PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDGARDO ESTEVAN Y EUGENIO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused-appellant Edgardo Estevan y Eugenio was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII at Pasig,
Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 42051 with a violation of Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as “The Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972,” as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, in an information of the following tenor:

“That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1981, in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been duly authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another
two (2) plastic bags of dried Marijuana stalks (flowering tops), a prohibited
drug, in violation of the above-cited law, as amended.

“Contrary to law.”^[1]

At the arraignment,
appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty.^[2] Forthwith, trial on the merits ensued.

The People’s version of
this case, which is sustained by the evidence and is not seriously disputed, is
presented as follows:

“At about 10:00 o’clock
in the morning of July 2, 1981,
the Philippine Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) at Camp
Crame, Quezon City, received confidential
information that traffic in prohibited drugs was rampant in the Daang Bakal area in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and two persons, namely, accused
Edgardo Estevan y Eugenio alias ‘Tikboy’ and one
alias ‘Boy Japon‘ were the traffickers.  Acting thereon, a team of CANU agents was
immediately sent to the place, arriving thereat at about 11:15 o’clock in the morning of the same day.  One of the agents, Sgt. Cesar V. Garcia,
posed as a buyer.  After a while the
poseur came upon the accused Edgardo Estevan alias Tikboy along Daang Bakal Street.  The poseur immediately ordered P250.00 worth
of marijuana from the accused, at the same time handing to the latter the
amount of P250.00.  After receiving the
P250.00, the accused left the poseur and walked toward a waiting shed along Daang Bakal St. about 30 meters away and there talked
to a person known only as Boy Japon who was alone at
the waiting shed.  The accused then gave
the P250.00 to Boy Japon and the latter in turn
handed to the accused two (2) plastic bags of dried marijuana.  The accused returned to the poseur and
delivered to him the two plastic bags. 
After getting the two plastic bags and upon ascertaining them to contain
marijuana (Exh. ‘C’ & ‘C-1’), the poseur arrested
the accused.  And, to assure the
apprehension of Boy Japon, the poseur fired a shot to alert his companions.  Boy Japon, however,
scampered and eluded arrest.  Thereupon,
the CANU agents brought the accused and the two plastic bags of marijuana to Camp
Crame (tsn, October 6,
1981, pp. 3-4, 7-11, 12-13; October 21, 1981, pp. 3-4).

“The two plastic bags and contents were referred to the PC
Crime Laboratory for examination.  The
laboratory tests confirmed the contents of the two plastic bags as marijuana (tsn, October 6,
1983, pp. 2-3, 4-5; Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’,
‘C-1’, ‘C-2’, ‘C-3’ and ‘D’).”^[3]

After appellant was apprehended, he was brought to Camp
Crame
where he allegedly executed a sworn written statement, presented in evidence as
Exhibit “E,” to the effect that he was caught by members of the CANU
while selling two (2) plastics bags of marijuana for P250.00 on July 2, 1981 at Daang Bakal Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

In its decision dated July 20, 1982,^[4]
the trial court, after finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime imputed to him, sentenced him to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P12,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs. 
It also ordered that, subject to rules and regulations, the period of
preventive imprisonment which started July
2, 1981 shall be credited to appellant.  The marijuana was ordered burned.

Not satisfied therewith, herein appellant took his case to the
former Intermediate Appellate Court, faulting the court below with the
following errors, to wit:

1.  That the trial court erred
in not finding the accused to have been instigated to commit a crime or
otherwise asked to purchase marijuana so as to entrap the drug pusher who
succeeded in eluding the law agents.

2.  That the trial court
erred in not finding the investigating officer to have violated the
constitutional rights of the accused.

3.  That the trial court
erred in not having acquitted the accused based on reasonable doubt.^[5]

The Intermediate Appellate Court, after discussing the evidence
and the law involved, affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the
penalty by imposing the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering herein
appellant to pay a fine of P20,000.00.^[6]
By reason of the penalty thus imposed, the Intermediate Appellate Court did not
enter judgment but certified the case to us pursuant to Section 12 (now Section
13), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.

It was held by said appellate court that what transpired in this
case is entrapment and not instigation. 
It adopted the trial court’s findings that the extrajudicial confession
signed by appellant adheres in all material aspects to his testimony in
court.  It also observed that appellant
did not find any difficulty in getting the marijuana, which goes to show that
the appellant himself was engaged in illegal trafficking of prohibited drugs.

The Intermediate Appellate Court further ruled that appellant
signed the sworn statement, Exhibit “E,” after he was informed of his
constitutional rights and that he validly waived his right to be assisted by a
lawyer.  The Solicitor General avers that
the ruling in Morales vs. Enrile,
et al.^[7]
to the effect that the waiver of the right to counsel shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel, has no retroactive effect and is thus not
applicable to the case at bar inasmuch as the extrajudicial confession of
appellant was taken way back on July 2, 1981 when the prevailing rule did not
require the assistance of counsel for the validity of the waiver.  It was submitted, nonetheless, that even if
the extrajudicial confession is expunged, there is more than enough evidence to
convict appellant.

On the other hand, appellant contends that his extrajudicial
confession taken by the police operatives should be rejected because he was not
informed of his constitutional rights; that his extrajudicial confession was
not read to him nor was he given the opportunity to read it before he was asked
to affix his signature; that he was threatened and forced to sign it; and that
his mother who does not know how to
read and write, signed as witness thereto without his presence.^[8] He insists that he was instigated to commit
a crime when he was utilized by the CANU operatives to entrap a certain Boy Japon who is a suspected drug dealer and that when the
latter eluded arrest, he was instead arrested and charged as a drug pusher.

We first deal with the admissibility of the sworn written
statement allegedly containing the extrajudicial confession of appellant.

The rule is firmly settled that a confession is presumed to be
voluntary until the contrary is proved and the burden of proof is upon the
person who gave the confession.^[9]
Appellant made the bare assertion that he was threatened and forced to execute
an extrajudicial confession.  He
admitted, however, having signed it.^[10]
His mother apparently appears to be a witness to such confession.

We cannot reject the extrajudicial confession on this
ground.  Appellant failed to substantiate
his claim that he was threatened and forced into executing the confession.  His nonchalant and indifferent attitude in not proving his assertion erodes the
reliability of his claim.

However, a careful
examination of the extrajudicial confession indicates that while appellant
waived his right to counsel, such waiver is not valid.  Nothing appears from the records that
appellant was assisted by counsel when he allegedly made the waiver.

This Court has clearly
set the rule that the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not
be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.  Any statement obtained in violation of this
requirement, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.^[11] Thus, even if the confession of the accused
speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it
had been voluntarily given.^[12]

As earlier noted, the
Solicitor General stresses the fact that since the extrajudicial confession in
this case was executed prior to the promulgation of Morales vs.
Enrile, et al. in
1983, ante., it should be
declared admissible even if the waiver was not made with the assistance of
counsel.

In People vs.
Eglipa,^[13] the trial court convicted the accused
therein on the basis of two separate extrajudicial confessions made on April
17, 1982 and on September
10, 1982.  While the trial court noted that the
extrajudicial confessions were taken without the presence of counsel,
nevertheless it admitted these confessions in view of the fact that they were
made before April 26, 1983, the date Morales vs. Enrile, et al. was promulgated.  We rejected the confessions and declared them
inadmissible.

In the fairly recent
cases of Aballe vs. People, et
al.,^[14] and People vs. Manlapaz, et al.,^[15] we discarded the extrajudicial confessions
therein it appearing that the waiver of counsel was not made with the
assistance of counsel as mandated by Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution.

There is still another
reason why we reject the extrajudicial confession of appellant.  A cursory reading of said extrajudicial
confession readily discloses that the statements therein purporting to show
compliance with the constitutional requisites for confessions made during a
custodial investigation fall short of the acceptable norms.  The supposed cautionary explanations
read:

“PASUBALI:           Ginoong Edgardo Estevan y Eugenio ay nasa ilalim ng isang
pagsisiyasat sa kasalanang paglabag sa batas gaya
ng pagbebenta ng bawal na
gamot, Marijuana (Violation of Section 4, Article II
of RA 6425 otherwise known as ‘The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972’, as amended), ngunit bago kita
tanungin ay nais kung ipaliwanag sa iyo
ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod
sa ating Bagong Saligang Batas gaya ng mga
sumusunod:

‘Na ikaw ay may karapatan na manahimik o huwag sumagot sa
ano mang itatanong sa iyo.’

‘Na ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng
iyong sariling pili na manananggol
upang sumubaybay sa iyo sa
pagsisiyasat na ito at kung hindi mo naman kaya ang
humirang ng isa, ang tanggapang
ito ang bahalang
humirang ng isa para sa
iyo‘.

‘Na ano man ang sasabihin
mo rito sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaring gamiting ebidensiya laban o pabor sa
iyo sa alin
mang hukuman dito sa ating
bansa‘.

“TAGASIYASAT:    Naunawaan at naintindihan mo bang lahat ang iyong mga
karapatan na ipinaliwanag at ipinabatid ko sa iyo?

“SINISIYASAT:       OPO.

“TANONG:             Matapos mong maunawaan
at maintin­dihan lahat ang iyong karapatan
alinsunod sa ating Bagong Saligang
Batas na ipinaliwanag at ipinabatid ko sa
iyo, ikaw ba ay nakahanda pang magbigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay
kahit na walang abogado sa ngayon?

“SAGOT:               OPO.”^[16]

Time and again, we have
emphasized that such long questions followed by monosyllabic answers do not
satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his
constitutional rights under the Constitution and our laws.  Instead, there should be several short and
clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under interrogation.^[17] When such an investigation conducted upon
the accused does not conform to the requirements set forth in the aforecited case of People vs. Galit, the extrajudicial confession taken therein is
inadmissible.

We now come to the
defense of appellant that he was instigated to commit a crime.  In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; in
instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the
commission of the offense and the former himself becomes a co-principal.^[18]

The usual defense of
being “framed-up” invoked by drug pushers, as in this case, does not
impress us.  In order that the
defense of having been set up or framed by the authorities may prosper, the
evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. 
Like alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct and is
difficult to prove.^[19]
Law enforcers are presumed to have
performed their duties regularly in the absence of proof negating the same.  Contrariwise, herein appellant failed to show
any ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to falsely impute such a serious charge against him, a
consideration debilitative of his defense as we have ruled in previous cases.^[20]

An analysis of the
testimony of appellant reveals his admission of the following facts:  that he knew Boy Japon
and the place where the latter can be found;^[21] that Boy Japon is
his acquaintance whom he used to see;^[22] and that he handed the money to Boy Japon in exchange for the marijuana after which he
delivered the same to the CANU operative.^[23]

In People vs.
Asio,^[24] which likewise involved the same offense
with which appellant is charged in the present case, we made the following
observation which can as aptly be stated in the case at bar:

“The existence beforehand of such unlawful trade is evident
from the fact that the accused-appellant had a ready supply of marijuana to
meet the buyer’s demand.  He might not
have it right at the time the initial transaction took place but he was readily
able to produce the desired quantity.  In
fact, it took him only a few minutes to produce the marijuana.  If it were really true that he was induced
into looking for marijuana, it would have taken him a considerable length of
time to look for a source.  The fact that
he returned shortly after the transaction shows that he already had contacts
from whom he could readily get the marijuana. 
This is clearly not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit
a crime.  This is simply a trap to catch
the criminal.”

The extrajudicial confession signed by appellant on July 2, 1981 substantially interlocks
with his testimony in court.  Thus, even
if said confession were completely disregarded, as we have done, there would
still be more than enough evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction.  The judgment of conviction we are asked to
review is not solely based on the disputed extrajudicial confession.^[25]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the former Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 11.

^[2]
Original record, 7.

^[3]
Brief for Appellee,
AC-G.R. CR No. 00469, 1-3; Rollo, 33.

^[4]
Per Judge Serafin
E. Camilon.

^[5]
Brief for Appellant, AC-G.R. No. 00469, 1; Rollo,
30.

^[6]
Rollo, 43.

^[7]
121 SCRA 538 (1983).

^[8]
TSN, Feb. 10, 1982, 6.

^[9]
People vs. Talla, et al., G.R. No. L-44414, Jan. 18, 1990, citing People vs.
De la Cruz, 115 SCRA 184 (1982).

^[10]
TSN, Mar. 15, 1982, 4.

^[11]
People vs. Hernandez, et al., 162 SCRA 422 (1988); People vs. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623 (1988).

^[12]
People vs. Newman, et al., 163 SCRA 496 (1988); People vs. Repe, et al., G.R. No. 64935, July 19, 1989.

^[13]
G.R. No. 78852, June 5, 1989.

^[14]
G.R. No. 64086, Mar. 15, 1990.

^[15]
G.R. No. 80179, Mar. 19, 1990.

^[16]
Exhibit E, Envelope of Exhibits, 4.

^[17]
People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985); People vs.
Flores, 165 SCRA 71 (1988); People vs. Olapani, et al., G.R. No. 69122, Nov. 16, 1989.

^[18]
People vs. Valmores, et al., 122 SCRA 922
(1983); People vs. Lapatha, et al., 167 SCRA
159 (1988); People vs. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, Sept. 1, 1989.

^[19]
People vs. Nabunat, G.R. No. 84392, Feb. 7, 1990.

^[20]
People vs. Paco, G.R.
No. 76893, Feb. 27, 1989; People vs. Napat-a,
G.R. No. 84951, Nov. 14, 1989; People vs. Borja,
G.R. No. 71838, Feb. 26, 1990.

^[21]
TSN, Feb. 10, 1982, 3.

^[22]
TSN, Mar. 15, 1982, 2-3.

^[23]
TSN, Feb. 10, 1982, 5.

^[24]
G.R. No. 84960, Sept. 1, 1989,
ante.

^[25]
People vs. Layuso, G.R. No. 69210, July 5, 1989; People vs. Periodica, Jr., G.R. No. 73006, Sept. 29, 1989.