G.R. No. 65097. February 20, 1984
GAVINO MANIKAD, ROBERTO BAÑEZ AND BENITO ARELLANO, PETITIONERS, VS. TANODBAYAN, HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON, AS DEPUTIZED TANODBAYAN PROSECUTOR, GUILLERMO M. SANTOS, JR., AND BERNA…
ESCOLIN, J.:
prohibition may be propounded thus: Is the power vested by Section 7
of Presidential Decree No. 1716-A on the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA) “to receive and investigate complaints relative to
violation of penal laws committed inside the zones and areas owned and
administered by the Authority” exclusive in character as to preclude the
Tanodbayan or his deputies from conducting a preliminary investigation
on a complaint against the director and members of the EPZA Police Force
for offenses committed within said zone?
The salient facts are not controverted: Sometime in November, 1982,
respondents Guillermo M. Santos, Jr. and Bernardo S. Yambao, both
members of the EPZA Police Force in Bataan, filed a complaint with the
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor, respondent Benjamin T. Vianzon,
charging petitioners Gavino Manikad, Roberto Bañez and Benito Arellano,
director and members, respectively, of the EPZA Police Force, with the
crimes of smuggling, qualified theft, violations of the Anti-Graft Law,
as well as the Anti-Fencing Law.
On the date scheduled for the preliminary investigation of the complaint, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss[1] advancing as grounds therefor that [1] Tanodbayan Prosecutor Vianzon had no authority to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; [2] the complaint filed by respondents Santos and Yambao was improperly and prematurely filed; and [3] there was no prima facie case against them. The motion was seasonably opposed by private respondents.
On March 8, 1983, respondent Fiscal Vianzon issued the challenged order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss.[2]
Upon receipt of said order, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or petition for review with the Tanodbayan; but the
same was likewise denied by the latter in an order dated May 27, 1983.
Still unable to secure a reconsideration thereof, petitioners came to
this Court on certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioners submit that respondent Fiscal Vianzon acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in having assumed
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents Santos and Yambao,
arguing in support thereof that the power to investigate complaints of
this nature is lodged exclusively upon the EPZA under Section 7 of P.D.
1716-A.
A mere cursory reading of the legal provision relied upon by petitioners
shows their submission to be devoid of merit. Said Section 7 provides:
“The EPZA, in the exercise of its sole police authority over the
export processing zones and areas owned or administered by the
authority, shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints
relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones and areas
owned and administered by the Authority, and when the evidence
warrants, to file and be deputized herein to prosecute the corresponding
criminal cases before the appropriate court or body.”
Indubitably, the aforecited provision empowers the EPZA not only to
exercise police authority, including the conduct of ordinary police
operations such as the maintenance of peace and order, enforcement of
the law, prevention and detection of crimes and apprehending of
criminals, but also, as an incident to its police authority, to perform
such functions as are usually assigned to the prosecution service.
Thus, it has been empowered [1]
to receive and investigate complaints relative to violations of penal
laws committed inside the zones and areas owned and be deputized under
said presidential decree to prosecute the corresponding criminal cases
before the appropriate court or tribunal.
It bears emphasis, however, that there is nothing in the context of said
Section 7 to even intimate that the latter functions are to be
exercised in an exclusive manner. While the adjective “sole” was used
in conjunction with “police authority”, no similar term or synonym was
employed to describe the other powers vested by Section 7 on the EPZA.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a meaning that does
not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the
statute cannot be placed therein.[3]
Thus, the interpretation given to Sections 182 and 184 of the Election
Code of 1978 in the case of Rogelio de Jesus vs. People of the
Philippines,[4] cited by
petitioners, cannot be accorded Section 7 of PD 1716-A. Neither can the
latter decree be considered as an exception to, or a limitation on, the
authority of the Tanodbayan or his deputies to investigate complaints
for offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, to
wit:
“(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No.
1379;“(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes;“(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office.”[5]
The objection posed by petitioners to the authority of respondent
Tanodbayan’s prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation of the
complaint filed against petitioners by private respondents, being
premised on the alleged exclusive authority of the EPZA “to file and be
deputized x x x to prosecute the corresponding criminal cases before the
appropriate court or body,” must therefore fail.
Equally untenable is the allegation of prematureness ascribed by
petitioners to the complaint filed against them. The pendency of an
administrative proceeding does not constitute a bar to a criminal
prosecution for the same offense. An administrative case is an entirely
separate and distinct proceeding from a criminal action. Each may
proceed independently of the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., joins J. Abad Santos in his concurring opinion, adding that Sec. 6 of Art. XIII of the 1973 Constitution prevails over Sec. 7 of PD 1716-A
Abad Santos, J., concurs with a brief opinion.
[1] Annex “A”, p. 9, Rollo.
[2] Annex “C”, p. 17, Rollo.
[3] Chang Yung Fa, et al. vs. Gianzon, 97 Phil. 913.
[4] G.R. No. 61998, promulgated on February 22, 1983.
[5] Section 4, P.D. No. 1606.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurs in a brief opinion:
I concur. In my view Sec. 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A gives the EPZA no more
than the power to organize a police department with functions similar
to the police department of a municipal corporation. Like the police in
town or city the EPZA police can file complaints in criminal cases; it
can prosecute criminal cases in municipal trial courts but it cannot
conduct preliminary investigations pertaining to fiscals, the Tanodbayan
and judges.