MARIA G. FORD, SUBSTITUTED BY PATRICK G. FORD, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SULPICIA FABRICAR, RESPONDENTS.

The generally accepted rule in our jurisprudence is that the
findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight since it had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand as a
further aid in determining their credibility. 
The rule, however, admits of exceptions, both in the factual findings of
the trial court and the conclusions drawn by it therefrom,
and, as respondent court holds, the decision of the court a quo in these cases exemplifies a warranted departure from the
aforesaid jurisprudential rule.

These consolidated petitions seek the review of the decision of
respondent court^[1]
in CA-G.R. Nos. 59402-03-R entitled “Sulpicia F.
Fabrigar, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Vicente F. Uy and Maria G. Ford, Defendants-Appellees,”
together with its resolution denying petitioners’ motions for reconsideration,
which reversed the decision of the trial court in Civil Cases Nos. M-282 and
M-283 of the then Court of First Instance of Capiz, Mambusao Branch, filed by herein private respondent Sulpicia Fabrigar against spouses
Vicente Uy and Paciencia Uy and spouses Thomas J. Ford and Maria G. Ford,
respectively.

From the nature of the issues raised in the present appeals, we
are constrained to set out and analyze the facts involved which we are told do
not sustain the conclusions drawn by the court below.  The decision of respondent court presents the
two sides of the incident as follows:

“On July 27, 1973, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, Sulpicia Fabrigar, being a public
school teacher of Barrio Sta. Cruz, Dumalag, Capiz reported to the precinct of her assignment
particularly at the Elementary School of Sta. Cruz, Dumalag,
Capiz, by reason of the deputization
of all public school teachers to assist the COMELEC in the conduct of the
National Referendum.

“Between 3:00 and 3:30 P.M. of that day, while she was inside
Precinct No. 11-A, she saw Elmo Uy, son of the barrio
captain of Sta. Cruz, Vicente Uy, get the remark
sheet of voter Regalado Firmalino and began to
write on said remark sheet of the latter. 
She called the attention of the Referendum Committee composed of Leandra Fagtanac, Chairwoman; Concepcion Fale and Benito Facura, Members, to these acts of Elmo Uy
but the Committee did not mind her.  So,
she took the initiative of going to and advising Elmo Uy
not to write anything on the remark sheet of the voter Firmalino.  Elmo Uy asked Sulpicia what business of hers (sic) in so doing to which
she answered that she was merely advising him. 
Elmo Uy stood up, pulled out his appointment
paper as an observer in the referendum and tore it to pieces saying that it was
useless and not respected anyway. 
Thereafter, Elmo Uy went out of the precinct
reported the matter to his father, Vicente Uy, the
barrio captain of Sta. Cruz.  A few
minutes later, barrio captain Vicente Uy, father of
Elmo, entered Precinct No. 11-A and shouted at Sulpicia
Fabrigar, ‘Hijo de puta, why do you interfere with what my son is doing?  Why are you pretending to be somebody here in
Sta. Cruz?  You are a no good headteacher.  I do
not send my children to this school because of your enviousness.’ Sulpicia Fabrigar answered that
she was merely advising Elmo Uy not to write on the
remark sheet of Regalado Firmalino
and she did not pretend to be somebody. 
While Vicente Uy was leaving the precinct, he
further said that he would report Sulpicia Fabrigar to Mrs. Maria
Ford.

“Thirty minutes after Vicente Uy had
left the precinct, Maria Ford, owner of the Asturias Sugar Central, arrived
very angry, saying, ‘Where is Suping, where is Suping?’ Sulpicia Fabrigar immediately presented herself to Maria Ford, and
the latter said, ‘Why did you campaign for ‘No’ according to the barrio captain?‘ Sulpicia
Fabrigar answered, ‘I did not campaign for ‘No’ I
even wanted a zero ‘No’ because you promised to provide electricity in this
barrio if nobody votes ‘No’.’ Elmo Uy then
interrupted their conversation and said that Sulpicia
Fabrigar really campaigned for ‘No’ votes.  Maria Ford said, ‘Its true you campaigned for
‘No’ and why do you still insist on reasoning?’, and then, Maria Ford slapped Sulpicia Fabrigar on the left
face.  She wanted to retaliate but her
sister, Fidelina Frias,
held her back and pulled her away.  Maria
Ford further said, ‘I’ll have you transferred to a far place.  You are ungrateful to me.  You are always rebelling against me.  Get out and go home.’ Afterwards, Sulpicia Fabrigar reported this
particular incident to the police authorities of Dumalag,
Capiz (Exhibit ‘A’/ ‘1’).  She also sent telegrams to the President
(Exhibits ‘I’ and ‘H’), to the COMELEC (Exhibit ‘J’) and to the Secretary of
National Defense (Exhibit ‘L’) in connection with this incident.^[2]

Respondent court observes that, on his part, Vicente Uy presented his version of the incident thus:

“At about 2 p.m. on
referendum day, Benito Facura, upon the request of
the chairwoman of the Referendum Committee, Leandra Fagtanac, went to the house of Vicente Uy
to inform him that there was
trouble in the barrio center. 
Vicente Uy went to said place and he had a
talk with Leandra Fagtanac
about what happened thereat.  Leandra Fagtanac informed Vicente
Uy that Sulpicia Fabrigar shouted at Elmo Uy; that
she requested Sulpicia Fabrigar
to keep quiet but the latter continued to shout at Elmo Uy
that he should not teach the voters because they were more intelligent than
him; that when Elmo Uy showed his appointment papers
as referendum observer, Sulpicia Fabrigar
tore it to pieces and threw it on the floor; and that as a result of the
commotion created by the quarrel of Sulpicia Fabrigar and Elmo Uy, the people
scattered away  from the precinct.

“Upon getting this information from Leandra
Fagtanac, Vicente Uy asked
her where was Sulpicia Fabrigar
and he was told that she had just left the room.  When Vicente Uy was
about to leave the precinct, Sulpicia Fabrigar came in. 
Vicente Uy then addressed her, ‘Mrs. Fabrigar, what happened here?  Can you not settle this
since this is our affair?’ Sulpicia Fabrigar answered, ‘I told Elmo not to teach the voters
because they also know what they’re doing and why are you inquiring?’
Vicente Uy said: 
‘Why did you humiliate Elmo when we have a chairwoman to refer this
matter?’ (sic) Sulpicia Fabrigar
countered, ‘You think you’re still a barangay captain
inside this precinct.  It’s the headteacher who is powerful in this building.’ Vicente Uy said, ‘I’m not trying to be somebody here.  If you won’t believe me, I’d report this
matter at the poblacion.’ Sulpicia
Fabrigar said, ‘I don’t care to whom you’d report,
I’m not afraid, go ahead.’ So, Vicente Uy left with
his jeep.  The people were no longer
voting, and on the way to the poblacion Vicente Uy thought of asking Maria Ford to pacify Sulpicia Fabrigar, to stop her
from molesting and disturbing the people so they could vote.  Vicente Uy then
believed that Maria Ford, being the godmother of Sulpicia
Fabrigar, could pacify her.

“Maria Ford asked Vicente Uy how the
voting was going along, and the latter told her that Sulpicia
Fabrigar was getting uncontrollable in the precinct,
that she tore the appointment as observer of his son Elmo, and that the people
were not voting anymore.      Vicente Uy asked Maria Ford to stop Sulpicia
Fabrigar from molesting and disturbing the
people.  Thereafter, Vicente Uy left to report the matter to the COMELEC Registrar but
he did not meet him because he was out. 
On his way home, he met the Mayor and the Governor and to whom he
narrated this incident.  The following
day, Vicente Uy reported this incident to the police
authorities of Dumalag, Capiz
and it was entered in the Police Blotter (Exhibit ‘3’-Uy).”^[3]

Said decision continues with an account of the incident this time
by Maria Ford:

“At about 1:30 p.m. on referendum day, some people reported to
Maria Ford that Sulpicia Fabrigar
was screaming at the polling place, and they asked her to stop Sulpicia Fabrigar as she is her
(a)hijada and relative because people were going away
and not voting anymore.  Then came
Vicente Uy, the barrio captain, who also asked Maria
Ford to intercede with Sulpicia Fabrigar
because she was creating trouble, fighting with his son, and many people were
leaving the polling place.

“Maria Ford went to the polling place to find out the truth of
the report and also to make the people vote. 
Upon her arrival at the polling place, Sulpicia
Fabrigar immediately shouted, ‘Why did you come here,
you’re helping the barrio captain!’ Maria Ford answered, ‘I came here because
the people and the barrio captain asked me to make you keep quiet and stop this
trouble.’ Then Sulpicia Fabrigar
screamed, ‘I’m the headteacher here!’ Maria Ford told
Sulpicia Fabrigar to keep
quiet and go home and not to scream, but she answered that she was the headteacher and she was supposed to be there and she would
not go home.  Then Maria Ford started to
inquire from the people around whether or not Sulpicia
Fabrigar has some trouble with Elmo Uy and whether or not she tore his appointment paper as
referendum observer.  Suddenly, Sulpicia Fabrigar screamed again
saying that Elmo Uy was insulting her.  Maria Ford told Elmo Uy
to go home, and when Elmo Uy passed between her and Sulpicia Fabrigar, the latter
continued to scream insulting words at Elmo Uy.  Sulpicia Fabrigar even wanted to beat Elmo Uy,
and she was trembling.  So, laboring
under the belief that Sulpicia Fabrigar
had already become hysterical, Maria Ford slapped her on the face to calm her
down.  After this, Sulpicia
Fabrigar quieted down momentarily, and then she said
to Maria Ford, ‘If you’re not only old, I’d beat you!’ Maria Ford held out her
face to Sulpicia Fabrigar
and ordered her to hit it, but she did not.”^[4]

After trial in the Court of First Instance of Capiz,
Mambusao Branch, presided over by Judge Tomas R. Leonidas, judgment was rendered dismissing Sulpicia Fabrigar’s complaint and
further ordering her to pay Maria Ford P2,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P1,000.00 for attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 for expenses of
litigation; and also to pay Vicente
Uy P2,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 for expenses of
litigation, said amounts to bear interest from the date of judgment.^[5]

In dismissing said complaint for damages of herein private
respondent, the lower court arrived at the following conclusions:

“According to Sulpicia Fabrigar, upon entering the precinct, Vicente Uy immediately shouted at her, ‘Hijo
de puta, why do you interfere with what my son is
doing here?  Why are you pretending to be
somebody here in Sta. Cruz?  You are a no
good headteacher. 
I do not send my children to this school because of your enviousness.’ x
x x

“It clearly appears that from among the statements of Vicente Uy, only ‘Why are you pretending to be somebody in Sta.
Cruz’ called for comment or action from Sulpicia Fabrigar which, to the mind of the court, is an innocuous
expression or statement merely showing disgust, displeasure or, at its worst,
anger, and not to slander.  It is of a
lesser degree and intensity than the words ‘putang ina mo’ which the Supreme Court in Reyes v. People,
L-21528, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 686, has stated to be a common expression in
the dialect that is often employed not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure.  With respect to
the other statements of Vicente Uy which did not call
for any comment from Sulpicia Fabrigar,
her silence should be deemed to be an admission of their truth and truth can
not hurt or insult.  Thus, an act or
declaration made in the presence and within the observation of a party who does
or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him.  (Sec. 23, Rule 130 Rules of Court).  x x x

x        x         x

“Maria Ford admitted that she slapped Sulpicia
Fabrigar because the latter became hysterical and the
former was then laboring under the belief that the only way to stop a hysteric
is to slap and jolt him into consciousness. 
There is speciousness in this assertion. 
Sulpicia Fabrigar
even admitted on the witness stand that Maria Ford slapped her so that she
would stop ‘talking’ with Elmo Uy, but she failed to
positively state that by this one slap she was dishonored, defamed or
shamed.  She merely felt a deafening
sensation, and nothing more.  Sulpicia Fabrigar, by her ravings
and rantings against Elmo Uy,
was already disturbing the peace of mind of the people and scaring them from
participating in the referendum process. 
There was then an emergency, absent any police officer, and as godmother
and second cousin by affinity of Sulpicia Fabrigar, Maria Ford thought it her duty to do what she did
which nobody would have dared done.  In
this setting, this court finds that Maria Ford acted within her legal and moral
right and duty, for her own peace of mind, to arrest the shameful act of an (a)hijada and relative. 
To restore peace and order in the polling place and to prevent Sulpicia Fabrigar from further
eroding and invading the right of suffrage of others.  In so doing, Maria Ford could not have been
actuated with malice aforethought of putting Sulpicia
Fabrigar into disrepute, but rather to restore her to
normal self and bring back order to the referendum process.” x x x^[6]

Respondent court, however, rejected said conclusions on the
following ratiocinations:

“As we appreciate the facts of the case, We believe that
Vicente Uy was very much offended by the action of
Mrs. Fabrigar in admonishing the former’s
son, Elmo, who has been shown to have interfered in the voting in Sta. Cruz, Dumalag, Capiz.  Unable to swallow the fact that someone has
questioned his ‘power’ as barrio captain, Vicente Uy
immediately rushed to the barrio school and there began insulting the lowly
school headteacher, Sulpicia
Fabrigar.

“We cannot clearly see Our way through when in disregarding
the other slanderous remarks of Vicente Uy, the lower
court said that ‘her silence (to those facts) should be deemed an admission of
their truth and truth cannot hurt or insult.’ The trial court most certainly is
in error in this regard.”^[7]

x        x          x

It further observed that —

“x
x x It is not for
Maria Ford to say whether her acts did or
did not place the offended party Sulpicia Fabrigar in contempt of the spectators.  The facts obtaining in this case indicate
that appellee Ford in performing the act of slapping
the school teacher in front of the barrio people was motivated by personal
animosity because Maria Ford has been misinformed that Sulpicia
Fabrigar has been campaigning for ‘No’ votes in the
National Referendum of July 27, 1973 which was against the wishes of Maria
Ford.  And taking into account the
position held by the victim and the circumstances surrounding the incidents in
question, we believe that Maria Ford has by deed slandered plaintiff Sulpicia Fabrigar which would
entitle the latter to damages.  There can
be no circumstance more humiliating for a headteacher
of a barrio school than to be seen by the barrio folks being slapped in her
face.”^[8]

Setting aside the decision of the trial court, respondent court
ordered Vicente Uy to pay Sulpicia
Fabrigar the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages,
P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and also
ordered Maria Ford to pay Sulpicia Fabrigar the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00
as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, with costs against both defendants-appellees.

In her petition at bar, the late Maria Ford contends that
respondent court erred in holding that she acted with malice and ill will when
she slapped private respondent, and in awarding damages and attorney’s fees to
the latter.^[9]
Along the same vein, petitioner Uy submits that the
Court of Appeals should not have reversed the trial court’s decision nor should
it have awarded damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs to
private respondent.^[10]

Petitioner Ford contends that the act of slapping, standing alone
and unexplained, would not speak well of the intent of the actor and that to
determine the intent, the surrounding circumstances, particularly those
preceding the slapping, should be taken into consideration.  It is submitted that this is so since malice,
which is an essential element in this type of an offense, is a state of mind
and can only be proven by extrinsic evidence. 
She declares that her act of slapping Sulpicia
Fabrigar was not actuated by malice but engendered by
a legitimate motive prompted by her desire to calm down a person who appeared to be hysterical and to stop a goddaughter
and relative from further creating a scandal. 
She also assails as exorbitant
the award of moral damages and, for alleged lack of legal basis, the awards of
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.^[11]

On the other hand, petitioner Uy
maintains that he has not slandered Sulpicia Fabrigar; and that the contents of Exhibits
“A”/”1” (police blotter of the incident in question),
“I” and “K”, (telegram of Fabrigar
to the President), “J” (telegram of Fabrigar
to the Commission on Elections) and “L” (telegram of Fabrigar to the Secretary of National Defense) constitute
admissions against Fabrigar’s interest under Section
22, Rule 130 and also judicial admissions under Section 2, Rule 129, both of
the 1964 Rules of Court, which would have barred respondent court from
reversing the lower court’s finding that he did not utter the words imputed to
him and did not insult Fabrigar.^[12]

We find both appeals devoid of merit.

The decision of the trial court proceeds from misapprehensions
and patently erroneous conclusions of fact. 
A slap on the face is an
unlawful aggression.  The face
personifies one’s dignity and slapping it is a serious personal affront.  It is a physical assault coupled with a willful disregard of the integrity
of one’s person.  This is especially true
if the aggrieved party is a school teacher who, in penal law, is a person in
authority.  Respect for a teacher is
required of all, if we are to uphold and enhance the dignity of the teaching
profession.  The demeaning act of
respondent Ford is virtually inexpiable when done, as in this case, in the
presence of the public inside a polling precinct during an electoral
exercise.  This certainly is one of the
extreme circumstances under which ridicule, discredit and contempt could be
cast upon the aggrieved party in the community where she performs her functions
as a mentor of their children.

As discerningly observed by respondent court, considering the
position of private respondent, nothing but shame, humiliation and dishonor
could have been heaped upon her by the indignities she had to suffer at the
hands of petitioner Ford.  Furthermore,
there is ample reason to believe that said petitioner’s displeasure over the
rumor that private respondent was campaigning for “No” votes was
sufficient motive for her to deliberately confront private respondent and
maltreat the latter.

The act of petitioner Ford in slapping private respondent on the
face in public is contrary to morals and good customs and under the
circumstances, could not but have caused the latter mental anguish, moral shock,
wounded feelings and social humiliation.^[13]
Full responsibility attached to said act of the late petitioner Ford and the
corresponding sanctions should be imposed. 
Her excuse that she was prompted by her desire to calm down private respondent and prevent her from becoming hysterical is too lame a subterfuge upon which to
premise a plea for exoneration.  We are
not persuaded by such pretense.  Private
respondent was in the performance of her duty when the incident took place and
she had every right to stay in her post. 
On the other hand, petitioner Ford had no legitimate business inside the
polling precinct.  Definitely, she barged
into the premises in response to the report and importuning of petitioner Uy.

The award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.^[14]
Under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to Paragraph (10), Article 2219
thereof, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for moral damages.  By way of
example or correction for the public good, exemplary damages may also be
awarded.^[15]
Attorney’s fees are also recoverable.^[16]

With respect to petitioner Uy, the
gravity of the defamatory words uttered by him depends not only upon their
sense and grammatical meaning, judging them separately, but also upon the
special circumstances of the case and the antecedents or relationship between
the offended party and the offender which might tend to prove the intention of
the offender at the time.^[17]

Suffice it to say that the imputations uttered by petitioner Uy against private respondent also cast further dishonor,
discredit and contempt on the latter. 
Petitioner Uy was a barrio captain.  His proven actuations do not speak well of a
public officer, especially when done in the presence of the public during said
referendum.

Petitioner Uy claims that private
respondent should be bound by her statement appearing in the police blotter where
she made no mention that she was slandered by the former.  This is fallacious reasoning.  The entry in the police blotter, even if
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, is not necessarily entitled to
full credit as the entrant did not have personal knowledge of the facts stated
and the police agent who prepared the same did not testify in court.^[18]
Admissibility of evidence is one thing; the weight thereof is another.  The court below also declared that an entry
in the police blotter is an entry in an official record made in the performance
of duty by a public officer and, as such, its trustworthiness arises and its
correctness cannot be impugned, there being a presumption of regularity in its
execution.  This is not entirely
correct.  Entries in official records are
only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.  They are not conclusive.

We are satisfied with private respondent’s explanation.  Her initiative in promptly instituting her
complaint clearly manifests her honest intention to vindicate the wrong
committed against her.  She explained
that shortly after the incident between her and petitioner Uy,
petitioner Ford came and slapped her. 
Thus, when the report was made by private respondent to the police
authorities of Dumalag, Capiz,
the immediate hurt and humiliation being felt by her was not only the slander
committed by petitioner Uy but, primarily and
foremost, the slapping by petitioner Ford. 
Hence, the police report of private respondent which focused on her
being slapped by petitioner Ford, although inadvertently omitting the incident
with petitioner Uy in view of her emotional state
then, should not be construed to mean that private respondent was not slandered
by petitioner Uy.

Like an affidavit, a police blotter is taken ex parte hence, in the same manner, it could be just as
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for
want of suggestion or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate
recollection of all that pertains to the subject.^[19]
It is understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy
and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter.  Petitioner Uy’s
disquisition on the omission of his intemperate and slanderous outburst in the
entries made in the police blotter, or in the telegrams sent by private
respondent, cannot outweigh the evidence on which respondent court based its
factual findings and conclusions that he did commit said act.  Further, the testimony thereon of private
respondent in open court, in our
view, has not been successfully rebutted and we have no reason to doubt the
veracity thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.  The decision of respondent court is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

* The title of this case has been
amended to indicate the substitution of the late Maria G. Ford by the present
petitioner as noted in the Court’s resolution of October 25, 1989.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Samuel F. Reyes, with Justices Andres Reyes and Carlos L. Sundiam concurring.

^[2]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 51171-72, 26-28.

^[3]
Ibid., id., 28-30.

^[4]
Ibid., id., 30-31.

^[5]
Ibid., id., 31-32.

^[6]
Record on Appeal, CA-G.R. Nos.
59402-03-R, 33-38; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 51171-72,
52.

^[7]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 59402-03-R, 35.

^[8]
Ibid., id., 37.

^[9]
Ibid., id., 14-23.

^[10]
Brief for Petitioner Uy, 1; Rollo,
G.R. No. 51273, 72.

^[11]
Brief for Petitioner Ford, 17, 21,
28-29; Rollo, G.R. No. 51171-72, 178.

^[12]
Brief for Petitioner Uy, 30-34; Rollo, G.R. No.
51273, 72.

^[13]
Patricio vs. Leviste,
etc., G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989.

^[14]
Magbanua, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 137 SCRA 328.

^[15]
Patricio vs. Leviste,
etc., supra; Art. 2229, Civil Code.

^[16]
Art. 2208(1), id.

^[17]
Victorio, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 31, 1989, citing Balite vs.
People, 18 SCRA 280 (1966).

^[18]
See People vs. Golfo, 119 SCRA 424 (1982).

^[19]
See People vs. Pasco, et al., G.R. No. 68520, Jan. 22,
1990.