CONTINENTAL BANK, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HON. JOEL P. TIANGCO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XXVIII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, INCOME AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, STAR LI…

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision dated
September 26, 1967, ordering Income and Acceptance Corporation, Star Life
Insurance Corporation and Primitivo E. Domingo to pay
solidarily to the Continental Bank the sum of
forty-six thousand three hundred pesos and eighty-one centavos (P46,300.81), with twelve percent interest per annum
from June 1, 1967 until the principal has been fully paid, plus attorney’s fees
of three thousand pesos and the costs (Civil Case No. 69703).

That judgment was rendered on the basis of the evidence which was
presented before the deputy clerk of court who was commissioned to receive the
same after the defendants were declared in default for nonappearance at the
pre-trial.  As no appeal was interposed
from the said judgment, it became final and executory.  It was not satisfied.

The sheriff in his return dated August 30, 1968 stated that he served the writ of
execution upon the judgment debtor, P.E. Domingo, who manifested that he would
settle the case with the bank.  After the
expiration of the sixty-day period, without the judgment having been satisfied,
the sheriff returned the writ to the court.

On March 17, 1977,
the bank, “through the Statutory Receiver”, filed a complaint also in
the Court of First Instance of Manila for the revival of the said judgment
(Civil Case No. 107556).  It was alleged
therein that the judgment debtors (now the private respondents) had made
partial payments and that the amount due as of March 15, 1977 was thirty-four thousand six hundred
twenty-two pesos and nineteen centavos (P34,622.19)
with twelve percent interest a year from March 16, 1977.  The
bank prayed that the judgment be revived.

The defendants answered the complaint.  Then, they filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the action for revival of judgment had prescribed and that the
plaintiff bank had no cause of action because the judgment sought to be revived
is void since it was based on the evidence received by the deputy clerk of
court as commissioner.

The motion to dismiss was opposed by the bank.  The trial court granted the motion in a
minute order which reads: 
“Considering the allegations contained, the arguments advanced and
the doctrine cited in defendants’ motion to dismiss as well as those of the
opposition filed thereto by the plaintiff, the Court resolves to grant the
motion.” The plaintiff appealed under Republic Act 5440.

We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute order
like the one under appeal.  A trial court
should specify in its order the reasons for the dismissal of the complaint so
that when the order is appealed, this Court can readily determine from a casual
perusal thereof whether there is a prima facie justification for
the dismissal.

The contention that the action for revival of the judgment had
prescribed is manifestly devoid of merit. “A judgment may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory.  After the lapse of such time, and before it
is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action.” (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.) The prescriptive period for
enforcing a judgment is ten years (Art. 1144[3], Civil Code).

In this case, the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment had
not yet expired when the action for its revival was filed on March 17, 1977 because, as already
stated, the judgment was rendered on September
26, 1967.  Respondents’
contention that between September 26,
1967 and March 17, 1977
a period of ten years, five months and twenty-one days had elapsed is a
palpable error.

There can be no doubt that the action herein was filed within ten
years from the rendition of the judgment, not to mention the date of the entry
thereof, which, although not shown in the record, can be assumed to be much
later.

Also erroneous and unmeritorious is respondents’ contention that the
judgment in question is void and unenforceable because it was based on evidence
which was heard by the deputy clerk of court as commissioner.  That judgment is valid and enforceable
because it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and it was not
impaired by extrinsic fraud nor by lack of due
process.  The trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the judgment debtors.  They acquiesced in the validity of the
judgment when they made partial payments to satisfy it.

The defendants or private respondents did not question in the
lower court its delegation to the deputy clerk of court of the duty to receive
plaintiff’s evidence.  There is no
showing that they were prejudiced by such a procedure, that the commissioner
committed any mistake or abuse of discretion, or that the proceedings were
vitiated by collusion and collateral fraud. 
It is too late at this hour for them to question the reception of
plaintiff’s evidence by the deputy clerk of court acting as commissioner.  (See CCC Insurance Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, L-25920, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 264; 2 Moran’s Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 159-160 citing Apurillo
vs. Garciano, L-23683, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1054;
Province of Pangasinan and Soriano
vs. Palisoc, 116 Phil. 609, 614. Cf. Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, L-40098, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 425, 453-4.)

WHEREFORE, the trial court’s order of dismissal is
reversed and set aside.  Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
and Abad
Santos, JJ., concur.