ADELAIDA DANGAN, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION AND TIERRA FACTORS CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution
issued on November 10, 1982 by the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in Case No. AB-8-12274-81, entitled “Adelaida Dangan
v. Tierra Factors Corporation”, dismissing petitioner’s appeal and
affirming the decision of the labor arbiter which ordered her
reinstatement without backwages.

This case arose out of two complaints filed by the petitioner against
Tierra Factors Corporation for illegal demotion and illegal constructive
dismissal.

We have given partial due course to the petition and considered the respondents’ comments as an answer.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

The petitioner started her employment with the respondent firm on
January 24, 1977 as a purchasing clerk on probationary basis with a
basic salary of P450.00. On May 1, 1977, she was made a permanent
employee with a monthly salary of P500.00. On July 16, 1979, she was
transferred from the Purchasing Department to the Financial Services
Department as clerk-typist. On May 1, 1980, she was promoted as
Secretary to the Manager of the Financial Services Department with a new
salary rate of P1,090.00 per month. On February 15, 1981, the
petitioner’s boss, Manager Andres S. Roy F. Lim tendered his resignation
from the company effective a month later. Sometime in March, 1981,
petitioner Dangan was re-assigned as clerk-typist in the Logistics
Department. On May 15, 1981, she was pulled out of Logistics and
assigned as billing clerk in the Accounting Department. From July 20,
1981 to October 1, 1981, the petitioner went on maternity leave. On
October 3, 1981, the corporation transferred Dangan from her temporary
assignment in the Billing Section to Secretary to the Technical Training
Senior Manager with office at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. It was at
this juncture that she filed the first complaint for illegal demotion.
Because her maternity leave had expired, the petitioner applied for
vacation and sick leaves which were approved by management ending
November 1, 1981.

On November 6, 1981, in response to a telegram sent by her employer,
Mrs. Dangan submitted a letter to the respondent’s Personnel Manager
Leonardo A. Pineda, informing him that she will not be reporting for
work until the instant case has been decided and terminated.

On November 10, 1981, the respondent sent Mrs. Dangan a memorandum requiring her to report for work on November 12, 1981.

On December 10, 1981, the petitioner filed the second case against the
respondent for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.

The dispositive portion of the arbiter’s decision which was affirmed by the NLRC reads:

“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

“Respondent, however, is ordered to accept complainant back to
work but without backwages. And complainant is directed to report to
work within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this decision. Failure to
do so would mean waiver on her right to reinstatement.”

Petitioner prays for the modification of the aforequoted decision and assigns as errors the following:

I

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT
OF THE PETITIONER WITHOUT PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES FROM THE TIME OF HER
TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AND WITHOUT DECLARING THAT SAID
REINSTATEMENT SHOULD BE TO HER FORMER POSITION OF DEPARTMENT SECRETARY
AT PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S MAKATI OFFICES.

II

IF EVER PETITIONER’S POSITION WITH THE COMPANY BECAME REDUNDANT AS
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COMMISSION, PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHOULD
NOT TRANSFER PETITIONER TO ITS BICUTAN OFFICE BUT INSTEAD SHOULD PAY
HER THE SEPARATION PAY PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 284 OF THE NEW LABOR CODE, AS
AMENDED.

It is petitioner’s contention that as the secretary of Mr. Andres Roy F.
Lim, Manager of the Financial Services Department, she was merely
following-up Mr. Lim’s termination pay after his resignation but these
follow-ups were resented by the respondent’s officials. As a result,
she claims to have been harassed and discriminated against in her job,
transferred from one position to another against her will and demoted
from department secretary to clerk typist and to killing clerk. The
petitioner alleges that the order to report to the Bicutan office was
really intended to ease her out of the service.

The recorded evidence supports the private respondent’s allegations that
the relief of the petitioner from her job as secretary to the manager
for financial services was warranted by actual and substantial economic
justifications. As early as September 15, 1980, and long before the
resignation of Mr. Lim from the company, the private respondent had
already adopted remedial measures designed to counteract economic
problems faced by the company. The private respondent stopped all
manpower hiring except for certain technical positions and informed its
staff that in the exercise of optimum utilization of manpower movements,
personnel may be transferred laterally and vertically and even in
office locations, if necessary. Pursuant to the company’s retrenchment
program, the Financial Services Department was abolished. As a result
of the abolition, the petitioner had to be assigned elsewhere. The
labor arbiter found nothing questionable nor suspicious in the company’s
retrenchment program and instead recognized that it was genuinely
motivated. Thus, the company proved that in 1980, twenty-nine (29)
personnel who had either resigned or had been terminated were not
replaced.

We, therefore, agree with the public respondent’s findings that the
company was not guilty of illegal constructive dismissal and that
instead of being terminated in her employment, the petitioner was merely
re-assigned pursuant to a legitimate exercise of managerial
prerogatives.

The petitioner’s contentions that her plight was ignored because she was
a secretary to Mr. Lim whom the private respondent “hated” have no
merit. The facts show otherwise.

It is perhaps timely to reiterate well settled principles involving
decisions of administrative agencies. Findings of quasi judicial
agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but
at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. (Special Events and Central Shipping Office Workers Union v.
San Miguel Corporation, 122 SCRA 557 citing International Hardwood and
Veneer Co. of the Philippines v. Hon. Vicente Leogardo, et al., 117 SCRA
967; Genconsu Free Workers Union v. Inciong, 91 SCRA 311; Dy Keh Beng
v. International Labor and Marine Union of the Phil., 90 SCRA 162). And
in a catena of cases, this Court has held that the findings of facts of
the National Labor Relations Commission are binding on the Court
(Philippine Labor Alliance Council PLAC v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 75
SCRA 162; Pan-Phil. Life Insurance Co. v. NLRC, 114 SCRA 866;
Pepsi-Cola Labor Union – BFLU-TUPAS Local Chapter No. 896 v. NLRC, 114
SCRA 960) if supported by substantial evidence (Reyes v. Philippine
Duplicators, Inc., 109 SCRA 438).

The factual findings of the public respondent show that Tierra Factors
Corporation was merely exercising management prerogatives recognized by
the Labor Code which provides:

Art. 284. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. –
The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to
the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment
to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this title, x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)

This Court has always sought to implement in proper cases the social
justice and protection to labor provisions found in Sections 6 and 9
respectively of Article II of the Constitution. But at the same time,
we have also accorded justice to the employer by recognizing and
affirming its right to lay off and dismiss employees justified by losses
in its operations, lack of work, and considerable reduction in the
volume of business. (Gregorio Araneta Employees’ Union, et al. v.
Roldan, et al., 97 Phil. 304; Special Events and Central Shipping Office
Workers’ Unions v. San Miguel Corp., 122 SCRA 557; Redundancy: Shell
Oil Workers’ Union v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., L-28607, Feb. 12,
1972; LVN Pictures Employees’ and Workers Association v. LVN Pictures,
Inc., 35 SCRA 147).

In a fairly recent case, this Court had occasion to reiterate
management’s prerogative to close or abolish a department or section of
the employer’s establishment for economic reasons. We reasoned out that
since the greater right to close the entire establishment and cease
operations due to adverse economic conditions is granted an employer,
the closure of a part thereof to minimize expenses and reduce
capitalization should also be recognized. Thus, in Special Events Central Shipping Office Worker’s Union v. San Miguel Corporation (122 SCRA 557) we ruled:

“The determination of the usefulness of a section being a company
prerogative, the closure may not be questioned specially in this case
where it is impelled by economic reasons due to the continuous losses
sustained in its operations coupled with the lack of demand for services
of such section. In Insular Lumber Co. Inc., v. CA, 80 SCRA 28, it was
held that just cause for terminating employment within a definite
period is closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
enterprise. While it is true that only one section of the company is
affected, the section involved in this case is one where the continuous
work could not even be guaranteed, and it was held in Pan-Am World
Airways, Inc. v. CIR, et al., 17 SCRA 813 that lack of work as a cause
of lay-off is justified.”

We note, moreover, that instead of terminating the petitioner’s
employment, the private respondent merely reassigned her to other
temporary positions before giving her a permanent job as secretary in
the Technical Training Department located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. The acts of the company negate the petitioner’s claim of
discrimination and illegal constructive dismissal. It tried its best to
continue using her services. Needless to say, no reinstatement can be
effected because the petitioner has not been dismissed. Neither may she
be reinstated to her former position which no longer exists. Ad imposible nemo tenetur.
Insofar as this aspect of the petition is concerned, the respondent
NLRC committed no abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s
appeal.

The petitioner’s termination from her last position as secretary to the
Senior Manager for Technical Training based on abandonment is, however, a
different matter. As earlier adverted to, the respondent Commission
found the petitioner’s dismissal on the ground of unauthorized absences
to be illegal. Abandonment cannot be a basis for termination of
employment, because the transfer to Bicutan was precisely the issue
being raised by the petitioner against the employer. According to Mrs.
Dangan, her being transferred to Bicutan was an act of harassment and
discrimination. She could not, therefore, be expected to report for
work at her new assignment until the cases she filed had been resolved.

At the same time, the employer cannot be compelled to pay her backwages
during a period when she was not working because of a sincere but
mistaken belief that she was being harassed and persecuted for having
worked as private secretary to an executive who resigned. The
petitioner has the option of accepting a reassignment to the
respondent’s Bicutan offices without any backwages. Otherwise, she may
avail herself of the separation pay to which an employee laid off due to
retrenchment is entitled under the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED insofar as petitioner’s
reinstatement as Secretary, Technical Training Department is concerned.
In the alternative, the employer shall cause payment to the petitioner
of separation pay computed on the basis of her compensation as
Secretary, Technical Training Department. The petition is DENIED
insofar as it prays that private respondent be required to reinstate the
petitioner to the position of Secretary, Technical Services Department,
with full backwages.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Relova, JJ., concur.