ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY AND TORIBIO T. BELLA, RESPONDENT.

Entry of judgment was made in this case on 18 August 1988.

Notwithstanding full awareness thereof, petitioners filed this
“Second Motion for Reconsideration with Request to Refer Case En
Banc” on the claim that the Resolution of this Division, dated 13 July
1988, is erroneous and, therefore, cannot attain finality.  In that Resolution.

“x x x the Court RESOLVED to DENY
the petition for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court
of Appeals had committed any reversible error in holding that the rates
prevailing at the time the complaint was filed should be applied in this case. 
It would be iniquitous and unconscionable to require the payment of the
increased fees which took effect one (1) year and two (2) months after the
complaint was filed in the Court below.”

Not only has entry of judgment been made, but also, petitioners’
Motion for Extension within which to file
a Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution of 31 August
1988, and the present Second Motion for Reconsideration was filed without leave
of Court.  Ordinarily, therefore, this
Second Motion for Reconsideration
should be expunged from the records. 
Nonetheless, we have opted to dwell on the allegations made by
petitioners.

To recall the antecedents – on 2 August 1983,
private respondent Atty. Toribio R. Bella, filed suit
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Civil
Case No. 39001) for payment of attorney’s fees.  He did not specify the amount of his claim in
the body of the Complaint but in the prayer he asked that petitioners be
ordered to pay him, “jointly and severally, reasonable attorney’s fees
based on quantum meruit for
services rendered in Civil Case No. 11180.” The docket clerk assessed the
amount of P210.00 as filing fees.

During the trial, testifying as a witness for himself, private
respondent declared the amount of his attorney’s fees to be P44,200,000.00, that is, 25% of the market value of the land
subject matter of Civil Case No. 11180. 
That prompted petitioners to file, on 23 April 1984, a Motion praying
that private respondent be ordered to pay the “proper amount of filing fee
before proceeding with the trial.” Said Motion as well as the Motion for
Reconsideration filed thereafter was denied by the trial Court, private
respondent’s claim being on quantum meruit.

Elevated by petitioner to the Court of Appeals on Certiorari
and Prohibition (CA-G.R. No. 03868), said Court, on 29 March 1985,^[1]
disposed of the Petition before
it thus:

“WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby granted and respondent
judge is prohibited from further hearing Civil Case No. Q-39001
unless and until private respondent
pays the correct filing fee.  This
case is remanded to the lower court for recomputation
of the filing fees based on the 25 percent of the 44 hectares involved in its
Civil Case No. 11180 at P400.00 per square meter and on whatever attorney’s
fees claimed by private respondent in Case No. Q-39001.”
(Underscoring supplied)

Under the rates in force at the time private respondent filed his
Complaint on 2 August 1983, the filing fee due on his claim would have been P89,000.00.  In fact, the
text of the Decision of the Court of Appeals contains the statement that
“the total filing fee is computed at P89,000.00,
more or less” (p. 10, Decision). 
Petitioners arrived at the same computation (p. 2, CA Resolution of
January 29, 1988, p. 25, Rollo).

However, on 19 July 1984, the Supreme Court increased the rates
of docket fees effective 1 October 1984. 
Under the increased rates, the filing fees on private respondent’s claim
would reach P178,164.00.

In January, 1987, private respondent tendered before the lower
Court the amount of P89,000.00 but the docket clerk
refused to accept the same and insisted on the payment of P178,164.00.

On 21 January 1987
private respondent filed before the Trial Court an Urgent Motion to require the Clerk of Court to accept
additional filing fees in accordance with the rates prevailing at the time of filing, which said Court
granted.

On 16 March 1987, or, three
(3) years after they had filed their Motion to require private respondent to
pay “the proper amount for filing fee” dated 23 April 1984, and after
the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 29 March 1985 had become final and executory (p. 2, CA Resolution of January 29, 1988, p. 25, Rollo), petitioners raised for the first time the matter of
increased filing fee in a Motion for Clarification filed before the Court of
Appeals.  Petitioners alleged that there
was a “seeming ambiguity” in said Court’s Decision of 29 March 1985
when it referred to the “correct filing fee,” and urged said Court to
make the necessary “clarification” so as to effect a recomputation of the filing fee based on the new rates.

On 17 July 1987 the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Clarification for absence of any ambiguity. 
On 29 January 1988, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was similarly
denied, with said Court^[2]
stating:

“x x x In
any case, if the phrase `correct filing fee’ as used in the dispositive
portion of the decision needs clarification, which it does not, it should be interpreted as the filing fee based on the rates at the time the complaint was
filed.  x x x “

Hence, this Petition for Review
on Certiorari, which we denied in the Resolution of 13 July 1988,
heretofore quoted.

Anent petitioners’ plea that the issue raised should be referred
to the Court en banc, petitioners are hereby informed that it was
so referred “en consulta” on 28 June 1988
and, after deliberation, the Court en banc “Resolved
to RETURN this case to the Second Division of this Court” (p. 98, Rollo), the
unanimous opinion being to apply the old rates. 
Accordingly, on 13 July 1988, the Second Division issued the questioned
Resolution.

Petitioners insist that the aforequoted
Resolution of 13 July 1988 is erroneous because it reverses the Manchester case
(G. R. No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562), holding that the complaint is
not deemed filed until the prescribed docket fees are paid and that only then shall the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case.

There is no error nor any reversal.

The focal issue is:  which
rate of docket fees should be paid by the private respondent – the new rates
which took effect on 1 October 1984 before
the promulgation of the Decision of the Court of Appeals on 29 March 1985, or
the rates in force on 2 August 1983 when the Complaint was filed?

We ruled that the old rates should apply.  The Resolution of this Court, dated 19 July
1984, amending Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and prescribing new rates of
docket fees, was expressly made to take effect on 1 October 1984 thereby
making the same applicable to cases filed from that date onward.  The general rule, therefore, that procedural
statutes may be applied retrospectively finds no applicability to the present
case.  The Complaint was filed on 2
August 1983 while petitioners filed their Motion for payment of the correct
filing fee on 23 April 1984, both pleadings way before the prescribed effectivity date.

Moreover, in the Manchester case, there was a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees prompting the Court to condemn such “fraudulent practice.”  In this case, however, as observed by the
Court of Appeals:

“x x x It is the sense of this Court – in the very least, there
is no allegation, much less proof, to the contrary – that private respondent
acted in good faith in originally paying a lesser amount of attorney’s fee, laboring on the
belief that the amount of attorney’s fee that he was seeking to recover was
based on quantum meruit, so
that the filing fee would depend on the amount of the award in the final
decision.  x x x” (p. 3, Resolution, January 29, 1988)

Note should also be taken of the fact that the ruling in the
Manchester case has been relaxed in Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs. Hon. Maximo C. Asuncion (G. R. Nos. 79337-38, February 13, 1989)
wherein it was held:  “This Court
reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed fee. 
However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a
reasonable time.”

 ACCORDINGLY,
petitioners’ Second Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with
FINALITY.  The entry of judgment made on
18 August 1988 stands.  No further
pleadings in this case will be entertained.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.

^[1] Penned by Justice Santiago M. Kapunan and concurred in by Justice Milagros A. German,
Jose A. R. Melo and Alfredo M. Lazaro.

^[2] By Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, with Justices Bienvenido
C. Ejercito, Nathanael P. de Pano,
Jr., and Pedro A. Ramirez, concurring, and Justices A.R. Melo,
dissenting.