PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TEOFISTA BRAGAT VDA. DE CABANGAHAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Teofista Bragat
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
del Norte^[1]
of the felony of parricide for having killed her husband, Zacarias
Cabangahan, on April 8, 1978, and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to suffer as well the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. 
Teofista and Zacarias
were married on November 25, 1950
before a Catholic priest in Malingao, Tubod, Lanao del Norte.^[2]
The conviction was grounded on circumstantial evidence, there being no
eye-witnesses to the killing.

It appears that on April
8, 1978, at about midnight,
Titing Manoop, a neighbor
of the spouses Zacarias Cabangahan
and Teofista Bragat at Barangay Candis, Municipality
of Tubod,
Lanao del Norte, went to the residence of Pat. Corsino Vicoy of the Integrated
National Police of Tubod, roused him from sleep, and
asked him to investigate a killing which had taken place at Barangay
Candis.

Before proceeding to Candis, however,
Pat. Vicoy first went to the Municipal Hall of Tubod to see if verification could be had of Manoop’s report. 
There he saw Teofista Bragat,
and learned from the guard on duty that she had “surrendered to him.”1
According to Vicoy, he had asked her, “Why are
you here?” and she had “answered that she (had) killed her
husband.”2
Pat. Vicoy then made the following entries in the
police blotter, in his own hand, to wit:3

ENTRY NO.              DATE              TIME

070-78                      04-09-78          0220H              VOLUNTARY

SURRENDRED.

One Teofista Cabangahan
y Bragat, 49 years old, married, farmer and a
resident of Candis, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, voluntarily surrendered in this station
for she allegedly killed her husband, Zacarias Cabangahan, 48 years old, married and a resident of Candis, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. 
Motive is family trouble.

0240H — Pat. Corsino Vicoy,
INP, investigator of Tubod Police Station (left
station) with Dr. Marcelino Robles, PHU, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, left
station and went to the scene of the incident to investigate.

Thereafter Pat. Vicoy went to Barangay Candis to
investigate the crime, in the company of Dr. Marcelino
Robles, the Municipal Health Officer. 
They came upon the lifeless body of Zacarias Cabangahan.  Dr.
Robles’ post-mortem examination of the cadaver which disclosed several
“deep, hacking” wounds in the head, neck and left shoulder.  In the autopsy report he subsequently drew
up,4
Dr. Robles detailed the number and nature of the decedent’s wounds, and set
down the “Cause of Death” as “Shock, due to hemorrhage,
secondary to multiple hacking wound.” Dr. Robles also later declared, on
the witness stand, that the victim’s wounds had been caused by a sharp-edged
instrument, like a bolo, and all the wounds were fatal.5 The
bolo supposedly used in the killing was turned over to Pat. Vicoy by the barrio captain, and later presented in
evidence at Teofista’s trial.6

On his return to the Municipal
Building, Pat. Vicoy
made another entry in the police blotter,7 as follows:

0530H Pat. Corsino
Vicoy arrived station from Candis,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte;
investigated the incident and it was found out that one Zacarias
Cabangahan was already dead.  The said incident was happened at about 12:00 midnight
April 8, 1978.

He asked Teofista,
who by then had been placed in a cell, why she had killed her husband.  Her reply, according to Vicoy,
was that “she can’t bear any more because he was always quarreling with
her.”1
He made no further effort to investigate Teofista
because when he asked his station commander if he should make an investigation
in writing, the latter had said, “never mind.”2

Teofista was in due course charged with
parricide in the Regional Trial Court. 
Upon arraignment she entered a plea of not guilty with the assistance of
counsel de oficio.  The prosecution thereafter presented
evidence, tending to establish the facts narrated in the preceding paragraphs.

In her defense, Teofista’s lawyer
presented two (2) witnesses.  The first
was Vicente Remocaldo.  He testified that he had attended a prayer
meeting in connection with the death of a barangay
resident held at Candis on April 8, 1978 at about 8 o’clock in the evening, that Teofista
was present at the meeting, that snacks were served after the prayers, and the
women started to leave at about 9:30 o’clock
that night.3
Teofista’s second witness was Agripino
Llangoren, who deposed that he knew Teofista and her husband, Zacarias
Cabangahan, because they were his neighbors; that Zacarias was a drunkard and when drunk, always quarreled
with his family; that at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of April 8, 1978, he
had heard loud noises emanating from the Cabangahan
spouses’ residence, followed by complete silence moments later; that at around
10:00 o’clock, when Teofista had returned from a
prayer meeting held at a nearby residence, loud noises had again emanated from
her house; that he had then repaired to the Cabangahans‘
house to find out what was going on; that he was met at the door by Teofista who asked him to bring her to the Municipal
Building of Tubod; and that he had escorted her to
the place and left her there.4 The defense opted not to present
the accused herself as witness, after having been given about a month’s time by
the Trial Judge to consider and come to a decision about the matter.

On November 12, 1984,
the Trial Court promulgated its verdict, finding Teofista
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide, as aforestated,5
and sentencing her accordingly.

Teofista has appealed and before this
Court pleads for reversal of her conviction, contending that the Court a quo
erred in finding her and the victim to have been legally married, and that her
guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

As observed in this opinion’s opening paragraph, there were no
witnesses at all to the killing.  Not one
of the witnesses who gave evidence made any claim to having seen Teofista kill her husband. 
There was no competent proof to establish that the bolo given to
Pat. Vicoy by the barangay
captain was indeed the weapon used in the killing, or that it even belonged to
Teofista.1

Neither was there any proof of the time of the victim’s
death.  In fact, Dr. Robles frankly
acknowledged his inability to make an estimate of that time.2 The
evidence shows that on the day in question, Teofista
was out of the house from about 7:30 o’clock
to 10 o’clock in the evening.  From aught
that appears, the killing could as well have taken place while she was out of
the house as upon her return.

It is true that Teofista had gone to
the Municipal Building
that night, having been escorted there at her request by her neighbor, Llangoren.  The
latter had gone to her home because he had heard loud noises coming from the
place.  Pat. Vicoy
had first seen her there, at the police station, and learned from the guard
that she had come to give herself up, in other words, to turn herself over to
the custody of the police.  It was under
these circumstances, after Vicoy had been asked to
investigate a killing and Teofista had placed herself
in police custody — in fact she was afterwards detained in a cell — that as
testified to by Pat. Vicoy, she had twice admitted
killing her husband:  first, to explain
her appearance at the police station, and later that same night, upon his
return from his investigation at the scene of the crime, when she also
disclosed the motive for the deed, that she could no longer endure her spouse’s
constant quarrelling with her.3

True, Vicoy declared on direct
questioning that it was he who had elicited both admissions from Teofista.  But to all
intents and purposes he recanted that testimony at least as to the first
alleged admission, when under cross-examination, he had had to admit otherwise
and that he was only informed about it by the jail guard;4

“Q   In
your direct examination, you said that you were in your house past midnight when somebody came to you on April 7, 1978?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    That
is the only time you knew about this case when you reached the police station?

WITNESS:

After that time.

Q 
  And it was when you arrived at
the police station that you knew the accused was already there?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    The
entries that you made mentioned Exhibit C-1 you actually have no knowledge of
the contents?

A     I
have because I was informed by the guard.

Q    Your
knowledge is thru information?

A     Yes, sir.

Q    So, all the things that you wrote is what
the guard told you?

A     Yes sir.

Q    So that, what you wrote in that entries is
not with your own knowledge but from
other sources?

A     The other paragraph, sir.

Q.   What paragraph in this entries in Exhibit
C-1?

A     The first paragraph, sir.

Q    What is the other paragraph?

A     I was referring to Exhibit C-1.

Q    This Exhibit C-1?

A     Yes, sir.”

Apart, therefore, from any other consideration bearing on its
admissibility or competence, Vicoy’s testimony as to Teofista’s initial admission must be dismissed as mere
hearsay, said admission not being made to him or in his presence, and of which
he learned only at second hand from the jail guard who, incidentally, was never
presented to testify.  Even, however,
positing the contrary, the fact remains that both alleged admissions of Teofista were made when she was already in police custody
or otherwise deprived of her freedom of action in some significant way.1  In such a case, it was required by the 1973
Constitution (then in force) that any interrogation of her be preceded by the
cautionary advice of her “right to remain silent and to counsel,”2
which, if the record is any indication, was never given.  Consequently, any answers given by her under
questioning were inadmissible in evidence against her and should have been so
treated by the Trial Court.

“If this case were to be decided under the 1935 Constitution,
the trial court’s judgment of conviction could be affirmed.  But we have to decide it under the rule in
the 1973 Constitution as to a confession
obtained while the confessant is under police custody.  And that rule applies squarely to this case (Magtoto vs. Manguera, Simeon vs. Villaluz and People vs. Isnani,
L-37201-02, L-37424 and L-38929, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4.)

“Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that
before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was
informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there
is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his
confession is inadmissible in evidence.”1

It may be stated as a corollary that in view of the peremptory
character of the Constitutional admonition about giving these pre-interrogation
advisories, there must be clear proof that they were given.  The presumption of regular performance of
official duty that might otherwise arise from the making of an admission or
confession to a police office will not suffice in lieu of such proof.

The Trial Court’s view that Teofista’s
declarations may be regarded as part of the res
gestae is incorrect.  It assumes in the first place, that said
declarations — that she had gone to the police station because she had killed
her husband, and she had killed him because his constant quarreling with her
had become unbearable — are hearsay. 
They are not.  They were actually
made to Pat. Vicoy, and actually heard by him.  So that when Pat. Vicoy
subsequently spoke about those statements on the witness stand, he was not
speaking of facts which he had merely learned from others, but of those which
he knew of his own knowledge, derived from his own perception.2 Teofista’s statements may more properly be considered
admissions, declarations of a party as to a relevant fact, which might
otherwise have been given in evidence against her,3
had they not been rendered inadmissible by the failure of Pat. Vicoy himself to observe the cardinal requisites prescribed
by the Constitution for custodial interrogation.

In second place, even if Teofista’s
answers to Pat. Vicoy’s questions be considered
hearsay, they would not in the premises still qualify as part of the res gestae.  To be so admissible, it should appear that Teofista’s answers had been made under the immediate
influence of a startling occurrence,4 in this case, obviously her
husband’s slaying, without time or opportunity to devise or contrive;1
that, as has so often been said in reference to the rule, it is the event
speaking through the witness, not the witness speaking of the event.  Here, however, the circumstances show Teofista to be no longer under shock; some time had already
passed from the startling occurrence to the time that she was questioned by
Pat. Vicoy at the police station; she had had time to
compose herself; indeed, there is nothing in the record to suggest that she was
otherwise than in full possession of her faculties at that time.

The Trial Judge evinced some perplexity as to why Teofista did not take the witness stand.  In His Honor’s view, she might have provided
the answers to some questions left unanswered by the evidence of the
prosecution.  There is, however, no obligation
imposed by law on a defendant in a criminal action to supply gaps in the
prosecution evidence by taking the witness stand himself, even if it should
appear that he is the only one in possession of the relevant information.  It is after all the duty of the prosecution
to furnish the answers to all questions relative to the guilt of the accused in
the form of clear and convincing evidence. 
If it is unable to give acceptable answers to some of those questions,
it cannot look to the accused for them. 
It is the defendant’s right to testify,2 or not to testify at all.3
And if he should choose not to testify, no adverse implication is allowed to be
drawn therefrom. 
Of this the law leaves no doubt. 
The defendant’s “neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him.”4

WHEREFORE, the appellant Teofista
Bragat Vda. de Cabangahan is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and the bail
given for her provisional liberty DISCHARGED, with costs de oficio.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Branch IV at Iligan
City, Hon. Jesus O. lbay, presiding

^[2] Exh. E-1, p. 5, Rec.; TSN, Jan. 23, 1981, pp. 20-22; Rollo,
pp. 47-49

1
TSN, Sept. 3, 1980, p. 38

2
Id., p. 39-43

3
Exhs. C-1, and C-2, respectively, p. 112, Record; a
typewritten certification was afterwards prepared by him under date of August 21, 1978 (Exh.
B) reproducing these entries (Exhs. B-1 and B-2,
respectively), and one (1) other (Exh. B-3), TSN, Sept. 3, 1980, pp. 43 et seq.

4
Exh. A, p. 3, Record

5
TSN, July 18, 1980, pp. 9-13

6
TSN, Sept. 3, 1980, p. 47; Exh. D

7
Exh. C-3; see footnote 5, supra

1 TSN, Sept.
3, 1980, pp. 53-54

2 Id.,
p. 54

3 Rollo, pp. 49-50

4 Id.,
p. 50

5 SEE footnote
2, at p. 1, supra

1 TSN, Sept.
3, 1980, p. 47; Oct. 15,
1980, pp. 65-66

2 TSN, July
18, 1980 pp. 21-22

3 See footnote 5, at p. 2:  Transcript of stenographic notes, Sept. 3, 1980, pp. 53-54, supra.

4 TSN, Oct.
15, 1980, pp. 63-64

1 People vs. Caguioa,
95 SCRA 2, 9, quoting Miranda vs. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
16, L.Ed. 694, 10 ALR, 3d. 974

2 Sec 20, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution

1 People vs.
Duero, 104 SCRA 379, 385-386; People vs. Caguioa, supra; People vs. Taylaran, 108 SCRA
373

2 Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court

3 Sec. 22, Rule 130, Rules of Court

4 Sec. 36,
Rule 130, Rules of Court

1 See Moran, Comments
on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 5, pp. 348-349

2 Sec. 1 (d),
Rule 115, 1964 Rules of Court

3 Sec. 1 (e),
Rule 115, 1964 Rules of Court

4 Sec. 1 (d),
Rule 115, 1964 Rules of Court.  The rule
has been amended by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and now reads,
“His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.

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