PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANICIO MASONGSONG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused-appellant Anicio Masongsong was charged with the crime of rape with homicide
in an information filed against him and reading as
follows:

“That on or about August 16,
1982 in the evening, of (sic) Barangay Inayapan, Municipa­lity of Santa
Maria, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, then provided with a deadly weapon, with lewd design
and with intent to have carnal knowledge, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation succeed in
having sexual intercourse with one AMANDA REYES VDA. DE MATIBAG, an old woman,
67 years of age against her will and consent, and by reasons on the occasion
thereof, after sexually abusing the aforenamed woman, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack and assault
and tie her feet, hands and mouth with a piece of cloth and thereafter drag and
throw said victim, Amanda Reyes Vda. de Matibag, into
an irrigation canal with water which caused her death by abdominal distention,
secondary to massive water swallowing, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of said victim.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (Rollo; p. 3)

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
notwithstanding his admission of guilt in an extra­judicial confession.  After trial, judgment was rendered, its
dispositive portion reading:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ANICIO MASONGSONG y DE
GUZMAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE and
hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme and extreme penalty of DEATH; and to
pay the heirs of Amanda Reyes
the sum of P12,000.00, with accessory penalties
provided for by law, and to pay the costs.” (Rollo, pp. 23-24)

The prosecution evidence upon which the judgment of conviction
was based is as follows:

“Appellant Anicio Masongsong y de Guzman, 23 years of age,
single, was a farmer residing in Bgy. Bejia, Tiaong, Quezon.  In 1979, he was accused of the crime of
Frustrated Murder, which charge was eventually dropped, in consideration of P5,000.00 which he paid to the offended party (tsn., Dec. 20, 1982, pp. 2-19; tsn., Dec. 22, 1982, pp. 19-20).

“In 1981, appellant became close to his uncle, Sergio Ocampo,
when the latter along with his family transferred residence to the same town (id.).

“Sergio formerly lived and owned a house in Bgy. Inayapan, Santa
Maria, Laguna. 
In 1981, he sold it to the victim, Amanda Reyes Vda. de
Matibag, a 67 year old widow, residing in the same place.  After the sale, the old woman immediately
occupied the house but allowed Sergio and family to stay until they finally
moved out to Tiaong, Quezon (tsn., Dec. 3, 1982, pp. 2-19).

On August 16, 1982,
appellant went with Sergio to attend a fiesta celebration in Sta. Maria, Laguna
(tsn., Dec.
20, 1982, pp. 2-19; tsn., Dec.
22, 1982, pp. 19-20).

“At around 6:00 in the
evening, they proceeded to the town plaza to watch an amateur singing
contest.  While in the town plaza, they
met by chance Felisa Macalindong, the victim’s daughter, who was also there
watching.  When Sergio smiled at her,
Felisa readily recognized him, taking noticed of appellant whom she saw for the
first time (tsn., Dec. 3, 1982, pp. 2-19).

“After watching the amateur contest, Sergio and appellant left
the town plaza.  On their way, they
agreed to steal chickens and pig at the victim’s house at Bgy. Inayapan
(Records, Extra-Judicial confession, Exhibit “P”).

“Upon reaching the place, Sergio immediately went under the
house and stole the pig tied to a post and some chickens inside a pen (id.).

“On the other hand, appellant ascended the house and seeing
the old woman, immediately grabbed and forcibly laid her on the floor.  The victim shouted for help, but appellant
took out his knife and threatened to kill her. 
Appellant ripped off her clothes with the knife and mounted her.  After taking off her panties, appellant
hastily unzipped his pants, took out his penis, inserting it into the victim’s
vagina.  The old woman could only cry in
silence, suffering the extreme pain of the
forcible sexual intercourse being perpetrated on her (id.).

“After the bestial act, appellant tied the victim’s hands and
hurried down the house to look for Sergio (id.).

“When he did not find his uncle, appellant proceeded to leave
(id.).

“As he was leaving, however, he saw the old woman (having
freed herself) running towards the ricefields. 
Appellant gave chase and easily overtook her.  He securely tied the victim’s hands with a
string, her feet with her own brassieres and covered her mouth with a white shirt
(id.).  Having bound the victim,
appellant mercilessly junked the old woman into an irriga­tion canal, drowning
her in the process.  He then fled to
Siniloan, Quezon seeking refuge at a friend’s house (id.)

“On the next day, August
17, 1982, Pedro Tromaneri, the barangay captain of Inayapan and
victim’s son-in-law received a report that a dead person was found floating in
the irrigation canal.  Pedro, along with
the other officers of the barangay and police department, rushed to the
place.  They saw the body float­ing on
the water, about a meter high.  When they
retrieved the old woman, Pedro recognized her to be his mother-in-law.  The victim was not wearing underwears.  Her hands and feet were still as tightly
bound and her mouth was covered with a white shirt (tsn.,
November 5, 1982, pp.
18-36).

“Dr. Cynthia Silva, the rural health physi­cian of Sta. Maria
who examined the cadaver, declared her post-mortem findings, as follows:

“‘1.
   Blood clot on the mons veneris,
laceration at the medial aspect, vaginal floor with blood oozing from the
laceration.

“‘2.    Cause of Death:  abdominal disten­tion secondary to massive
swallowing’ (Exh. “A”).

“In court, Dr. Silva explained that the vaginal laceration was
still possible, the victim being an aged widow whose opening had already
narrowed (tsn., Nov. 5, 1982, pp. 4-17).

“Meantime, a certain Rodolfo Padilla surrendered the stolen
pig (placed inside a sack and which was supposedly entrusted to him by Sergio)
to Sgt. Ednalino, a constabulary officer at the PC Detachment in Bgy. Nanguma,
Mabitac, Laguna.  A pair of blue rubber
shoes was likewise recovered from the same sack.  (tsn., Nov. 19, 1982, pp. 5-29).

“Felisa who was then in the PC Station readily recognized the
pig as the same pig stolen from her mother and the pair of shoes as that worn by Sergio at the town plaza in the evening of August 16, 1982.  She informed the PC that Sergio was
accompanied by appellant in the evening of the incident (id.).

“When asked for the description of the two, Felisa replied
that she could not recall appellant’s features since it was the first time she
had ever seen him.  As regards Sergio,
Felisa described him as tall, with pointed chin, chinky eyes and wearing a
yellow striped T-shirt (id.)

“Sgt. Balleber then inquired if she knew their
whereabouts.  Felisa said that Sergio
stayed at the time in the bakery owned by a cer­tain Narding Diola in Sta.
Maria (id.).

“When they went to the place, an old woman informed them that
Sergio, along with a short and pimpled fellow, had just left and gone to a
house behind the cemetery in Siniloan, Quezon. 
Accordingly, the PC proceeded
to the said place and saw three persons conversing with each other.  Sgt. Balleber inquired from them if they knew
Sergio.  Appellant, a short and dimpled
man, asked why he was interested in Sergio. Sgt. Balleber replied that Sergio
was in fact his ‘compadre’.  Appellant
then told him that Sergio was his uncle. 
Suspecting that appellant was indeed Sergio’s companion in the evening
of the incident, Sgt. Balleber pointed at
appellant saying:  ‘So you were the one who killed the old woman!’.  Appellant immediately turned pale and
speechless (tsn., Nov. 19, 1982, pp. 32-35).

“After a while, Sgt. Balleber asked appellant where Sergio
could be found.  Appellant said his uncle
had already gone to Tiaong, Quezon (id.).

“The PC then brought appellant along to Tiaong, Quezon where
Sergio was duly apprehended (tsn., Nov. 19, 1982, pp. 36-37).” (Rollo, pp. 115-122)

The accused-appellant
now assigns the following errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING AND
ACCEPTING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE
ACCUSED WHICH RESULTED IN HIS
CONVICTION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE THE
ALLEGED CONFESSION ASIDE FROM THE EVIDENCE OF CORPUS DELICTI. (Accused-Appellant’s Brief, p. 1)

Considering that the two assigned
errors are closely interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.

The appellant’s main contention is that his extra?judicial
confession should not have been
accepted considering that there was no
evidence to corroborate
it apart from the corpus delicti, and it was not given with the assistance of counsel.

The appellant’s contention is untenable.  In the first place, the records clearly show
that the extra­judicial confession was not the sole basis for his
conviction.  There were pieces of other
evidence presented, to wit:  the
testimonies of Dr. Cynthia Silva, Pedro Tromaneri, Sgt. Jesus Balleber, Juanito
Ednalino, and Felisa Macalindong, the picture of the victim’s geni­talia, the
footprints near the dam and the shoes of the companion of the accused.  When brought to the police station,
co-accused Sergio Ocampo pointed to the appellant as the one who killed the old
woman because he was left there.  (tsn., Nov. 26,
1982, pp. 2-14).  Moreover,
the cause of death of the victim was sufficiently proven.

There is nothing in the
records to suggest that the prosecution witnesses were ill-motivated and had
any grudge or ill-feeling against appellant, or that they
received any compensation or
benefit which could have prompted them to testify falsely for the prosecution (People v. Santillan, 157 SCRA 534
[1988]).

Second, there is
reason for us to reject the extrajudicial confession.  The constitutional requirement of
providing the accused with a counsel to
protect his rights and the process of explaining to the accused his rights were satisfactorily met.

Masongsong was told of
his right to have a lawyer to assist him. 
He stated that he had no money to pay for a lawyer and that he needed no
lawyer to aid him.  When told that the
government would provide him with the free services of counsel, he expressed
his thanks and then conferred with Atty. Cenon Realeza of Siniloan, Laguna who
was appointed to assist him.  It was only
after the conference that he gave a statement. 
The statement was taken in the presence of Fiscal Felipe Arcigal,
Jr.  The constitutional requirements were
sufficiently met.  There is nothing in
the records to suggest the alleged psycholo­gical and physical coercion
employed against him.

To accept the appellant’s
contention that he was in effect denied justice since the counsel assigned to
him was not really his choice is ridiculous. 
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, every lawyer is presumed to
have knowledge of the law as well as the training in procedure sufficient to
enable him to protect his Client. 
Furthermore, the accused was given sufficient time to choose his own
counsel had he opted to do so.  His failure, therefore, to request for another counsel negates his
claim of denial of the right to choose his lawyer.

There is no proof that
the extrajudicial confession was secured through duress, intimidation, or
improper inducement.  The
accused-appellant did not exert any effort to complain about the alleged
physical injuries that he now alleges on appeal.  There was neither a medical certificate to
show that a physical examination was conducted which would show any injury
sustained by him.  On the contrary, the
charges were explained to him and he was apprised of his rights.  All these were explained to him in Tagalog,
the dialect in Laguna where he lived.

The extrajudicial
confession jibed in its details with the other evidence presented as well as the testimonies given.

On the basis of the above, we
are constrained to accept the extrajudicial confession, it appearing
that the same has been corroborated on all material points by the other
evidence presented.

The defense of the
accused-appellant is mainly alibi.  The
records, however, not only show that it was not impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of the incident but precisely fixed his presence
in the house where the rape was committed. 
This Court has held in a sufficient number of cases that alibi is a
defense easily fabricated.  In fact, the
distance from Siniloan, Laguna where the appellant places himself at the time
of the incident and Sta. Maria where the incident happened does not preclude
the possibility that the appellant committed the crime (People v. Santillan, supra).

The accused-appellant’s
actuations are likewise indicative of guilt rather than innocence.  During the two occasions when he was
confronted, he never denied the charges made against him.  Contrary to usual human beha­vior, the
appellant kept silent instead of protesting if he were truly innocent.  The records also reveal that immediately
after the commission of the crime, the accused fled to a friend’s house in
Siniloan.  The Supreme Court has held in
not a few cases that flight after the incident is indicative of guilt (People
v. Reunir, 157 SCRA 686 [1988]; People v. Masangkay, 157 SCRA 320 [1988]).

Lastly, the accused-appellant contends that he was not positively
identified as the perpetrator of the crime since there was no witness to the
actual commission of the crime.

The absence of witnesses in rape cases is not unusual as the
offended party, more often than not, is the only one available to prove the
commission of the crime of rape.  Rape is
usually done with the least possibility of being seen by the public.  In fact, the presence of eyewitnesses could
even raise serious doubts (People v. Landicho, 43 O.G. 3167).  In this particular case, the only person who
could testify against the accused-appellant, namely, the victim herself, was hogtied, thrown into an irrigation canal and
left to drown.

The records of the case
lead us to only one conclu­sion
— that the accused-appellant is guilty beyond rea­sonable
doubt of the crime charged.

There being no reason for
us to reverse the lower court’s decision, we
hereby affirm its decision with some modifications as to the non-imposition of
the death penalty and the increase of the indemnity following the latest
decisions of this Court.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED except for the reduction of the death penalty to
reclusion per­petua, pursuant to Section 19, Article III of the
Constitution, and the increase in the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased,
Amanda Reyes, Vda. de Matibag which shall be THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.