REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PABLO, JUAN, JR., JULIAN, RUFINA, LEONOR, GLORIA TERESITA, ANTONIO, DOLORES, BERNARDO, JR., AND MA…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court*, dated
December 2, 1985, in AC-G.R. CV No. 67964 affirming the appealed decision of
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon, Branch II, Lucena City.

The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:

Claiming that they acquired the property by virtue of a document
which they alleged to be a Spanish title originally issued in the name of
Bernardo Merchan, the private respondents filed a complaint dated August 7, 1974 against petitioner
Republic of the Philippines
for quieting of title over said
property located in Sitio de Malapianbato
alias Arras, Bo. de Ayuti, Lucban, Quezon, containing an area of one million six hundred and
sixty thousand (1,660,000) square meters, more or less, or 166 hectares.

The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case because the land is part of a forest reserve established
by Proclamation No. 42 dated October 14, 1921, and by Proclamation No. 716
dated May 26, 1941 which declared the area as part of the “Mts. Banahaw-San Cristobal National
Park.”

The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court.

The private respondents filed a motion to declare the petitioner
in default for failure to file its answer within the reglementary
period and for the appointment of a Commissioner
to receive their evidence, which was granted.

The petitioner filed a motion to lift the order of default which was denied by the trial
court.  The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid denial.

Meanwhile, Judge Manolo L. Maddela rendered a decision on December 18, 1975, declaring the private respondents as owners of
the land subject of the litigation.

On April 21, 1976, the trial court, presided over by Judge Delia P. Medina, issued an order
declaring as moot and academic petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
order denying the motion to lift the order of default in view of this Court’s
resolution declaring null and void all judicial acts, decisions, orders and
resolutions performed, promulgated and issued after January 2, 1976, by then Judge Manolo
L. Maddela.  In
the same order, Judge Medina required the petitioner to file a reply to the
private respondents’ opposition to its motion to set aside the decision of
December 18, 1975.  The petitioner filed
its reply on May 10, 1976.

Petitioner’s motion to set aside the decision dated December 18,
1975 of the trial court which rendered judgment in private respondents’ favor
was granted by the court on July 23, 1976, thereby vacating and setting aside
the questioned decision and the order of default.  In the same order, the petitioner was
required to file its answer to the complaint 
which it did.

The private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order granting the motion to set aside the decision dated December 18, 1975,
which was denied.

On September 16, 1976, the private respondents filed a manifestation assailing the
jurisdiction of the court to hear the case contending that it properly belonged
to another branch of the court but this was denied.

On September 27, 1976, the private respondents filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Medina.  The appellate court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent judge from further proceeding with Civil
Case No. 7840.  The appellate court
further required the petitioner to file
its answer, which was duly submitted.

Meanwhile, on December 29, 1976, the private respondents, six
months after the effectivity of P.D. No.892, filed an
application for the registration of the parcel of land involved in Civil Case
No. 7840.  This was docketed as Land
Registration Case No. N-1055.

On November 29, 1977, the appellate court denied the aforesaid
petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order.

The trial court, this time presided by Judge Benigno
M. Puno, issued an order setting the case for pre-trial.  For failure of petitioner’s counsel to attend
the scheduled hearing, the trial court issued an order declaring the said
failure as a waiver to present evidence and to cross-examine the private
respondents’ witnesses and declared the case submitted for decision.

On March 3, 1980,
the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant:

“(1) Declaring
the plaintiffs the rightful co-owners and
possessors of the land in question as well as the improvements thereon since time immemorial by
themselves and/or their predecessors-in?interests;

“(2) Ordering
the defendant Bureau of Forestry,
as represented by the Director of Forestry, to desist from disturbing the peaceful possession and ownership of the
plaintiffs over the land in question;

“(3) Ordering the defendant to recognize the right of possession
and ownership of the plaintiffs over  the land described in paragraph 7 of the complaint which is particularly known as Cad. Lot No. 4292 (portion) of Cadastral Survey No.
340-D, Case No. 4, situated at the barrio Ayuti,
Municipality of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon;

“(4) Ordering the defendant to agree in, and cause the
segregation of the land in question within the perimeter of the Mt. Banahaw-San Cristobal National
Park, it being private property of the
plaintiffs; and

“(5) The
applicants in Land Registration Case No. 1055 are hereby directed to take
immediate measures for the early and prompt hearing and/or disposition of said case, otherwise, the Court
will be constrained to dismiss the same
for lack of interest.” (Rollo, pp. 113-114).

The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

On August 10, 1987, the Court gave due course to the petition and
granted the parties a period of thirty (30) days from notice within which to
file memoranda (Rollo, p. 112).  The petitioner filed its memorandum on
September 18, 1987 (Rollo, p. 113), while the private
respondents submitted for consideration their comment to the petition dated
August 25, 1986, and their rejoinder to the reply of the petitioner dated June
29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 135).

The main issue in this case is whether or not the subject parcel
of land which was declared a part of the forest reserve in 1921 and later a
national park in 1941 may be subject of private appropriation and registration.

The petitioner contends that being part of a forest reserve, and
later as a national park, the subject parcel of land cannot be the subject of appropriation as private
property.  As reservation for a national
park, the land cannot be registered because public reservations are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or registered as private property.

The petitioner further argues that the document itself dated July
29, 1870 which private respondents allege to be a Spanish title negates their
claim.  The supposed Spanish title
plainly reveals that it is a mere instrument executed by Bernardo Merchan, private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest,
claiming possession over the land described therein which he sought to be
recognized by the government during the Spanish regime.  The document does not say it is a title, nor
does it state that Bernardo Merchan has acquired
ownership over the land.  The document
does not contain the specific area of the land which is claimed to be owned by
private respondents.

The petition is impressed with
merit.

The land in question
was proclaimed part of a forest reserve by virtue of Proclamation No. 42 dated
October 14, 1921.  This proclamation was
superseded by Proclamation No. 716 dated May 26, 1941 establishing the Mts. Banahaw-San Cristobal National
Park.  It is already a settled rule that
forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and
possession thereof, however long, can not convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161
[1920]; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of
Forestry v. Munoz, 132 Phil. 637 [1968]; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221
[1975]; Director of Lands v. Reyes and Alinsunurin v.
Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA
648 [1979]; Republic v. Animas, 56 SCRA 499 [1974]; Director of Lands v. Court Of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701
[1984]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; Director of Lands v.
Rivas, 141 SCRA 329 [1986]) unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 154 SCRA 476 [1987]).

In this case, there
is no proof of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in
question is disposable or alienable.

Furthermore, with the passage of Presidential Decree No. 892,
effective February 16, 1976, Spanish Titles can no longer be used as evidence
of land ownership.  Under the same
decree, lands not under the Torrens System shall be considered as unregistered.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the appellate court
is hereby REVERSED, and Civil Case No. 7840 and Registration Case No. N-1055
are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.

* IAC, Second Civil Cases
Division, Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr., penned the decision and concurred in by
Justices Crisolito Pascual,
Serafin E. Camilon and Desiderio P. Jurado.