THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BONIFACIO ALVARADO, ERNESTO ROBLES AND JOHN DOE, ALIAS MARIO VILLACAMPA, ALIAS BOY RAVACAL, ALIAS BEN TAGALOG, AS PRINCIPA…

Bonifacio Alvarado, Ernesto Robles and
Mario Villacampa, as principals, and Wenceslao Alvarado (Bonifacio’s
brother), as an accomplice, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu with robbery with homicide for having robbed in the
evening of July 3, 1966 the house of Erlinda N. Misa located at Hippodromo, Cebu City, taking from her at gunpoint the sum of one
hundred pesos and killing her on the occasion of the robbery.

Treachery, nocturnity, disregard of
sex, use of a motor vehicle and abuse of superiority were alleged as
aggravating circumstances.  Wenceslao Alvarado was charged as an accomplice for having
opened the side-gate of the Misa residence to enable
the three malefactors to enter the house.

It was further alleged in the information that Erlinda sustained an entrance gunshot wound in the chest, a
gunshot wound of exit in the back, injuries in the blood vessels at the base of
her neck and injuries in the lungs and that there was a twenty-nine
centimeter-long fetus in her uterus.

Bonifacio, Wenceslao
and Ernesto were arrested on July 19,
1966.  Villacampa
was not arrested.  When arraigned on the
original information, wherein five aggravating circumstances were alleged,
Ernesto and Bonifacio, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded guilty.  Wenceslao pleaded not guilty.

Later, the counsel of Bonifacio and
Ernesto moved that the plea of guilty be withdrawn.  He manifested that he would ask the fiscal to
reinvestigate the case with respect to the aggravating circumstances.  The trial court allowed the withdrawal of the
plea of guilty.

The fiscal amended the information by eliminating the aggravating
circumstances of disregard of sex and use of a motor vehicle.  Ernesto and Bonifacio
were re-arraigned on August 27, 1966.  They were assisted by their counsel.  The amended information was translated to
them in the Cebuano dialect.  Again, they pleaded guilty.

Their counsel moved that they be given the benefit of the
mitigating circumstances of poverty, lack of instruction and lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong.  The fiscal
objected to the motion.

Thereafter, the following proceedings took place:

“Court (to accused Robles and Alvarado):  I believe your lawyer must have explained to
you the nature of the crime charged.  As
a matter of fact when this was arraigned two weeks ago you pleaded guilty.

“But when you were reminded of the seriousness of this case,
your lawyer asked that your plea of guilty be withdrawn so that he could study
the case, now the fiscal has filed an amended
information.  This is the one just read
to you so that with the assistance of your lawyer you pleaded guilty.

“Do you realize that this crime is serious, that you will be
punished in accordance with law and what the court wants is that you will be
punished in accordance with the law because you admit that you are guilty.

“Accused Alvarado:  I
plead guilty but I do not realize the gravity of the penalty because this is
the first time that I have been involved in crime.

“Court:  I am telling
you that this is a serious crime and the penalty may be life imprisonment or
death, it depends upon the mitigating circumstances that the court will
appreciate.

“Accused Alvarado:  I
ask that since this is the first time I have committed a crime that the penalty
be imposed in the minimum because I have a family.

“Court:  Your lawyer has
invoked all the mitigating circumstances but if it is not also allowed by law,
we cannot also consider those circumstances, the court will only follow the
law.  So you already understand the
consequences?

“Alvarado:  Yes, I
understand.

“Court:  And you insist
on your plea of guilty?

“Alvarado:  I will just
plead guilty, sir, because it is true that I have committed the crime.

“Court:  You Ernesto
Robles, you also plead guilty?

“Robles: 
Yes, sir.

“Court:  Alright, just
wait for the promulgation of the decision.”

No decision was rendered right away by the trial court.  Counsel for the accused submitted a
memorandum in support of his contention that the said three mitigating
circumstances should be appreciated in their favor.

A trial was held as to Wenceslao
Alvarado, who as already stated, was charged as an accomplice and who had
pleaded not guilty.  At that trial, Conchita Serdoncillo and Carmen
N. Rosal (the sister of the victim, Erlinda Misa), both of whom lived
with Erlinda in her residence, testified as to how
the robbery with homicide was committed by Robles, Bonifacio
Alvarado and Villacampa and how Wenceslao
Alvarado cooperated with the three malefactors in perpetrating that crime.

Presented in evidence at that trial were the
necropsy report on the injuries suffered by Erlinda
Misa (Exh. G), the
affidavits of Robles and the Alvarado brothers (Exh.
H, I and J), the hats of Robles, Villacampa and Bonifacio Alvarado and the adhesive tape and pieces of
twine (Exh. A to F) found at the scene of the crime
and used in the commission thereof.

The trial court convicted Wenceslao
Alvarado as an accomplice in its decision of December 23, 1966. 
He did not appeal.  In a separate
decision dated December 24, 1966, the lower court convicted Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado as principals in the robbery with
homicide, sentenced them to death and ordered them to pay solidarily
to the heirs of Erlinda Misa
an indemnity of four thousand eight hundred pesos plus eighty pesos “as
their share” of the stolen money. 
It further held the two subsidiarily liable
for the sums of one thousand two hundred pesos and twenty pesos which represent
the shares or quotas of their accomplice in the indemnities of P6,000 and P100
(Criminal Case No. V-12013).

Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado did not
appeal.  The record was elevated to this
Court for the review of the death sentence imposed upon them.

Their counsel de oficio
contends that the trial court erred in not taking additional evidence for the
purpose of ascertaining the circumstances attending the commission of the crime
and in imposing the death penalty.

We hold that in this case there was substantial compliance with
the long settled rule that “the proper and prudent course to follow where
the accused enters a plea of guilty to capital offenses, specially where he is
an ignorant person with little or no education, is to take testimony not only
to satisfy the trial judge himself but to aid the Supreme Court in determining
whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning,
full significance and consequences of his plea” (People vs. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767, 770).

In effect, that rule was observed by the trial court because
after Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado had entered their
plea of guilty, the death sentence was not rendered immediately.  There was a trial as to their co-accused, Wenceslao Alvarado, who had pleaded not guilty.

At that trial, the prosecution presented its evidence to prove
that robbery with homicide was committed by Robles and Bonifacio
Alvarado, as co-principals, and by Wenceslao Alvarado
as an accomplice.  Wenceslao
was represented at that trial by the same lawyer who represented
Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado at their arraignment.

What the trial court should have done was to require Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado to be present at the trial of Wenceslao Alvarado. 
Its failure to do so should not be a ground for setting aside the death
sentence or for remanding the case (at this late day or thirteen years after
their arraignment) for the purpose of presenting the prosecution’s evidence
against them.

It should further be recalled that the trial court imposed the
death sentence on Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado after
it had finished the trial of Wenceslao Alvarado and
after it had rendered its separate judgment against him.

Obviously, the trial court, in imposing the death sentence, took
judicial notice of the evidence presented by the prosecution against Wenceslao Alvarado which was the same evidence proving the
complicity of Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado in the
crime imputed to him.

It may be argued that because Robles and Bonifacio
Alvarado were not present at that trial (their counsel attended the trial as Wenceslao Alvarado’s counsel), the
prosecution’s evidence therein is res inter
alios acta as
to them (Sec. 25, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

Considering the singular facts of this case, as above-recited,
the rule of res inter alios acta should
not be strictly applied herein because Robles and Bonifacio
Alvarado were themselves the co-accused of Wenceslao
Alvarado and were not strangers to the case wherein the trial was held.

Using the decision against Wenceslao
Alvarado as a basis for ascertaining whether the aggravating circumstances
alleged in the amended information should be appreciated against his
co-accused, Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado, we find
that treachery was not proven because no eyewitness testified as to how the victim,
Erlinda Misa, was assaulted
and killed by Villacampa (at large) and Bonifacio Alvarado.

But abuse of superiority, nocturnity
and dwelling are aggravating.  Plea of
guilty is the only mitigating circumstance that may be appreciated in favor of
Robles and Bonifacio Alvarado.  Lack of instruction and lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong cannot be considered extenuating in this case.

Justices Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., G. S. Santos, Guerrero, De Castro and
Herrera, or seven justices, voted for the affirmance
of the death penalty.  Justices Teehankee and Barredo voted for
the imposition of reclusion perpetua.  The Chief Justice concurred in the dissent of
Justice Abad Santos, except as to the last paragraph
thereof.  Justice Fernandez concurred in
the dissent of Justice Abad Santos.

WHEREFORE, the trial court’s judgment of conviction is
affirmed but, for lack of necessary votes, the death penalty is commuted to reclusion
perpetua. 
The indemnity of four thousand eight hundred pesos is increased to
twelve thousand pesos.  The two accused
are solidarily liable for that indemnity.  Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., concurs in the conviction of the accused but votes for the imposition
of life imprisonment in view of their long detention after the judgment of the
trial court.

Abad Santos, J., see dissent.

Fernando, C.J., and
Fernandez, J., joins J. Abad
Santos in his dissenting opinion.

Teehankee, J., votes for the imposition of reclusion perpetua in a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., no part.