ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

An appeal interposed on
June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-appellant, Ortigas & Co.,
Limited Partnership, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at Pasig, Hon.
Andres Reyes presiding, which dismissed its complaint in Civil Case No. 7706,
entitled, “Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, plaintiff, v. Feati Bank and Trust
Company, defendant”, for lack of merit.

The following facts – a
reproduction of the lower court’s findings, which, in turn, are based on a
stipulation of facts entered into by the parties – are not disputed.  Plaintiff (formerly known as “Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia“) is
a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and
Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. 
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling
lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal.^[1]

On March 4,
1952, plaintiff, as
vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements
of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong,
Rizal.  On July 19,
1962, the said
vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor
of one Emma Chavez.  Upon completion of
payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds
of sale in favor of Emma Chavez.  Both
the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained
the stipulations or restrictions that:

“1.  The parcel of land subject of this deed of
sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes,
and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it
or any other lots belonging to the Seller.

2.    All buildings and other improvements (except
the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of
strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary
installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic
tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its
boundary lines.”^[2]

The above restrictions
were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, covering the said lots and issued in the name of
Emma Chavez.^[3]

Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos.
101613 and 106092 issued in its name, respectively, and the building
restrictions were also annotated therein.^[4]
Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly from
Emma Chavez, “free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex
‘D’,”^[5]
while Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic
Flour Mills through a “Deed of Exchange”, Annex “E”.^[6] TCT
No. 101719 in the name of Republic Flour Mills likewise contained the same
restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that
Republic Flour Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 “in good faith, free
from all liens and encumbrances,” as stated in the Deed of Sale, Annex
“F”^[7] between
it and Emma Chavez.

Plaintiff-appellant
claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719,
101613, and 106092 were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed
for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which
forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and
industrial sites are also designated or established.^[8]

Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area
along the western part of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and
industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.^[9] It
alleges that plaintiff-appellant “completely sold and transferred to third
persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue”^[10] and the subject lots thereunder
were acquired by it “only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years
after the area x x x had
been declared a commercial and industrial zone x x x.”^[11]

On or about May 5,
1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the
construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking
purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims could
also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes.  The following day, plaintiff-appellant
demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the
construction of the commercial building on the said lots.  The latter refused to comply with the demand,
contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the
zoning regulations, defendant-appellee having filed
building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building and
planning permits to proceed with the construction.^[12]

On the basis of the
foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the lower
court for decision.  The complaint
sought, among other things, the issuance of “a writ of preliminary
injunction x x x
restraining and enjoining defendant, its agents, assigns, and those acting on
its or their behalf, from continuing or completing the construction of a
commercial bank building in the premises x x x involved, with the view to commanding the defendant to
observe and comply with the building restrictions annotated in the defendant’s
transfer certificate of title.”

In deciding the said
case, the trial court considered, as the fundamental issue, whether or not the
resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong
declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and
industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions
imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question.^[13] The records do not show that a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued.

The trial court upheld
the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint,
holding that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution
No. 27, supra.  It predicated its
conclusion on the exercise of police power of the said municipality, and
stressed that private interest should “bow down to general interest and
welfare”.  In short, it upheld the
classification by the Municipal Council of the area along Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and
held that the same rendered “ineffective and unenforceable” the
restrictions in question as against defendant-appellee.^[14] The trial court decision further emphasized
that it “assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that there is no
issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and
void.”^[15]

On March 2,
1965,
plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision,^[16] which motion was opposed by defendant-appellee on March 17, 1965.^[17] It averred, among others, in the motion for
reconsideration that defendant-appellee “was
duty bound to comply with the conditions of the contract of sale in its favor,
which conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Title
issued in her (Emma Chavez’) favor.” It also invited the trial court’s
attention to its claim that “. . . the Municipal Council had (no) power to
nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant corporation.”^[18]

The trial court denied
the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965.^[19]

On April 2,
1965
plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the
complaint and from the order of March 26, 1965 denying
the motion for reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal bond.^[20] On April 14, the appeal was given due course^[21]
and the records of the case were
elevated directly to this Court, since only questions of law are raised.^[22]

Plaintiff-appellant
alleges in its brief that the trial court erred –

I.   When it sustained the view that Resolution
No. 27, series of 1960, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong,
Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as
part of the commercial and industrial zone, is valid because it did so in the
exercise of its police power; and

II.   When it failed to consider whether or not the
Municipal Council had the power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed
by defendant-appellee and when it did not make a
finding that the building was erected along the property line, when it should
have been erected two meters away from said property line.^[23]

The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors.  In this connection, We already had occasion
to hold in Relativo v. Castro^[24]
that “(I)t is not incumbent on the
appellee, who occupies a purely defensive position,
and is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error.”

The only issues to be
resolved, therefore, are:  (1) whether
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power; and (2) whether
the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations
assumed by defendant-appellee.

1.  The contention that the
trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise
of police power is without merit.  In the
first place, the validity of the said resolution was never questioned before
it.  The rule is that the question of law
or of fact which may be included in the appellant’s assignment of errors must
be those which have been raised in the court below, and are within the issues
framed by the parties.^[25]
The object of requiring the parties to present all questions and issues to the
lower court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable
the lower court to pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal may
determine whether or not such ruling was erroneous.  The requirement is in furtherance of justice
in that the other party may not be taken by surprise.^[26]
The rule against the practice of blowing “hot and cold” by assuming
one position in the trial court and another on appeal will, in the words of
Elliot, prevent deception.^[27]
For it is well-settled that issues or defenses not raised^[28]
or properly litigated^[29]
or pleaded^[30]
in the Court below cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.

In this particular case,
the validity of the resolution was admitted, at least impliedly, in the
stipulation of facts below, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the
same.  The only controversy then as
stated by the trial court was “. . . whether or not the resolution of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong x x x which declared Lots Nos. 4
and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in question.”^[31]
Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if
impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.

But, assuming arguendo that
it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of
the invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion
that its posture is unsustainable. 
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act,^[32]
empowers a Municipal Council “to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations“^[33] for the municipality.  Clearly, the law does not restrict the
exercise of the power through an ordinance. 
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly
is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word
“regulation” under the provision. 
As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists
“(A)ny provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding x x x.”

An examination of Section
12 of the same law^[34] which prescribes the rules for its
interpretation likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality
should be “liberally construed in its favor” and that “(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the
power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be
presumed to exist.” The same section further mandates that the general
welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more
power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare
and material progress of the people in the community.  The only exceptions under Section 12 are
existing vested rights arising out of a contract between a “a province,
city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other,” in which
case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern.  The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the
case at bar.

2.  With regard to the
contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations
assumed by the defendant-appellee – referring to the
restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee
– it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people.”^[35] Invariably described as “the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers”^[36] and “in a sense, the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government,”^[37] the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guarantee.^[38] As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine
Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al.^[39] police power “is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow
circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the
legal progress of a democratic way of life.” We were even more
emphatic in Vda. de Genuino
vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al.,^[40]
when We declared:  “We do not see
why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should
not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power.”

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway
54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short)
from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an
industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong, Rizal in
the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace,
good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.  Judicial notice may be taken of the
conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are
located.  The lots themselves not only
front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about
the place.  EDSA, a main traffic artery
which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area,
supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the
residents in its route.  Having been
expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the
circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

The scope of police power
keeps expanding as civilization advances, stressed this Court, speaking thru Justice
Laurel in the leading case of Calalang v.
Williams, et al.^[41]  Thus
–

“As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195
US 223, 238 49 L. ed. 169), ‘the right to exercise the police power is a
continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of
changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to
the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good.‘
And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil. 440), it was
observed that ‘advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police
power of the state today things which were not thought of as being with in such
power yesterday.  The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion,
with an increasing desire on the part of
the masses and of the government to look after and care for the
interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power
many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered.'”^[42]
(Emphasis, supplied.)

Thus,
the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.  Persons may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state^[43] and to this fundamental aim of our
Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.^[44]

The need for reconciling
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the valid exercise of police power
may also be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis^[45] wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo,
speaking for the Court, resolved the conflict “between one welfare and
another, between particular and general,” thus –

“Nor is the concept of the general welfare static.  Needs that were narrow or parochial a
century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation.  What is critical or urgent changes with the
times”.^[46]

The motives behind the
passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a
“legitimate response to a felt public need,”^[47] not whimsical or oppressive, the
non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the
municipality’s proper exercise of the power. 
Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it aptly when he declared:  “Police power legislation then is not
likely to succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered
nugatory.”^[48]

Furthermore, We restated
in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General^[49] that laws and reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the parties.  Thus –

“Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to
fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order.  The policy of
protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile – a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order
of society.”

Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of
Industrial Relations,^[50]
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that “x x x the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract,
unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases
where such exclusion is allowed.” The decision in Maritime Company of
the Philippines v. Reparations Commission,^[51]
written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice, restates the
rule.

One last observation. 
Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American jurisprudence and
authorities^[52]
to bolster its theory that the municipal resolution in question cannot nullify
or supersede the agreement of the parties embodied in the sales contract, as
that, it claims, would impair the
obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution.  Such reliance is misplaced.

In the first place, the
views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per se
controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be
construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and such intent
may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto.^[53] In the second place, Dolan, et al. v.
Brown^[54] and Burgess, et al. v. Magarian, et al.,^[55] two of the cases cited by
plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the conclusion reached by the trial court,
i.e. that the municipal resolution supersedes/supervenes over the contractual
undertaking between the parties.  Dolan
v. Brown, states that “Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a
restriction upon the use of property by injunction where the property has so
changed in character and environment as to make it unfit or unprofitable for
use should the restriction be enforced, but will, in such a case,
leave the complainant to whatever remedy he may have at law.”^[56]
(Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the remedy of injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied on the specific holding
that “A grantor may lawfully insert in his deed conditions or restrictions
which are not against public policy and do not materially impair the beneficial
enjoyment of the estate.”^[57]
Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We can say that
since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use
Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendant-appellees should be permitted, on the strength of the
resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the
same for commercial purposes.  In Burgess v. Magarian, et al. it was held that
“restrictive covenants running with the land are binding on all subsequent
purchasers x x x.”
However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended
“to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or other
agreement between parties.”^[58]
In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution.

It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building
restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee
as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later,
in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual
obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly
exercised its police power through the said resolution.  Accordingly, the building restrictions, which
declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from,
dismissing the complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED. 
Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., see concurring opinion.

Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., took no part.

Barredo, J., concurs.  He holds it is a
matter of public knowledge that the place in question is commercial.  It would be worse if the same were to be left
as residential and all around are already commercial.

Abad Santos, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

---

^[1]
Record on Appeal, p. 110.

^[2]
Id., pp. 4-5.  Emphasis supplied.

^[3]
Id., pp. 111-112.

^[4]
Id., p. 112.

^[5]
Id., p. 80.

^[6]
Id., p. 86.

^[7]
Id., p. 94.

^[8]
Id., pp. 112-113.

^[9]
Id., pp. 60 and
113.

^[10]
Brief for Defendant-Appellee, p. 2.

^[11]
Id., p. 3.

^[12]
Record on Appeal, pp. 113-114.

^[13]
Id., p. 114.

^[14]
Id., pp. 114-115.

^[15]
Id., p. 114.

^[16]
Id., p. 116.

^[17]
Id., p. 118.

^[18]
Id., p. 117.

^[19]
Id., p. 127.

^[20]
Id., pp. 127-129.

^[21]
Id., p. 130.

^[22]
Ibid.

^[23]
See Brief for Defendant-Appellee, pp. 30-31.

^[24]
76 Phil. 563, 567 (1946).

^[25]
Sec. 18, Rule 46, Revised Rules of Court; Tan Machan v.
De la Trinidad, 3 Phil. 684, (1946).

^[26]
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. III, 1968 Ed., p. 648, citing Jones
v. Seymour, 95 Art. 593, 597, 130 S.W. 560.

^[27]
Id., pp. 648-649,
cit. Elliot on Appellate Procedure, 416-417.

^[28]
Sumerariz, et al. vs. Development Bank of the Philippines,
et al., L-23764, Dec.
26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1374; San Miguel Brewery, et al. vs.
Vda. de Joves, et al.,
L-24258, June 26, 1968, 23
SCRA 1093, 1097.  See also Tuason vs. Hon. Arca, et al., L-24346, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1308, 1312.

^[29]
Plaridel Surety and Ins. Co. vs. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, L-21520, Dec.
11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1187.

^[30]
Manila Port
Service, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
L21890, March 29, 1968, 22
SCRA 1364.

^[31]
Record on Appeal, p. 114.

^[32]
Sec. 3 reads:

Sec. 3.  Additional powers of provincial boards,
municipal boards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized
municipal district councils.

x x
x

Power to adopt
zoning and planning ordinances.  – Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding Municipal Boards or City
Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized
to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their
respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor
or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. 
Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning
Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning.  (Emphasis supplied.)

^[33]
Emphasis supplied.

^[34]
The full text of Section 12 follows:

“SEC. 12.  Rules for the Interpretation of the Local
Autonomy Act.

1.  Implied power of a province, a city or municipality
shall be liberally construed in its favor. 
Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be
interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.

2.  The general welfare clause be liberally interpreted
in case of local governments in promoting the economic condition, social
welfare and material progress of the people in the community.

3.  Vested rights existing at the time of the
promulgation of this arising out of a contract between a province, city or
municipality on one hand and third party on the other, should be governed by
the original terms and provisions of the same, and in no case would this act
infringe existing right.”

^[35]
Primicias vs. Fugoso,
80 Phil. 77 (1948).

^[36]
Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil.
136 (1919), citing earlier authorities, Justice Malcolm ponente.

^[37]
Edu v. Ericta,
L-3206, Oct. 24, 1970, 35
SCRA 487, Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice, speaking for the court.

^[38]
See Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,
L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20
SCRA 849, Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice, also wrote the decision for the
Court.

^[39]
L-23080, Oct. 20, 1965, 15
SCRA 244, 247-248.

^[40]
L-25035, Feb. 26, 1968, 22
SCRA 792, 797.

^[41]
70 Phil. 726 (1940).

^[42]
Id., p. 734;
Emphasis supplied.

^[43]
Id., p. 733, citing
U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218 (1915).

^[44]
Id., p. 733.

^[45]
301 U.S. 619
(1937).

^[46]
Emphasis supplied.

^[47]
Edu v. Ericta, supra,
p. 489.

^[48]
Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed., p. 558.

^[49]
L-19255, January 18, 1968,
22 SCRA 135, citing Home Building
and Loan Association v. Blaisedell, 78 L. ed.,
413, 428.

^[50]
L-25389-90, June 27, 1968,
28 SCRA 1115, citing Manresa,
Comm. Vol. 8, part 2 (5th Ed.) p. 535.

^[51]
L-29203, July 26, 1971, 40
SCRA 75.

^[52]
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 9-17.

^[53]
Proctor & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corporation vs.
Commissioner of Customs, L-24173, May
23, 1968, 23 SCRA 691.

^[54]
170 NE 425, 428 Illinois (1930).

^[55]
243 NW 356, 358-359 Iowa (1932).

^[56]
Op. Cit. at p. 427.

^[57]
Id., id.

^[58]
Op. Cit. at p. 358.

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