
remained registered in the names of the individual members of the Lim family
notwithstanding that the property had supposedly been conveyed to the plaintiff
partnership long before the execution of the mortgage and its amendments, and
that even assuming ownership of the property by the partnership, the mortgage
executed by all the partners was valid and binding under Articles 1811 and 1819
of the Civil Code.[35]
The motions having been opposed in due course by the plaintiff
partnership, they remained pending until January 31, 1985 when Syjuco
moved for their immediate resolution. Syjuco now claims that judge Castro never acted on the
motions. The latter however states that
that he did issue an order on February
22, 1985 declaring that he had lost jurisdiction to act thereon
because, petitio principii,
his decision had already become final and executory.
8. G.R. L-70403; THE PROCEEDING AT BAR
For the third time Syjuco
is now before this Court on the same matter.
It filed on April 3, 1985
the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. It prays in its petition that the default
judgment rendered against it by Judge Castro in said Civil Case No. Q-36485 be
annulled on the ground of lack of
service of summons, res judicata and laches, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action; that the sheriff be
commanded to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage on the property
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Numbered 75413, 75415, 75416 and 75418 of the Manila
Registry; and that the respondents — the Lims, Judge
Castro, the Sheriff and the Register of Deeds of Manila, the partnership known
as “Heirs of Hugo Lim,” and Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, counsel for the Lims and
their partnership — be perpetually
enjoined from taking any further steps to prevent the foreclosure.
The comment filed for the respondents by Atty. Canlas in substance alleged that (a) Syjuco was validly served with summons in Civil Case No. Q-36485,
hence, that the decision rendered by default therein was also valid and, having
been also duly served on said petitioner, became final by operation of law
after the lapse of the reglementary appeal period;
(b) finality of said decision removed the case from the jurisdiction of the
trial court, which was powerless to entertain and act on the motion for
reconsideration and motion to dismiss; (c) the petition was in effect an action
to annul a judgment, a proceeding within the original jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals; (d) the plea of res
judicata came too late because raised after
the decision had already become final; moreover, no identity of parties existed
between the cases invoked, on the one hand,
and Civil Case No. Q-36485, on the other, the parties in the former being the Lims in their personal capacities and in the latter, the
Lim partnership, a separate and distinct juridical entity; and the pleaded
causes of action being different, usury in the earlier cases and authority of the partners to encumber partnership
property in the case under review; (e) the plea of laches
also came too late, not having been invoked in the lower court; and (f) the
property involved constituted assets of the Lim partnership, being registered
as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission.[36]
On his own behalf Atty. Canlas
submitted that he had no knowledge of the institution of Civil Case No. Q-36485
(though he admitted being collaborating counsel in said case); that he did not
represent the Lims in all their cases against Syjuco, having
been counsel for the former only since 1977, not for the last seventeen years
as claimed by Syjuco; and that he had no duty to
inform opposing counsel of the pendency of Civil Case
No. Q-36485.[37]
Respondent Judge Castro also filed a comment[38]
disclaiming knowledge of previous controversies regarding the mortgaged
property. He asserted that Syjuco had been properly declared in default for having failed to answer the complaint
despite service of summons upon it, and that his decision in said case which
was also properly served on Syjuco became final when
it was not timely appealed, after which he lost jurisdiction to entertain the
motion for reconsideration and motion to dismiss. He also denied having failed to act on said
motions, adverting to an alleged order of February 22, 1985 where he declared his lack of
jurisdiction to act thereon.
The respondent Register of Deeds for his part presented a comment
wherein he stated that by virtue of an order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-36485, he had cancelled TCT’s
Nos. 75413, 75415, 75416 and 75418 of his Registry and prepared new
certificates of title in lieu thereof, but that cancellation had been held in
abeyance for lack of certain registration requirements and by reason also of
the motion of Syjuco’s Atty. Formoso
to hold in abeyance enforcement
of the trial court’s order of July 16, 1984 as well as of the temporary
restraining order subsequently issued by the Court.[39]
It is time to write finis to this unedifying narrative
which is notable chiefly for the deception, deviousness and trickery which have
marked the private respondents’ thus far successful attempts to avoid the
payment of a just obligation. The record
of the present proceeding and the other records already referred to, which the
Court has examined at length, make it clear
that the dispute should have been laid to rest more than eleven years ago, with
entry of judgment of this Court (on September 24, 1977) in G. R. No. L-45752
sealing the fate of the Lim’s appeal against the amended decision in Civil Case
No. 75180 where they had originally questioned
the validity of the mortgage and its foreclosure. That result, the records also show, had
itself been nine (9) years in coming, Civil Case No. 75180 having been
instituted in December 1968 and,
after trial and judgment, gone
through the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 00242-R) and this Court (in G.R.
No. 34683), both at the instance
of the Lims, on the question of reopening before
the amended decision could be issued.
Unwilling, however, to concede defeat, the Lims
moved (in Civil Case No. 75180)
to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground of lack of republication. On December 19, 1977 they obtained a
restraining order in said case, but this notwithstanding, on the very same date
they filed another action (Civil Case No. 117262) in a different branch of the
same Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the foreclosure sale on the
same ground of alleged lack of republication.
At about this time, Syjuco republished the
notice of sale in order, as it was later to manifest, to end all further
dispute.
That move met with no success.
The Lims managed to persuade the judge in
Civil Case No. 75180, notwithstanding his conviction that the amended decision
in said case had already become final, not only to halt the foreclosure sale
but also to authorize said respondents to dispose of the mortgaged property at
a private sale upon posting a bond of P6,000,000.00 (later increased by
P3,000,000.00) to guarantee payment of Syjuco’s
mortgage credit. This gave the Lims a convenient excuse for further suspension of the
foreclosure sale by introducing a new wrinkle into their contentions — that
the bond superseded the mortgage which should, they claimed, therefore be
discharged instead of foreclosed.
Thus from the final months of 1977 until the end of 1980, a
period of three years, Syjuco found itself fighting a
legal battle on two fronts: in the already finally decided Civil
Case No. 75180 and in Civil Case No. 117262, upon the single issue of alleged
lack of republication, an issue already mooted by the Lims‘
earlier waiver of republication as a condition for the issuance of the original
restraining order of December 26, 1968 in Civil Case No. 75180, not to mention
the fact that said petitioner had also tried to put an end to it by actually republishing
the notice of sale.
With the advent of 1981, its pleas for early resolution having
apparently fallen on deaf ears, Syjuco went to this
Court (in G. R. No. L-56014) from which, on September 21, 1982, it obtained the decision already referred
to holding, in fine, that there existed no further impediment to the
foreclosure sale and that the
Sheriff could proceed with the same.
Said decision, instead of deterring further attempts to derail
the foreclosure, apparently gave the signal for the clandestine filing — this
time by the Partnership of the Heirs of Hugo Lim — on October 14, 1982 of Civil Case No. Q-36485, the
subject of the present petition, which for
the first time asserted the claim that the mortgaged property had
been contributed to the plaintiff partnership long before the execution of the Syjuco’s mortgage in order to defeat the foreclosure.
Syjuco now maintains that it had no
actual knowledge of the existence and pendency of
Civil Case No. Q-36485 until confronted, in the manner already adverted to,
with the fait accompli’ of a “final” judgment with
permanent injunction therein, and nothing in the record disabuses the Court
about the truth of this disclaimer.
Indeed, considering what had transpired up to that denouement, it
becomes quite evident that actuations of the Lims and
their lawyer had been geared to keeping Syjuco in the
dark about said case. Their filing of
two other cases also seeking to enjoin the foreclosure sale (Civil Case No.
83-19018, Regional Trial Court of Manila in July 1983, and Civil Case No.
Q-32924, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
September of the same year) after said sale had already been permanently
enjoined by default judgment in Civil Case No. Q-36485, appears in
retrospect to be nothing but a brace of feints calculated to keep Syjuco in that state of ignorance and to lull any
apprehensions it may have harbored about encountering further surprises from
any other quarter.
Further credence is lent to this appraisal by the unusually rapid
movement of Civil Case No. Q-36485 itself in its earlier stages, which saw the
motion to declare Syjuco in default filed, an order
of default issued, evidence ex parte
for the plaintiffs received and judgment by default rendered, all the brief
span of twelve days, February 10-22, 1983. Notice of said judgment was
“served” on February 23, 1983, the day after it was handed down, only
to be followed by an unaccountable lull of well over a year before it was ordered executed on July 9, 1984
— unaccountable, considering that previous flurry of activity, except in the
context of a plan to rush the case to judgment and then divert Syjuco’s attention to the Lims‘
moves in other directions so as to prevent discovery of the existence of the case until it was too late.
The Court cannot but condemn
in the strongest terms this trifling with the judicial process which degrades
the administration of justice, mocks, subverts and misuses that process for
purely dilatory purposes, thus tending to bring it into disrepute, and seriously
erodes public confidence in the will and competence of the courts to dispense
swift justice.
Upon the facts, the only defense to the foreclosure that could
possibly have merited the full-blown trial and appeal proceedings it actually
went through was that of alleged
usury pleaded in Civil Case No. 75180 and finally decided against the
respondent Lims in G.R. No. L-45752 in September
1977. The other issues of failure to
republish and discharge of mortgage by guarantee set up in succeeding actions
were sham issues, questions without substance only raised for purposes of delay
by the private respondents, in which they
succeeded only too well. The claim urged
in this latest case: that the mortgaged property had been contributed to the
respondent partnership and was already property of said partnership when the individual Lims
unauthorizedly mortgaged it to Syjuco, is of no better stripe, and this, too, is clear from the
undisputed facts and the legal conclusions
to be drawn therefrom.
The record shows that the respondent
partnership is composed exclusively
of the individual Lims in whose name all the cases
herein referred to, with the sole exception of Civil Case No. Q-36485, were brought and
prosecuted, their contribution to the partnership consisting chiefly, if not
solely, of the property subject of the Syjuco
mortgage. It is also a fact that despite
its having been contributed to the partnership, allegedly on March 30, 1959, the property was
never registered with the Register of Deeds in the name of the partnership, but
to this date remains registered in the
names of the Lims as owners in common. The original
mortgage deed of November 14, 1964
was executed by the Lims as such owners, as were all
subsequent amendments of the mortgage.
There can be no dispute that in those circumstances, the respondent
partnership was chargeable with knowledge of the mortgage from the moment of
its execution. The legal fiction of a
separate juridical personality and existence will not shield it from the
conclusion of having such knowledge which naturally and irresistibly flows from
the undenied facts.
It would violate all precepts of reason, ordinary experience and common
sense to propose that a partnership, as such, cannot be held accountable with
knowledge of matters commonly known to all the partners or of acts in which all
of the latter, without exception, have taken part, where such matters or acts
affect property claimed as its own by said partnership.
If, therefore, the respondent partnership was inescapably chargeable
with knowledge of the mortgage executed by all the partners thereof, its
silence and failure to impugn said mortgage within a reasonable time, let alone
a space of more than seventeen years, brought into play the doctrine of estoppel to preclude any attempt to avoid the mortgage as allegedly unauthorized.
The principles of equitable estoppel,
sometimes called estoppel in pais, are made part of our law by Art. 1432 of the Civil Code. Coming under this class is estoppel by silence, which obtains here and as to which it has been held that:
“* * * an estoppel may arise from
silence as well as from words. ‘Estoppel by silence’ arises where a person, who by force of
circumstances is under a duty to another to speak, refrains from doing so and
thereby leads the other to believe in the existence of a state of facts in
reliance on which he acts to his prejudice.
Silence may support an estoppel whether the
failure to speak is intentional or negligent.
“Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a
misrepresentation and concealment of the facts, so as to raise an equitable estoppel. When the
silence is of such a character and under circumstances that it would become a
fraud on the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what
his silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an estoppel. This
doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in
conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in
conscience he ought to remain silent. He
who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he
should be silent.”[40]
And more to the point:
“A property owner who knowingly permits another to sell or
encumber the property, without disclosing
his title or objecting to the transaction, is estopped
to set up his title or interest as against a person who
has been thereby misled to his injury.
* * *
“An owner of real property who stands by and sees a third
person selling or mortgaging it under claim of title without asserting his own
title or giving the purchaser or mortgagee any notice thereof is estopped, as against such purchaser or mortgagee, afterward
to assert his title; and, although title does not pass under these
circumstances, a conveyance will be decreed by a court of equity. Especially is the rule applicable where the
party against whom the estoppel is claimed, in
addition to standing by, takes part in making the sale or mortgage.”[41]
“More specificatly, the concept to
which that species of estoppel which results from the
nondisclosure of an estate or interest in real property has ordinarily been
referred is fraud, actual or constructive. * * * Although fraud is not an
essential element of the original conduct working the estoppel,
it may with perfect propriety be
said that it would be fraudulent for the
party to repudiate his conduct, and to assert a right or claim in contravention
thereof.”[42]
Equally or even more preclusive of the
respondent partnership’s claim to the mortgaged property is the last paragraph
of Article 1819 of the Civil Code, which contemplates
a situation duplicating the circumstances that attended the execution of
the mortgage in favor of Syjuco and therefore applies
foursquare thereto:
“Where the title to real property is in the names of all the
partners a conveyance executed by
all the partners passes all their rights in such property.”
The term “conveyance” used in said provision, which is
taken from Section 10 of the American Uniform Partnership Act, includes a
mortgage.
“Interpreting Sec. 10
of the Uniform Partnership Act, it has been held that the right to mortgage is
included in the right to convey. This is
different from the rule in agency that a special power to sell excludes the
power to mortgage (Art. 1879).”[43]
As indisputable as the propositions and principles just stated is
that the cause of action in Civil Case No.
Q-36485 is barred by prior judgment.
The right subsumed in that cause is the negation of the mortgage,
postulated on the claim that the parcels of land mortgaged by the Lims to Syjuco did
not in truth belong to them but to the partnership. Assuming this to be so, the right could have
been asserted at the time that the Lims instituted
their first action on December 24, 1968 in the Manila Court of First Instance,
Civil Case No. 75180, or when they filed their subsequent actions: Civil Case No. 112762, on December 19, 1977;
Civil Case No. 83-19018, in 1983, and Civil Case No. Q-39294, also in
1983. The claim could have been set up by the Lims, as
members composing the partnership, “Heirs of Hugo Lim.” It could very
well have been put forth by the partnership itself, as co-plaintiff in the
corresponding complaints, considering that the actions involved property
supposedly belonging to it and were being prosecuted by the entire membership
of the partnership, and therefore, the partnership was in actuality, the real
party in interest. In fact, consistently
with the Lims‘ theory, they should be regarded, in
all the actions presented by them, as having sued for vindication, not of their
individual rights over the property mortgaged, but those of the
partnership. There is thus no reason to
distinguish between the Lims, as individuals, and the
partnership itself, since the former constituted the entire membership of the
latter. In other words, despite the
concealment of the existence of the partnership, for all intents and purposes
and consistently with the Lims‘ own theory, it was
that partnership which was the real party in interest in all the actions; it
was actually represented in said actions by all the individual members thereof,
and consequently, those members’ acts, declaration and omissions cannot be
deemed to be simply the individual acts of said members, but in fact and in
law, those of the partnership.
What was done by the Lims — or by the
partnership of which they were the only members — was to split their cause of
action in violation of the well known rule that only one suit may be instituted for a single
cause of action.[44]
The right sought to be enforced by them in all their actions was, at bottom, to
strike down the mortgage constituted in favor
of Syjuco, a right which, in their view, resulted
from several circumstances, namely that the mortgage was constituted over
property belonging to the partnership without the latter’s authority; that the
principal obligation thereby secured was usurious; that the publication of the
notice of foreclosure sale was fatally defective, circumstances which had
already taken place at the time of the institution of the actions. They instituted four (4) actions for the same
purpose on one ground or the other, making each ground the subject of a
separate action. Upon these premises,
application of the sanction indicated by law is called for, i.e., the judgment
on the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others.[45]
The first judgment — rendered in Civil Case No. 75180 and
affirmed by both the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 51752) and this Court (G.R.
No. L-45752) should therefore have barred all the others, all the requisites of
res judicata
being present. The judgment was a final and executory
judgment; it had been rendered by a competent court; and there was, between the
first and subsequent cases, not only identity of subject-matter and of cause of
action, but also of parties. As already
pointed out, the plaintiffs in the first four (4) actions, the Lims, were representing exactly the same claims as those of
the partnership, the plaintiff in the fifth and last action, of which
partnership they were the only members, and there was hence no susbstantial difference as regards the parties plaintiff in
all the actions. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the
judgment in the first was and
should have been regarded as conclusive in all other actions not only
“with respect to the matter
directly adjudged,” but also “as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto.”[46]
It being indisputable that the
matter of the partnership’s being the owner of the mortgaged properties
“could have been raised in relation” to those expressly made issuable in the first action, it follows that that matter
could not be re-litigated in the last action, the fifth.
Though confronted with the facts thus precluding the respondent
partnership’s claim to the property under both the principle of estoppel and the provisions of Article 1819, last
paragraph, of the Civil Code, as well as the familiar doctrine of res judicata, the respondent Judge refused to act
on Syjuco’s
motions on the ground that he no longer had jurisdiction to do so because they
were filed after judgment by default against Syjuco, which failed to answer the complaint despite valid service of
summons, had been rendered and become final.
The sheriff’s return, however, creates grave doubts about the
correctness of the Judge’s basic premise that summons had been validly served on Syjuco. For one thing, the return[47]
is unspecific about where service was effected.
No safe conclusion about
the place of service can be made from its reference to a former and a present
office of Syjuco in widely separate locations, with
nothing to indicate whether service was effected at one address or the other,
or even at both. A more serious defect
is the failure to name the person served who is, with equal ambiguity,
identified only as “the Manager” of the defendant corporation (petitioner
herein). Since the sheriff’s return
constitutes primary evidence of the manner and incidents of personal service of
a summons, the Rules are quite specific about what such a document should
contain:
“SEC. 20. Proof of service. — The proof of service of a summons
shall be made in writing by the server and shall set forth the manner, place
and date of service; shall specify any papers which have been served with the process and the name of the
person who received the same; and shall be sworn to when made by a person
other than a sheriff or his deputy.”[48]
In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing[49]
it was held that:
“(a) strict
compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the
court over a corporation. The officer
upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise
the service is insufficient. So, where
the statute requires that in the case of a domestic corporation summons should
be served on ‘the president or head of the corporation, secretary, treasurer,
cashier or managing agent thereof’, service of summons on the secretary’s wife
did not confer jurisdiction over the corporation in the foreclosure proceeding
against it. Hence, the decree of
foreclosure and the deficienty judgment were void and
should be vacated (Reader vs. District Court, 94 Pacific 2nd 858).
“The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation
will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that
the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation
that such person will know what to
do with legal papers served on him. In
other words, ‘to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the
action’. (35 A C.J.S. 288 citing Jenkins
vs. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 48 F. Supp. 848; MacCarthy vs. Langston,
D.C. Fla.,
23 F.R.D. 249).
“The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as
a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons
should be served on domestic corporation (U. S.
vs. Mollenhauer Laboratories, Inc., 267 Fed. Rep. 2nd
260).”
The rule cannot be any less exacting as regards adherence to the
requirements of proof of service, it being usually by such proof that
sufficiency of compliance with the prescribed mode of service is measured. Here the only proof of service summons is the
questioned sheriff’s return which, as already pointed out, is not only vague
and unspecific as to the place
of service, but also neglects to identify by name the recipient of the summons
as required by Rule 20, Section 14, of the Rules of Court. Where the sheriff’s return is defective the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions will not lie.[50] The defective sheriff’s return thus
being insufficient and incompetent to prove that summons was served in the
manner prescribed for service upon corporations, there is no alternative to affirming
the petitioner’s claim that it had not been validly summoned in Civil Case No.
Q-36485. It goes without saying that
lacking such valid service, the Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petitioner Syjuco, rendering null and void all
subsequent proceedings and issuances in the action from the order of default up
to and including the judgment by default and the order for its execution.[51]
The respondents’ contention that the petition is in effect an
action to annul a judgment which is within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals[52]
has already been answered in Matanquihan
vs. Tengco[53]
where, by declaring that an action for annulment of judgment is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
this Court in effect affirmed that certiorari is an appropriate
remedy against judgments or proceedings alleged to have been rendered or had
without valid service of summons.[54]
Respondent Judge Castro begged the question when, instead of
resolving on the merits the issue of the invalidity
of his default judgment and of the proceedings leading thereto because
of absence of valid service of summons on the defendant, which had been
expressly raised in the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, he simply
refused to do so on the excuse that he had lost jurisdiction over the
case. This refusal was, in the premises,
a grave abuse of judicial discretion which must be rectified.
What has been said makes unnecessary any further proceedings in
the Court below, which might otherwise be indicated by the consideration that
two of the postulates of petitioner’s unresolved motions which the Court
considers equally as decisive as res judicata, to wit:
estoppel by silence and Article 1819, last
paragraph, of the Civil Code, do not constitute grounds for a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Such a step would only cause further delay. And delay has been the bane of petitioner’s
cause, defying through all these years all its efforts to collect on a just
debt.
The undenied
and undisputable facts make it perfectly clear that the claim to the mortgaged
property belatedly and in apparent bad faith pressed by the respondent
partnership is foreclosed by both law and equity. Further proceedings will not make this any clearer
than it already is. The Court is clothed
with ample authority, in such a case, to call a halt to all further proceedings
and pronounce judgment on the basis of what is already manifestly of record.
So much for the merits; the consequences that should attend the
inexcusable and indefensible conduct of the respondents Lims,
the respondent partnership and their counsel, Atty. Paterno
R. Canlas, should now be addressed. That the Lims and
their partnership acted in bad faith and with intent to defraud is manifest in
the record of their actuations, presenting as they did, piecemeal and in one
case after another, defenses to the foreclosure or claims in derogation thereof
that were available to them from the very beginning — actuations that were to
stave off the liquidation of an undenied debt for
more than twenty years and culminated in the clandestine filing and prosecution
of the action subject of the present petition.
What has happened here, it bears repeating, is nothing less than
an abuse of process, a trifling with the courts and with the rights of access
thereto, for which Atty. Canlas must share
responsibility equally with his clients.
The latter could not have succeeded so well in obstructing the course of
justice without his aid and advice and his tireless espousal of their claims
and pretensions made in the various cases chronicled here. That the cause to which he lent his advocacy
was less than just or worthy could not have escaped him, if not at the start of
his engagement, in the years that followed when with his willing assistance, if not instigation, it was shuttled
from one forum to another after
each setback. This Court merely stated
what is obvious and cannot be gainsaid when, in Surigao
Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel[55]
it held that a party’s lawyer of record has control of the proceedings and that
“(w)hatever steps his client takes should be
within his knowledge and responsibility.”
In Prudential Bank vs. Castro,[56]
strikingly similar actuations in a case, which are described in the following paragraph taken from
this Court’s decision therein:
“Respondents’
foregoing actuations reveal an ‘unholy alliance’ between them and a clear indication of partiality for the party
represented by the other to the detriment of the objective dispensation of
justice. Writs of Attachment and
Execution were issued and implemented with lightning speed; the case itself was
railroaded to a swift conclusion through a similar judgment; astronomical sums
were awarded as damages and attorney’s fees; and topping it all, the right to
appeal was foreclosed by clever maneuvers,”
and which, the Court found, followed a pattern of conduct in other cases of which judicial notice
was taken, were deemed sufficient cause for disbarment.
Atty. Canlas even tried to mislead this
Court by claiming that he became the Lims‘ lawyer
only in 1977,[57]
when the record indubitably shows that he has represented them since September 9, 1972 when he first
appeared for them to prosecute their appeal in Civil Case No. 75180.[58]
He has also quite impenitently disclaimed a duty to inform opposing counsel in
Civil Case No. Q-39294 of the existence of Civil Case No. Q-36485 as
plaintiffs’ counsel in both actions, even while the former, which involved the
same mortgage, was already being litigated when the latter was filed, although
in the circumstances such disclosure was required by the ethics of his
profession, if not indeed by his lawyer’s oath.
A clear case also exists for awarding at least nominal damages to
petitioner, though damages are not expressly prayed for, under the general
prayer of the petition for “such
other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the
premises,” and the action being not only of certiorari and
prohibition, but also of mandamus — in which the payment of
“damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant” is expressly authorized.[59]
There is no question in the Court’s mind that such interests as
may have accumulated on the mortgage loan will not offset the prejudice visited
upon the petitioner by the excruciatingly long delay in the satisfaction of
said debt that the private respondents have engineered and fomented.
These very same considerations dictate the imposition of
exemplary damages in accordance with Art. 2229 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, so that complete justice may be dispensed here
and, as far as consistent with that end, all the matters and incidents with
which these proceedings are concerned may be brought to a swift conclusion:
(1) the assailed judgment by default in Civil
Case No. Q-36485, the writ of execution and all other orders issued in
implementation thereof, and all proceedings in the case leading to said
judgment after the filing of the complaint are DECLARED null and void and are
hereby SET ASIDE; and the complaint in said
case is DISMISSED for being barred by prior judgment and estoppel,
and for lack of merit;
(2) the City Sheriff of Manila is ORDERED, upon
receipt of this Decision, to schedule forthwith and thereafter conduct with all
due dispatch the sale at public auction of the mortgaged property in question
for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt of the respondents Lims to petitioner, in the principal amount of
P2,460,000.00 as found in the amended decision in Civil Case No. 75180 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, interests thereon at the rate of twelve
(12%) percent per annum from November 8, 1967 until the date of sale, plus such
other and additional sums for commissions, expenses, fees, etc. as may be
lawfully chargeable in extrajudicial foreclosure and sale proceedings;
(3) the private respondents, their successors and
assigns, are PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from taking any action whatsoever to
obstruct, delay or prevent said auction sale;
(4) the private respondents (the Lims, the Partnership of the Heirs of Hugo Lim and Paterno R. Canlas) are sentenced,
jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner P25,000.00 as nominal damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as treble costs; and
(5) let this matter be referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report, and recommendation insofar as the conduct of Atty. Canlas as counsel in
this case and in the other cases hereinabove referred to is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 75180, pp. 3-4, 10, 35; Rollo,
G.R. No. 45752, p. 197
[2]
Civil Cases Numbered 75180 (CFI, Manila),
112762 (CFI, Manila), 83-19018
(RTC, Manila), Q-32924 (RTC,
QC), and Q-36485 (RTC,
QC)
[3]
CA-G.R. No. 00242-R; CA-G.R. No. 51752
[4]
G.R. No. L-34683; G.R. No. L-45752; G.R. No. L-56014
[5]
Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 75180, pp. 1-13, 32, 33; Rollo
G.R. No. L-45752, p. 197
[6]
Later Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Ombudsman
[7]
Rollo, G.R. No. L-45752, pp. 316-338
[8]
Rollo, G.R. No. L-45752, pp. 211-214
[9]
Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 75180, pp. 683-737; Rollo,
G.R. No. L-45752, p. 197
[10]
Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 75180, pp. 737-740; Rollo,
G.R. No. L-45752, p. 197
[11]
Rollo, G.R. No. L-45752, p. 198
[12]
Id., pp. 105-134
[13] Id.,
at pp. 244 et seq.
[14]
Branch 9, presided over by Hon. Manuel Reyes, later Associate Justice, C.A.
[15]
SEE footnote 5 at p. 3, supra
[16]
Rollo, G.R. No. L-56014, p. 5
[17]
Referred to in the later Order of February 19, 1979 in Civil Case No. 75180; Rollo, G.R. No. 56014, p. 27
[18]
His Honor was made aware of Civil Case No. 112762 when the Lims
filed a motion for the consolidation of that case with Civil Case No. 75180
[19]
Rollo, G.R. No. 56014, p. 27 (Order, Feb. 19, 1979, supra;
p. 28 (Order March 6, 1979)
[20]
Id., pp. 103-106
(Order, Aug. 10, 1979); pp. 151-152 (Orders, Nov. 26, 1979 and Jan. 28, 1980)
[21]
Id., pp. 89-93, 94-97
[22]
Second Division, per Barredo, J.
[23]
Rollo, G.R. No. 56014, pp. 415-423
[24]
Id., pp. 424-442
[25]
Id., pp. 498-500
[26]
Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, p. 65
[27]
Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, pp. 66-68 (Annex E,
Petition)
[28]
Id., p. 69
[29]
Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, p. 222
[30]
Id. p. 223
[31]
His comment dated June 7, 1985;
Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, p. 226
[32]
Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, p. 9
[33]
Rollo, G.R.
No. 70403, pp. 191-194
[34]
Id., pp. 83-85
[35]
Id., pp. 86-93
[36]
Rollo, G.R. No. L-70403, pp. 221-250
[37]
Id., at pp. 223, 225, 227
[38]
Id., pp. 265-271
[39]
Rollo, G.R. No. L-70403, pp. 171-172
[40]
31 C.J.S. pp. 490-494
[41]
Id., pp. 498-499
[42]
28 Am.Jur. 2d pp. 727
[43] Padilla, Civil Code, 1987 ed., Vol.
VI, p. 153; see also Tolentino, Civil Code, 1959 ed.,
Vol. V, p. 303, citing Bosler vs. Sealfon, 82 Pa. Sup.
Ct., 254
[44]
Sec. 3, Rule 2, Rules of Court
[45]
Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court
[46]
Sec. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court, which provides that the effect of a judgment
rendered by a court having jurisdiction is, in proceedings other than those in rem, “with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity.”
[47]
SEE footnote 26 at p. 12, supra
[48]
Rule 14, Rules of Court (underscoring supplied)
[49]
70 SCRA 598, 602-603
[50]
Venturanza vs. CA, 156 SCRA 305, 313
[51]
I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., p. 435, citing Salmon, et
al. vs. Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556, Echevarria vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 51 Phil. 980,
and Reyes vs. Paz, 60 Phil. 440; see also Keister
vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209, citing Pantaleon
vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761, Gov’t. vs. Bator, 69 Phil. 130, Caneda vs.
CA, 116 Phil. 283, and Trimica, Inc. vs. Polaris Marketing Corp., 60 SCRA 321,325; I Francisco’s
Revised Rules of Court, 2nd ed., p. 761
[52]
Sec. 9 (2) B.P. 129, The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
[53]
95 SCRA 478, 485
[54]
See also the following cases where the Court took cognizance of, and resolved,
similar petitions without regard to the question of whether or not an action
for annulment was the appropriate recourse:
Ang. vs. Navarro, 81 SCRA 458; Olar vs. Cuna, 90 SCRA 114
Cavili vs. Vamenta,
Jr., 114 SCRA 343; and Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. vs.
IAC, 149 SCRA 193
[55] 31 SCRA 1, 23
[56]
155 SCRA 604, 621
[57]
Rollo, G.R. No. L-70403, p. 225
[58]
SEE footnote 10 on p. 5, supra
[59]
Rule
65, Sec. 3, Rules of Court