CUCUFATA A. SABINO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE), RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees’
Compensation Commission (ECC) which affirmed the ruling of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) disallowing the petitioner’s
claim for disability compensation.

Petitioner Cucufata A. Sabino is now completely blind. She had been a
public school teacher from June 14, 1963 until her retirement which took
effect on July 6, 1981. She retired because of visual defects caused
by retinitis pigmentosa and bilateral glaucoma OS absolute.

The records show that as early as 1972, the petitioner had episodes of
dimness of vision occurring occasionally. On April 29, 1981, she filed a
claim with the GSIS for disability compensation. The claim was denied
by the GSIS on the ground that the illnesses causing disability are not
occupational diseases within the contemplation of P.D. No. 626, as
amended, and that there is no showing that the petitioner’s position as
teacher increased the risk of her contracting said ailments.

On September 12, 1981, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
with the GSIS, stressing that her position as elementary classroom
teacher increased the risks of her contracting her ailments. She asked
in the alternative that Section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act on
the legal presumption of compensability be applied to her case.
Applying the new Labor Code, the GSIS denied the motion for
reconsideration.

On March 22, 1983, the petitioner appealed the GSIS’ ruling to the
Employees Compensation Commission. The Employees Compensation
Commission affirmed the GSIS decision basing its affirmance on the
following medical dissertation:

“Medical science intimates that glaucoma is a visual disorder
characterized by increased intraocular tension which can cause
impairment of vision ranging from slight abnormalities to absolute
blindness. Glaucoma may be of an acute or chronic congestive (narrow
angle) type or chronic simple (wide angle) type. Absolute glaucoma is
one kind of primary glaucoma. Among the predisposing factors of
glaucoma are vasomotor and emotional instability, hyperopia and
heredity. Secondary glaucoma results from pre-existing ocular disease,
usually uveitis, intraocular tumor, or an enlarged cataract. Prolonged
corticosteroid therapy, especially with topical ophthalmic preparations,
can produce and increase pressure, particularly in patients with a
predisposition. It usually occurs in the 6th and 8th week of therapy.

“The last stage of any form of glaucoma when unrelieved by
treatment is referred to as absolute glaucoma. The eye is blind due to
progressive atrophy of the optic nerve head. The pupil is widely
dilated and fixed, the iris atrophied, the disc deeply excavated. After
a time, the eyeball may degenerate. (The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and
Therapy, 13th ed., 1977, pp. 1702-1703). Similarly, retinitis
pigmentosa is pigmentary degeneration of the retina often associated
with other abnormalities of which cataracts, deafness and mental
deficiency are outstanding. It is strongly hereditary, chiefly as a
recessive trait, although dominant inheritance has been seen (Wintrobe,
et al., Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine, 7th ed., p. 1848).”

The theory of aggravation and the legal presumption of compensability
found in the Workmen’s Compensation Act were not applied by the
Employees’ Compensation Commission for the reason that the same are no
longer provided for in the new Labor Code.

The following issues are raised in this petition:

I. WHETHER THE AILMENTS OF PETITIONER WHICH ACCRUED IN 1972 AND
GRADUALLY DEVELOPED UNTIL HER FORCED RETIREMENT ON JUNE 6, 1981 BE
DECIDED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE OLD WORMENS COMPENSATION ACT, AS
AMENDED OR UNDER THE NEW LABOR CODE ON EMPLOYEES COMPENSA­TION LAW, PD
626, AS AMENDED.

II. WHETHER THE PRINCIPLES OF PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY AND
AGGRAVATION RULE ARE APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIM OF PETITIONER.

The only question raised is whether it is the Labor Code or the
Workmen’s Compensation Act that is applicable to the facts of the case.

The petitioner contends that since her illness started in 1972 and
developed until 1980 the respondent Commission erred in applying the new
Labor Code to her case.

On the other hand, the respondent Commission maintains that nowhere in
the Labor Code on the Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund
is there a pro­vision authorizing either the GSIS or the ECC to apply
the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to claims filed with
the GSIS under the provisions of the new Labor Code. It states that
when a claim is filed, the GSIS and the ECC apply the provisions of the
Labor Code in determining the compensability or non-compensability of a
claim.

The petition should be granted. Applying precedents in earlier cases,
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, is the law that governs the
instant case and not P.D. No. 626, as amended. This Court has ruled
that principles governing vested rights founded on statute should apply.
Considerations based on the social justice and protection to labor
provisions of the Constitution also played a role in the following
rulings:

“Petitioner’s claim having accrued prior to the New Labor Code,
the presumption of compensability, the principle of aggravation, the
award of attorney’s fees and the payment of administrative fees must be
observed and applied. And the Employees’ Compensation Commission as the
successor of the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Commission is duty
bound to observe and apply the foregoing principles in passing upon
worker’s compensation. x x x” (Corales v. ECC, et al., 88 SCRA 554
[1979]; Lao v. ECC, et al., 97 SCRA 780 [1980]; Panangui, et al. v. ECC,
et al., 121 SCRA 65).

“Under Section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission Act, a
presumption of compensability is established, although rebuttable by
substantial evidence to the contrary. And this Court ruled in
Segismundo v. GSIS, et al., 121 SCRA 305), that, ‘(T)the presumption of
compensability places upon the employer the burden of establishing the
contrary by substantial evidence. As there was no evidence presented by
the employer to rebut the presumption, there can therefore be no
occasion for respondent Commission to absolve the deceased’s employer.
The presumption of compensability becomes conclusive (Pantoja v.
Republic, 87 SCRA 443; Cañonero v. WCC, 81 SCRA 712; Lorenza v. WCC, 81
SCRA 434; Santos v. WCC, 75 SCRA 365).

“And, ‘the cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important
is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment’
(Evangelista v. ECC, et al., 111 SCRA 66 [1982]). It then becomes
unquestionable that once the illness supervened at the time of the
employment, there is a rebuttable presumption that such illness arose
out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment’
(Panangui, et al., ECC, et al., 121 SCRA 65; Makabali v. ECC, et al.
Nov. 29, 1983).

The respondent Commission contends that the records of the case do not
include the applications for sick leave of absence of petitioner in
determining when for the first time petitioner complained of her visual
defects. It questions the allegations of the petitioner that the
present claim filed in April 1981 is still within the prescriptive
period of ten years allowed by this Court for these types of claims.
According to respondents, the petitioner was disabled from her work only
after January 1, 1975.

The medical history of the petitioner shows that in 1972 she had
episodes of dimness of vision which occurred occasionally. In July,
1980 she had severe headache and sudden loss of vision of the left eye
and was totally unable to engage in her work until the present time.
Her failure to stop working in 1972 does not necessarily mean that she
was not ill or suffering from physical disability then. In the case of Makabali v. ECC (supra)
this Court expressed that “like the real teacher that she is,
petitioner went on working through sheer determination despite the fact
that her vision was rapidly deteriorating. She should not therefore be
deprived of her compensation but on the contrary she should be rewarded
for her unstinted devotion to her duties as a teacher.” We are
constrained to apply the same presumption in favor of the petitioner who
is a former teacher.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports is
hereby ordered:

1. To pay the petitioner the sum of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as disability compensation benefits;

2. To reimburse petitioner her medical and hos­pital expenses duly supported by proper receipts; and

3. To pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount of the award.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Relova, JJ., concur.