A.C. No. 1892. July 07, 1989
ATTY. LUIS V. ARTIAGA, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ENRIQUE C. VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is a motion filed by the respondent seeking a
reconsideration of the decision of this Court dated July 29, 1988 suspending respondent indefinitely
from the practice of law until such time when he can demonstrate that he has
rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume the practice of law. The following grounds are recited:
“I
RESPONDENT DID NOT WITTINGLY OR WILLINGLY
PROMOTE OR SUE IN BEHALF OF HIS POOR AND UNLETTERED CLIENT FOR MONEY OR MALICE
IN THE SUBJECT CIVIL CASES AGAINST A VERY WEALTHY PUBLIC LAND APPLICANT FROM
SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, BUT AFTER BEING CONVINCED IN GOOD FAITH THAT HIS SAID
CLIENT’S CAUSE SEEKING FOR JUSTICE IS LAWFUL, TRUE, JUST AND VALID UNDER THE
FACTS AND EXISTING LAW ON SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY ON GIVING PUBLIC
LAND TO THE LANDLESS AND NOT GROUNDLESS SUITS.
II
RESPONDENT IN GOOD FAITH AND FIDELITY TOOK
UP THE CHALLENGE OF HANDLING OF THE CAUSE OF THE POOR UNLETTERED LANDLESS
CLIENT AS THIS IS HIS DUTY AS DICTATED BY HIS CONSCIENCE AND CONVICTION.
III
RESPONDENT-MOVANT HEREIN HAS ONLY A FEW
MORE MONTHS REMAINING FOR HIM TO SERVE IN THE PROSECUTION ARM OF THIS PRESENT
DISPENSATION. HIS ONLY REMAINING
ASPIRATION AT PRESENT IS TO REDEEM HIS NAME, HONOR AND INTEGRITY AGAINST THESE
CHARGES OF ALLEGED PERJURY AND DELAY OF JUSTICE COMING FROM THE ADVERSE PARTY
COUNSEL BEFORE HIS LIFE ENDS FOR, WITHOUT HONOR IS, FOR HIM, EQUIVALENT TO
UNTIMELY DEATH AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR, AS PROVINCIAL FISCAL AND AS A
CITIZEN.”
In the said decision, the Court found respondent guilty of
unethical practices in: (1) causing his
client to perjure himself; (2) that he lacks candor and respect towards his
adversary and the courts; and (3) that he had been abusive of his right of
recourse to the courts.
On the first charge, the Court found that respondent filed a
verified complaint for ejectment docketed as Civil
Case No. 192 in the Municipal Court of Los Baños,
Laguna wherein it is alleged that in the early part of 1960 defendant
Julian Estolano dispossessed plaintiff Glicerio Aquino of a portion of
the property in question, while in an amended complaint it is alleged that Estolano deprived Aquino of a
portion of said property in the early part of 1973 to enable the
inferior court to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent now argues that he filed the said pleadings in good
faith and that he had no intention to cause his client to commit perjury. He stressed that Aquino
had been a bona fide occupant of the property in question even
before 1958 and that his right was recognized by the Director of Lands in a
decision dated August 13, 1962; that said property is an alienable portion of
public land known as Camp Eldridge at Barangay Bambang, Los Baños, Laguna which
is disposable under Republic Acts No. 274 and 730, with preferential right
expressly given to actual occupants as Aquino; and
that all he did was to exert his utmost and relentless time and effort in
defending the cause of his poor, oppressed and unlettered landless client.
On the second and third charges for lacking candor towards his
adversary and the courts and for abusing his right of recourse to the courts,
respondent asserts that he only did his duty to protect the interests of his
client.
The antecedents are the following:
Respondent filed an ejectment case in
the Municipal Court of Los Baños, Laguna against Estolano on April
13, 1974, docketed as Civil Case No. 192. A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was issued by the trial court on May
21, 1974 restoring Aquino in the
possession of the property upon his filing a bond.
On May 15, 1974, respondent as counsel
of Aquino, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Laguna an action for the annulment of the title of Estolano
docketed as Civil Case No. 179-C. It was
denied on April 26, 1976
for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
In the meanwhile, on June
15, 1974, Estolano filed an action for
recovery of possession of the property against Aquino
also in the CFI of Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 183. This case was resolved in favor of Estolano and was appealed by Aquino
to the Court of Appeals where it is still pending.
On January 5, 1977,
the Municipal Court dismissed Civil Case No. 192 for lack of jurisdiction and
the writ issued was dissolved. Said
judgment was not executed as Aquino appealed to the
CFI. Nevertheless, the appeal was
dismissed. After the judgment had become
final and executory, Estolano
filed an ex parte motion for the
execution of the same. Respondent filed
an opposition stating that he filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI
of Laguna. In deference to the same, the
Municipal Court held in abeyance further action on the Estolano
motion.
On July 1, 1977, respondent filed in behalf of Aquino an action against the Director of Lands and Estolano in the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in San
Pablo, Laguna for a determination of the preferential acquisitive rights and/or
security of tenure of Aquino under Republic Acts No.
274 and 730 and Presidential Decrees No. 27 and 152 and Land Administrative
Order No. 29. The case was docketed as
CAR Case No. 7043. Upon an ex parte motion of respondent, the CAR issued a
restraining order on July 2, 1977 enjoining the Director of Lands and Estolano from enforcing an earlier decision of the Director
of Lands dated May 27, 1964 recognizing the prior right of Estolano
to the questioned property and reversing his decision dated August 13, 1962
awarding to Aquino the preferential right to the
property. However, this case was also
dismissed on May 18, 1979
for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal,
said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 5, 1981.
Respondent argues that in all these cases that he filed in court
his primary interest was to defend what he believes is the lawful cause of his
client Glicerio Aquino. He asserts that he filed the ejectment case inasmuch as Aquino’s
possession and preferential right to the property had been upheld in the
decision of the Director of Lands dated August
13, 1962. Although the
Director of Lands, in a subsequent decision dated May 27, 1964, reversed
himself and sustained the claim of Estolano over the
property, respondent alleges that said decision is null and void on the ground
that the same is against public policy and that it was procured through deceit,
fraud, corruption and undue influence.
He also refers to Resolution No. 9, S-72 dated February 24, 1972 of the Presidential Action
Committee on Justice and Agrarian Reform which in effect set aside said
decision as it ordered a relocation survey of the property to determine once
and for all the conflicting claims of Aquino and Estolano.
Respondent explains that these are the
reasons why he filed the action for annulment of the title of Estolano. He states
that he filed the complaint in the agrarian court also to enforce the right of Aquino as a tenant tilling the land who is given
preferential right to the property under the law. He emphasizes that he did not deceive the CAR
when he sought the issuance of a restraining order against the enforcement of
the decision of the Director of Lands inasmuch as the parties had submitted
their controversy to arbitration by then Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs,[1]
but Estolano reneged on this agreement. Respondent concludes that Estolano
and his counsel are responsible for the protracted litigation.
In March, 1988, an order of execution was issued by the trial
court pending appeal of Civil Case 183-C.
Thus, Aquino was effectively dispossessed of
the property in question.
The filing of this administrative complaint on April 2, 1978, notwithstanding,
respondent went on with his practice of law for several years. Most of his clients were poor/landless and
indigent tenant-farmers from Laguna and Cavite, and from Parañaque, Bayumbong, and Jala-Jala, Rizal.[2]
On January 20, 1987,
he represented the Laguna chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) in the Government/NPC, Laguna Committee on Reconciliation and Ceasefire.[3]
Thereafter, President Aquino appointed him Municipal
Councilor of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.[4]
Upon recommendation of the then Minister of Justice and the
officials and members of the Laguna chapter of the IBP attesting to his
probity, integrity, trustworthiness, exemplary life and character,[5]
President Aquino appointed him Provincial Fiscal of
Laguna[6]
which position he assumed on February 9, 1987.
Upon his suspension from the practice of law by this Court, he took an
indefinite leave of absence effective August
11, 1988.
Respondent points out that except for this administrative case,
no complaint, whether civil or criminal, had ever been filed against him. He also points out that he performed his duty
as government prosecutor with dedication so much so that he received an award
of appreciation from the PC/INP Command of Laguna.[7]
Respondent adds that since 1978, he joined the Cursillo
movement, the Christian charismatic movement and the Christian Family
Movement. It also appears that he is a
YMCA director and life member.[8]
Respondent also contends
that when he handled the case of Glicerio Aquino, his only motivation was to defend him from
oppression and to protect him against a rich landowner, and that he received no
monetary remuneration for his long and dedicated service except some tokens in
the form of vegetable crops as camotes, guavas,
mangos, star apples, etc. He maintains
that all his actuations were predicated on good faith and the honest belief
that they were proper.
After due investigation, the Office of the Solicitor General
recommended a suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law as
penalty. Respondent has been suspended
since August 11, 1988, or
for a period of about ten (10) months to date.
He is due to retire as Provincial Fiscal of Laguna in July, 1989.
A careful reexamination of the records of the case shows that the
acts of respondent may be attributed to his extreme zeal and enthusiasm in
prosecuting the cause of his client.
There is no proof of any dishonest motive or fraud, much less of any
contemptuous act committed by him towards the courts or towards the adverse
party or counsel. While the courses of
action he took tended to delay the disposition of the controversy and were
redundant, his suspension from the practice of law is sufficient disciplinary
action against him. Moreover, there is
proof that the fault cannot be attributed entirely to the respondent. Complainant and his counsel also contributed
to the delay in filing Civil Case No. 183 for recovery of possession, which is
still pending appeal, and in failing to comply with the agreement to settle the
dispute by arbitration. Respondent and
his client Aquino were willing to settle the problem
but Estolano and his counsel did not care to pursue
this course of action which could have terminated the matter once and for all.
The attestations of responsible persons in the public and private
sector as to the integrity and good moral character of respondent show that he
has rehabilitated himself as to deserve another chance to resume the practice
of law.[9]
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED in
that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is hereby
lifted. This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., joins J. Feliciano in his dissenting opinion.
[1]
Annexes K to K-8 of Motion for Reconsideration.
[2]
Annex A, ibid.
[3]
Annex C, ibid.
[4]
Annex D, ibid.
[5]
Annexes E-1 to E-3, ibid.
[6]
Annex E, ibid.
[7]
Annex F, ibid.
[8]
Annex G, ibid.
[9]
Annexes B, C, D, E to E-3, F, G, H to H-4, and I to I-4, ibid.
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DISSENTING OPINION
FELICIANO, J.:
I am compelled to dissent from the majority opinion basically for
the reason that, in my view, the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration
has reversed the unanimous decision of this Court dated July 29, 1988 which
“suspended indefinitely [the respondent] from the practice of law from
date of notice until such time that he can demonstrate to the Court that he has
rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume the practice of law.” This
Court may, of course, reverse itself on a motion for reconsideration where it
finds that indeed it had committed serious error in rendering its original
decision or resolution. However, the
Court must, I respectfully submit, specify the basis which it has found
sufficient for reversing its earlier unanimous decision.
In the instant administrative case, the majority resolution on
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration omits any indication of any adequate
legal or factual basis for reversing itself.
In its original Decision dated July 29, 1988, the Court found respondent Atty. Villanueva
guilty of the following unethical practices with which he had been charged:
“[1] that respondent had caused his client to perjure himself;
[2] that he lacks candor and respect
toward his adversary and the courts; and
[3] that he had been abusive of the right
of recourse to the courts.” (Decision, pp. 5-6)
1. The original decision
found that:
“Anent the first charge, the complaint and amended complaint
for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 192 filed by respondent’s client are clear
proofs that respondent had indeed caused his client Glicerio
Aquino to perjure himself as to the date he lost
possession of the subject property so as to place the case within the
jurisdiction of the court.” (Decision, p. 6; underscoring supplied)
The Court went on to say that:
“Such action of respondent counsel is a clear violation of
his oath that ‘he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court.’ A legal counsel is of course expected to
defend his client’s cause with zeal but not at the disregard of truth. x x x He violated his oath of office when he resorted to deception. x x x Instead of safeguarding the interests of his client as
his responsibility dictates, he did exactly the opposite by causing his
client to commit a felony.” (Decision, pp. 7-8; underscoring supplied)
2. In respect of the second charge against respondent, the Court
in its original decision made the following findings:
“Indeed, the manner in which respondent counsel handled the
forcible entry case filed against the client of complainant shows his total
lack of candor and respect for the courts and the rights of his adversary. He had employed every step necessary to
forestall complainant’s client from taking rightful possession of subject property. He has shown utter disregard of the proper
rules of procedure to suit his purpose.
While he filed his urgent ex-parte
motion for clarification, he chose not to wait for its resolution and instead
perfected his appeal to the Court of First Instance. When finally the decision became executory because of his failure to appeal to the Court of
Appeals, he filed a petition for certiorari against the decision of the
CFI which petition is obviously frivolous and a mere tactic to delay
enforcement of the court’s decision.
In the meantime, the clients of respondent refused to obey the order of
execution.
A lawyer should obey all lawful orders and rulings of the
court. He should have counseled his
clients to submit to the order of the court instead of encouraging them to
resist such order. The actuations of respondent of employing dilatory tactics by filing
a clearly frivolous case amounts to obstruction of the
administration of justice which constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him.
Respondent counsel further demonstrated his questionable motive
by filing another case, this time for annulment of the title of
complainant’s client to the other 2-1/2 hectares of subject land with the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI.
This case was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata and prescription. Respondent appealed this ruling to the Court
of Appeals where it was pending resolution at the time the instant complaint
for disbarment was filed. The decision
of the trial court was affirmed and remanded to the lower court for execution.
Not satisfied with the above-mentioned appeal, respondent
counsel brought another case against complainant’s client this time before the
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR Case No. 7043) for determination allegedly
of who had a better right over the subject property when he was well aware
of the absence of any tenancy relationship between the parties.
An examination of the records shows that respondent did not
disclose before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) prior lawsuits and
decisions rendered relative to the subject land. x x x” (Decision, pp. 9-11; underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
3. In respect of the third charge against him, the findings of the
Court in its original decision were as follows:
“The cause of respondent’s clients is obviously bereft of
merit. Respondent was aware of this fact
so he resorted to forum shopping, continuously seeking the court where
he may possibly obtain favorable judgment, thereby adding to the already clogged
dockets of the courts with the unmeritorious cases he filed. He grossly abused his right of recourse to
the courts by filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause
that had been previously rejected in the false hope of getting some favorable
action, somehow, thus, obstructing the administration of justice. He was derelict in his duty as counsel
to maintain such actions or proceedings only as appears to him to be just,
and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law. He had thus prostituted his
office at the expense of justice.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to certain standards of mental and moral fitness. For a counsel who has been sworn to assist in
the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, respondent has
miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar. Instead of assisting in the speedy
disposition of cases, he made a mockery of our system of justice, thus
deserving to be censured and penalized by this Court. No doubt, respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct in office.” (Decision, pp. 12-13, underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
In its present Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
majority’s findings are as follows:
“A careful re-examination of the records of the case shows
that the acts of respondent may be attributed to his extreme zeal and
enthusiasm in prosecuting the cause of his client. There is no proof of any dishonest motive
or fraud, much less of any contemptuous act committed by him towards
the courts or towards the adverse party or counsel.” (Underscoring
supplied)
I respectfully submit that the above subsequent findings are
quite inconsistent with the findings set out in the original unanimous decision
of the Court. It is very difficult to
understand how “a clear violation of [the lawyer’s] oath“,
“deception“, “lack of candor and honesty [towards]
the courts and his adversary”, “utter disregard of the proper
rules on procedure to suit his purpose”, “obstruction of the
administration of justice“, “questionable motive”, knowingly
filing suits which are “obviously bereft of merit“, “forum
shopping“, “prostitut[ing] his office at the expense of justice” and
“miserably fail[ing] to live up to the standards
expected of the member of the Bar” can be reasonably attributed to
respondent’s “extreme zeal and enthusiasm in prosecuting the
cause of his client.” Moreover, I am unable to understand what proof of
“dishonest motive or fraud” or “contemptuous act” the
majority is looking for. The nature
and character of the acts of which respondent attorney was found guilty by
the Court in its original decision is such that they only could have been
committed with “dishonest motive[s].” At the very least, it was incumbent
upon respondent to prove that notwithstanding the obvious nature of those acts,
he in fact acted from some pure and commendable internal motive visible only to
himself. Respondent attorney has not,
however, submitted any such proof other than his own assertion that he had
acted “in good faith and fidelity” for “his poor and unlettered
client.”
The present majority resolution refers to a number of
circumstances relating to respondent attorney, such as: his having represented tenant-farmers from
Laguna, Cavite
and Rizal; his appointment as Provincial Fiscal of
Laguna on 9 February 1987;
his having joined the Cursillo, Christian Charismatic
and Christian Family Movements; and his being a YMCA Director and life
member. Without detracting from whatever
merit one may find in these circumstances, it should be pointed out that none
of the circumstances appear to have materialized after July 29, 1988, the date of the
promulgation of the original decision of this Court. As such, they do not appear to be proof that
respondent attorney has “rehabilitated himself.” Finally,
assuming that the above circumstances materialized after July 29, 1988, I do not believe that such, by
themselves and without more, would constitute adequate proof that respondent
attorney has indeed rehabilitated himself.
Accordingly, I vote for DENYING the Motion for Reconsideration.