G.R. No. 54427. June 06, 1989
BLUE BAR COCONUT PHILS., INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE MINISTER OF LABOR, THE ACTING REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION AND BLUE BAR WORKERS UNION – PAMBANSANG KAPATIRANG MA…
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
which seeks to annul and set aside the follow orders issued by public
respondents in Case No. R04-2-1634?77-LS, entitled “Blue Bar Workers
Union – Pambansang Kapatirang
Manggagawa – NLU vs. Blue Bar Coconut Philippine
Inc.”:
(a) Order dated March 21, 1977, issued by respondent Acting
Regional Director, thru Vicente Leogardo, Jr.,
Officer-in?Charge, Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, directing
petitioner to pay all its employees the sum of P0.63 as living allowance
deficiency for each day of actual work during the period August 1, 1974 to December 31, 1976;[1]
(b) Order dated November 24, 1978 of the Minister of Labor
through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong
affirming the above stated Order of March
21, 1977;[2]
(c) Order dated March 18, 1980 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the November 24,
1978 Order.[3]
The antecedent facts, as stated in the Memorandum of the
Solicitor General, are as follows:
On 14 December 1973, petitioner and Blue Bar Workers Union
(BBWU), the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers in Blue Bar Coconut
Philippines, entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which
provided for, among others, a general wage increase of P0.80 per day to said
workers, effective 1 January 1974. The
CBA had a three
(3) year duration, from 1 January 1974
to 31 December 1976.
On 4 January 1974,
the President of the Philippines,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, in a speech at the inauguration of the Central
Bank Building,
appealed to private employers to grant ECOLA (emergency cost of living
allowance) to their employees.
On 10 June 1974,
petitioner granted its employees a P1.00 per day ECOLA. It increased this amount to P1.37, first, by
P0.18 and second by P0.19, which increases simultaneously took effect on 1 August 1974.
On 1 August 1974,
P.D. 525 which provided for a mandatory payment to employees or workers of
P2.00 ECOLA per day, became effective.
Sometime in April 1975, petitioner and BBWU entered into an Agreement[4]
in which they acknowledged that the “principal motivation (of petitioner)
in granting P0.80 a day wage increase to its workers was to countervail the
jump in the cost of living as a result of the energy crisis which started in November
1973.” In the same April 1975 Agreement, the BBWU acknowledged that with
the P0.80 a day wage increase
and the daily ECOLA of P1.37, “the Company shall have fully complied with
all laws and agreements involving wages and allowances.”
On 2 February 1977,
respondent BBWU filed with Regional Office No. IV of the Ministry of Labor a
complaint (Case No. R04-2-1634-77-LS) against petitioner for underpayment of
its workers by P0.63 of the P2.00 mandatory ECOLA under P.D. 525.
On 21 March 1977,
respondent Acting Regional Director, thru his officer-in-charge, issued the aforestated first order
in question (Annex A, Petition).
On 24 November 1978,
respondent Minister of Labor, thru his Deputy Minister, issued the aforestated second order in question, which affirmed the
first assailed order of 21 March 1977
(Annex B, Petition).
On 18 March 1980,
respondent Minister, thru his Deputy Minister, issued the aforestated
third order in question which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the order dated 24 November 1978
(Annex C, Petition).
Under date of 14 April
1980, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President,
and on 21 April 1980 a
motion for issuance of a staying order.[5]
On 12 September 1980,
Hon. Jacobo C. Clave, Presidential Executive
Assistant, acting by authority of the President, issued a resolution dismissing
petitioner’s appeal and motion for the issuance of staying order.[6]
The issues for resolution in the case at bar are:
1. whether the P0.80 a day
wage increase granted by petitioner effective 1 January 1974, may be credited as ECOLA pursuant to the
Interpretative Bulletin on LOI 174;
2. whether the CBA dated
December 1973 was impaired when the Agreement of April 1975 was ignored by
public respondents;
3. whether petitioner was
deprived of due process of law;
4. whether the inclusion in
the orders of public respondent of workers who intervened three years after
filing of the complaint runs counter to the 3-year prescriptive period for money claims under the Labor Code.
We shall deal with the first and second issues together as they
are interrelated.
As stated earlier, the President of the Philippines
on 4 January 1974, during
the inauguration of the Central Bank Building, issued an appeal to employers in
the private sector to grant emergency allowance to their low-income employees
in order to help them cope with the increasing prices of prime
commodities. The Interpretative Bulletin
on LOI 174 set the guidelines to
be followed in the grant of the ECOLA.
Section 6 of the Interpretative Bulletin on Letter of
Instructions No. 174 provides:
“Section 6. Allowances
under LOI (174). – All allowances,
bonuses, wage adjustments and other benefits given by employers to their
employees shall be treated by the Department of Labor as in substantial
compliance with the minimum standards set forth in LOI if:
‘(a) they conform with at least the minimum allowance scales specified in the immediately preceding
Section;[7] and
‘(b) they are given in response to the appeal of the President in
his speech on 4 January 1974, or to countervail the quantum jump in the cost of
living as a result of the energy crisis starting in November, 1973, or pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 390; Provided, That the payment is retroactive to 18
February 1974 or earlier.’
“x x x.”
Petitioner avers that at the time it started negotiations on the
CBA with the BBWU in November 1973, the jump in the cost of living was already
of public knowledge. To cushion the
impact of the high cost of living on the employees, the parties mutually
agreed to a P0.80 a day increase in the wages of the workers, effective 1 January 1974. Consequently, petitioner argues, under the abovecited Interpretative Bulletin, the P0.80 a day wage
increase is creditable to the ECOLA of P2.00 under PD No. 525 since the
language of the Bulletin supports the conclusion that wage increases or
adjustments may be considered a creditable part of the emergency allowance for
as long as they have been given “to countervail the quantum jump in the
cost of living as a result of
the energy crisis starting in November 1973.”[8]
Petitioner further argues that its Agreement of April 1975 with
the BBWU, which confirms the parties’ intention when they negotiated the CBA –
that the P0.80 a day wage increase acts to countervail the quantum jump in the
cost of living – was entered into after both parties utilized the grievance and
voluntary arbitration machinery in their CBA, which the law requires.[9]
Hence, the agreement of April 1975, like a voluntary arbitration decision or
award, is final and inappealable by express provision
of law. According to petitioner, the
legal effect of the April 1975 agreement was to render the matter of
petitioner’s compliance with P.D. 525 a closed and terminated issue.
Petitioner finally submits that the
respondent Minister of Labor should not have disregarded the April 1975
agreement, as it is sufficient proof that it (petitioner) has complied with LOI
174 and PD 525. To support its position,
it cites the following provision of the Interpretative Bulletin (supra) –
“Section 6. xxx.
“Allowances and other benefits which are not given in
substantial compliance with the LOI as interpreted herein shall not be treated
by the Department of Labor as emergency allowances in the contemplation of the
LOI unless otherwise shown by sufficient proof. Thus, without such proof, escalation
clauses in collective bargaining agreements concluded before the appeal of the
President providing for automatic or periodic wage increases shall not be
considered allowances for purposes of the LOI.” (underscoring
supplied)
We are not fully persuaded by petitioner’s contention.
It will be noted that at the time the P0.80 a day wage increase
was granted by the petitioner, negotiations
had been ongoing for a new collective bargaining agreement. It was but natural for representatives of the
union, whose members were then feeling the weight of the price increases in
prime commodities, to demand a wage increase for the workers higher than what
had been granted in previous collective bargaining agreements.
On this point, we agree with the Acting Regional Director in
rejecting petitioner’s argument that the P0.80 a day wage increase should be
credited in the computation of the ECOLA, when he held that:
“True, any wage increase can be treated as emergency
allowance. Glaring is the fact, however, that the
said increase was granted as a result of the CBA negotiations concluded in
December, 1973, sixty-six (66) days before the effectivity
of LOI 174, or twenty (20) days before the appeal of the President. Nothing in the record shows – and respondent never bothered to allege – that
the daily wage increase of P0.80 was granted specifically in response to the
appeal of the President. Irresistible is
the conclusion, therefore, that the P0.80 wage increase is – and should be –
termed ‘wage increase’, pure and simple, hence, not part of the emergency allowance.”[10]
In De la Concepcion vs. Mindanao
Portland Cement Corporation,[11]
the Court ruled that emergency allowances that do not conform with LOI 174 and given in the guise of salary
increases are a circumvention of the decree (PD No. 525) granting employees
emergency living allowance.
It is petitioner’s contention that its Agreement of April 1975
with the BBWU is, in effect, a voluntary arbitration award or decision; hence,
it is, as between the parties, final, inappealable
and executory.
Yet, it is evident that the Agreement works to the disadvantage of the workers and runs counter to the
constitutional guarantee of protection
to labor. More importantly, the
Agreement violates the spirit and intent of LOI 174 and P.D. 525 which were
purposely issued to alleviate the plight of low-income employees who have
suffered undue hardship caused by
rising prices of prime commodities. The Court will not look with favor at
agreements, schemes or devices that result in depriving laborers of the full
benefits that the law provides for them.
The respondent Minister of Labor was correct in disregarding said
Agreement.
Even if the Agreement of April 1975 were considered in the same
class as a voluntary
arbitration decision, still, decisions of voluntary arbitrators, while given
the highest respect and, as a rule, accorded a certain measure of finality,
especially where the arbitrators chosen by the parties enjoy first rate
credentials do not preclude the exercise of judicial review over such
decisions. Article 262 of the Labor Code
making voluntary arbitration awards final, inappealable
and executory, except where the money claims exceed
P100,000.00 or 40% of paid up capital of the employer or where there is abuse
of discretion or gross incompetence, refers to appeals to the National Labor
Relations Commission and not to judicial review.[12]
Having resolved the first and second issues, we now come to the
third – the alleged denial of due process to petitioner. Petitioner claims that it was denied due
process because the assailed orders were rendered without benefit of hearing on
a factual issue not resolvable by summary investigation. The records show, however, that following the
practice and procedure before the Regional Office, Ministry of Labor, the BBWU
complaint was set for hearing where the parties were given opportunity to conciliate
their differences, after which they were required to submit position
papers. Another hearing on the complaint
could be dispensed with as, according
to respondent Acting Director, “(T)he facts are not substantially in
dispute.”[13]
There is no violation of due process where the Regional Director
merely required submission of position paper and resolved the labor case
summarily thereafter against the employer without submitting the case for arbitration.[14]
Summary investigation and decision on the merits are proper where the issues
raised by the parties did not involve intricate questions of law.[15]
What the law prohibits is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.[16]
Moreover, petitioner appealed the Order of the Acting Regional
Director to the Minister of Labor and a motion for reconsideration of the Labor
Minister’s order of affirmance was likewise
filed. Whatever flaws the Regional
Director may have committed based on an alleged denial of due process were
deemed cured by the filing of the appeal and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.[17]
Finally, petitioner impugns the jurisdiction of the public
respondents to award the money claims of the workers, contending that they
disregarded the three-year prescriptive period for money claims under Article
291 of the Labor Code, which provides:
“Article 291. Money
Claims. – All money claims arising from
employer-employee relations occurring during the effectivity
of this code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued: otherwise, they shall be
forever barred.”
This issue was not raised before public respondents. It is settled that an issue raised for the first time in a petition
for certiorari can no longer be considered by the Court at such stage.[18]
Moreover, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the complaint was instituted
by respondent union in a representative capacity. The relief sought for involved not only the
109 workers who authorized the filing of the complaint against petitioner on 24 February 1977 but also the other
workers who later intervened as they were similarly situated.[19]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., no part, my son is a member of law firm of petitioner.
Sarmiento, J., on leave.
[1]
Annex A, Petition, Rollo, pp. 30-33
[2]
Annex B, Petition, ibid., pp. 34-35
[3]
Annex C, Petition, ibid., pp. 36-37
[4]
Annex D, Petition, Ibid., pp. 38-39
[5]
Annex A. Private Respondent’s
Supplementary Comment and/or Manifestation dated 25 September 1980. Rollo, p. 73
[6] Id.
[7]
The “immediately preceding section” refers to the determination of
the amount of allowances that should be given by employers to their
employees. Petitioner, being capitalized
at more than P1 Million, is required to give emergency allowance to its
employees of P50.00 a month, or P2.00 per day for daily paid employees.
[8]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 23
[9]
Art. 261, Labor Code of the Philippines
[10]
Annex A, p. 5, Petition, Rollo, p. 32
[11]
127 SCRA 647
[12]
Oceanic Bic Division v. Romero, 130 SCRA 392
(1984); Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers Union
v. Bacungan, 144 SCRA 510 (1986); Continental
Marble Corp., et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
L-43825, 9 May 1988
[13]
Order dated 21 March 1977,
p. 1, Rollo, p. 30
[14] Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Minister of Labor,
L-50238, March 29, 1982,
113 SCRA 257.
[15]
Columbia Development Corporation v. Minister of Labor and Employment,
No. L-57769, Dec. 29, 1986,
146 SCRA 421.
[16] Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company vs. Associate Commissioner Josue L. Cadiao, et al., L-28725, March 12, 1968, 22 SCRA 987
[17]
Alfredo S. Marquez, etc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al., G.R. No.
80685, March 16, 1989, citing De Leon v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 56968, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 117; Remerco
Garments Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos.
56176-77, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 167; Sampang v.
Inciong, G.R. No. 50992, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 56; Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. The Hon. Regional
Director/Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 54285, December 8, 1988
[18]
Alfredo Marquez, etc. v. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Kaisahan
ng Manggagawang Pilipino,
et al., supra.
[19]
Memorandum for Public Respondents, p. 10