SANDOVAL SHIPYARDS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, AS PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, HON. MINISTER OF LABOR, AND SERGIO SINDAY, RESPONDENTS.

This is an original special civil action for certiorari to
set aside the order in TFU Case No. 786 en­titled “Sergio Sinday vs.
Sandoval Shipyards, Inc.” of the Regional Director of the Department of
Labor at Cebu City, dated March 16, 1977, directing the reinstatement of
private respondent, Sergio Sinday, which order was affirmed by the Acting
Secretary of Labor and by Presi­dential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave in
a decision dated November 27, 1978.^[1]

The petition states that the Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. is engaged
in the ship-building business in Tayud, Consolacion, Cebu and as such employs
around 160 workers; that the private respondent, Sergio Sinday, was employed as
carpenter by the petitioner in December 1974; that on May 4, 1976, the
respondent Sinday applied to go on leave indefinitely from May 6, 1976; that
because no justifiable reason was stated in the application and his services
were vitally needed, the respondent Sinday was told by the petitioner’s manager
that the application for leave would be approved for only fifteen days; that
the respondent Sinday arrogantly refused so that the petitioner disapproved the
application for leave; that the respondent Sinday continued to work thereafter
apparently abandoning his idea to obtain an indefinite leave of absence; that,
however, on May 26, 1976, the respondent Sinday failed to show up and since
then had not reported for work; that in view thereof, the petitioner filed on
August 20, 1976 with the Department of Labor a Clearance Application/Report of
Dis­missal as to respondent Sergio Sinday together with 38 other employees and
workers; that the private respondent, Sergio Sinday, instituted a complaint for
reinstatement against the petitioner before Region VII of the Department of
Labor at Cebu City; that the action was docketed as TFU Case No. 786; that the
private respondent, Sergio Sinday, alleged that he was wrongfully dismissed and
asked for reinstatement and back wages; that after an ex–parte
hearing, the Regional Director rendered a decision dated December 20, 1976
ordering the reinstatement of private respondent, Sergio Sinday, to his work as
carpenter with full back wages from June 7, 1976 until actually reinstated
without loss of seniority rights; that on motion of the petitioner, it was
allowed to adduce its evidence which consisted partly of the affidavit of the
shipyard manager, David Villono; that in an order dated March 16, 1977, the
Regional Director directed anew the petitioner to reinstate the private
respondent, Sergio Sinday, with full back wages; that the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration and/or appeal; that the Regional Director forwarded
the records of the case to the Department of Labor; that on November 24, 1977,
the then Acting Secretary of Labor; Hon. Amado C. Inciong, in a one sentence
order denied the appeal for lack of merit; that the order of Acting Secretary
Inciong vio­lated the constitutional right of the petitioner to due process of
law in as much as said order did not contain the findings of fact and
conclusion of law; that the petitioner appealed to the Office of the President;
that Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave issued an order on April
11, 1978 directing the Secretary of Labor to hold in abeyance the execution of the
decision appealed from; and that on November 27, 1978, the public respondent
Jacobo C. Clave rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and
lifting the order of April 11, 1978 staying the execu­tion of the appealed
order.^[2]

In his comment,^[3]
the private respondent, Sergio Sinday, avers tha t the petitioner was never denied its cons­titutional right to due
process of law because during the hearings held in the Office of the Regional
Director on De­cember 15, 1976, February 11, 1977, February 17, 1977 and
February 25, 1977, the petitioner, represented by its law­yers, submitted
position papers, affidavits of witnesses and documentary evidence; that this is
admitted by the pe­titioner itself that it was allowed to adduce its evidence;
that the public respondents never acted with grave abuse of discretion because
they decided the case pursuant to the evidence and the law applicable; that
according to P.D. 850, the Regional Director has original jurisdiction in ter­mination
cases with or without CBA and any party not satis­fied with the decision of the
Regional Director may appeal to the Secretary of Labor by filing an appeal with
the Regional Director within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the
adverse decision; that the public respon­dent, Hon. Jacobo C. Clave, should not
be a respondent in this case because his decision rendered in this case was
made for and by authority of the President and the proper party to be sued by
the petitioner should be the President of the Philippines; and that certiorari
will not lie in this case because the public respondents never acted with grave
abuse of discretion and the petitioner was afforded due process of law.

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the public res­pondents,
alleges in his comment that the private respondent; Sergio Sinday, per findings
of the public respondent Pre­sidential Executive Assistant in his decision
dated Novem­ber 27, 1976, was employed by the petitioner, a firm engaged in the
ship-building business since 1968 as a carpenter with the daily wage of P8.75;
that the respondent Sinday conti­nuously worked with the firm until May 4, 1976
when he was granted a one month vacation leave; that on June 7, 1976, however,
when private respondent Sinday reported back for work, he was refused
admittance by the petitioner and was told to re-apply for the position
previously held by him; that owing to the aforesaid refusal by the petitioner,
the private respondent filed a complaint, docketed as TFU Case No. 786 with
Regional Office VII of the Department, now Ministry, of Labor, at Cebu City for
reinstatement with back wages claiming that he was wrongfully and illegally
dismissed by the petitioner; that on December 20, 1976, Regional Director
Francisco P. Arnado of Labor Regional Of­fice No. VII held that private
respondent’s services were terminated without the required prior clearance and
decreed his reinstatement to his former position with full back wages from June
7, 1976 until actually reinstated, without loss of seniority rights; that on motion
of the petitioner for the reason that it was allegedly not properly notified of
the hearing which resulted in the aforesaid order of December 20, 1976, the
petitioner was allowed by Regional Director Arnado to adduce its evidence which
consisted, among others, of the affidavit of the shipyard manager, David
Villono, a self-serving document; that in an order dated March 16, 1977, the
aforesaid named Regional Director directed anew the petitioner to reinstate the
private respondent to his work as carpenter with full back wages from June 1977
until actually reinstated and without loss of seniority rights holding that the
evidence submitted by the petitioner could not alter the findings stated in the
order dated December 20, 1976; that on appeal, the Acting Secretary, now Minis­ter,
of Labor, in an order dated November 24, 1977, affirmed in toto
the order of the aforementioned Labor Regional Di­rector; that thereafter, the
petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President in an appeal dated
March 18, 1978; that in an order dated April 11, 1978, the public respondent
Presidential Executive Assistant directed the Secretary, now Minister, of
Labor, to hold in abeyance the execution of the order appealed from pending
resolution of the appeal by the Office of the President, as prayed for in
petitioner’s appeal; and that on November 27, 1978, the public respondent
Presidential Executive Assistant ren­dered a decision dismissing petitioner’s
appeal for lack of merit and lifting the order of April 11, 1978 staying the
execution of the appealed order.^[4]

The main issue involved is whether the petitioner may be
compelled to reinstate the private respondent, Ser­gio Sinday, as carpenter.

Sergio Sinday alleges that he applied for leave for one month on May 4, 1976 which was granted and that
when he reported for work on June 7,
1976, he was no longer ad­mitted by the petitioner.  The Regional Director and implied­ly the
Minister of Labor and the public respondent Presi­dential Executive Assistant,
Jacobo C. Clave, sustained this contention of Sergio Sinday.  However, the finding that Sergio Sinday was
granted one month vacation leave on May
4, 1976 is not supported by substantial evidence ex­cept by the
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Sergio Sinday.  On the contrary, an indubitable document
appears of record that on May 4, 1976,
private respondent, Sergio Sinday, requested for approval to incur absence from
May 6, 1976 to an indefinite
date but this request was dis­approved because the private respondent Sinday
could not give any justifiable reason for his application and that his services
were vitally needed.  The shipyard
manager of the petitioner, David Villono, offered to grant the private
respondent Sinday a leave for fifteen (15) days but the lat­ter arrogantly
refused the offer.

Annex “A” of the petition reads:

“SANDOVAL
SHIPYARDS, INC.

CEBU
DIVISION

AUTHORITY OF
ABSENCE

5-4-76

Sir:

The undersigned hereby requests for an approval to incur absence(s)
on/from 5-6-76 to Indefinite
Date.

(SGD) SINDAY, SERGIO

Employee

ACTION TAKEN:

Approved: From _____

Disapproved: __________   (SGD) DAVID VILLONO“^[5]

The genuineness and due execution of this document was not denied
by private respondent, Sergio Sinday. 
Hence the genuineness and due execution of said document is deemed
admitted.^[6]
It is clear from the application for leave signed by the private respondent
Sergio Sinday that said application for indefinite leave was disapproved.

It is noteworthy that the private respondent Sinday has not
presented any document showing that he was granted a leave of absence of one
month.  The affidavit of the pe­titioner’s
shipyard manager is that he disapproved the ap­plication of respondent Sergio
Sinday and said respondent left his work without leave on May 26, 1976 to look for another job and did not
show up any more on the succeeding days.

It also appears of record that on August 20, 1976, the petitioner filed an application for
clearance to ter­minate the services of Sergio Sinday, together with 38 others.^[7]

While as a rule the findings of fact in appeals by certiorari
are binding on the Supreme Court, a finding of fact that is not supported by
competent evidence should be disregarded.^[8]

In the instant case, the finding that the private res­pondent,
Sergio Sinday, was granted a vacation leave of one month from May 4, 1976 is
not only not supported by substan­tial evidence except the lone testimony of
private respon­dent Sinday but is contradicted by indubitable evidence con­sisting
of the application of said private respondent Sergio Sinday for an indefinite
vacation leave of absence from May 6, 1976. 
The biased testimony of the private respondent Sinday cannot prevail
over his application for indefinite leave of absence which appears on its face
to have been disapproved.

The private respondent Sinday did not specifically deny the
following allegations of the petition:

“4. On May 5, 1976 Sinday applied to go on
leave indefinitely from May 6, 1976.  Inasmuch as no justifiable reason was stated
and his services were vitally needed, Sinday was told by the petitioner’s
manager that the application for leave would be approved for only fifteen (15)
days.  Sinday arrogantly refused so that
the petitioner disapproved the application for leave.  Copy of the application with the disapproval
is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’.

“5. The
respondent Sinday con­tinued to work thereafter apparently abandoning his idea
to obtain an in­definite leave of absence.

However, on May 26, 1976
the respondent Sinday failed to show up and since then had not reported to
work.

In view thereof, the petitioner filed on August 20, 1976 with the De­partment of labor a
Clearance Application/Report of Dismissal as to respondent Sergio Sinday
together with thirty eight (38) other employees and workers.  Copies of said application and the list of
employees are attached hereto as Annexes ‘B’ and ‘B-1’.”^[9]

Material averments in the complaint not specifically denied are
deemed admitted.^[10]

The petitioner did not arbitrarily dismiss Sergio Sinday.  It filed the required application for
clearance to terminate on August 20,
1970 not only Sinday but 38 other employees.^[11]
The reason given in said application is that Sergio Sinday and the other
thirty-eight (38) em­ployees had quit their jobs.

Concern for labor should not extend to allowing employees to
abandon their work at will and then later de­mand that they be reinstated.  There is a showing that Ser­gio Sinday left
his work without leave for the purpose of seeking a better employment.  It was only when he failed to find another
employment that he sought reinstatement with the petitioner.

Under the facts of record, the petitioner was fully justified in
refusing to reinstate Sergio Sinday after he had abandoned his work to look for
a better job.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED and the decision of the public respondent, Hon. Jacobo C. Clave, and
the order of the Regional Director dated March 16, 1977, ordering the reinstatement of Sergio
Sinday, are set aside and the complaint of Sergio Sinday for reinstatement in
TFU Case No. 786 against Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1] Rollo,
pp. 17-19.

^[2] Rollo,
pp. 2-4.

^[3] Rollo,
pp. 40-42.

^[4] Rollo,
pp. 59-65.

^[5] Rollo,
p. 11.

^[6]
Section 8, Rule 8, Revised Rules of Court.

^[7]
Annexes “B” and “B-1”, Rollo, pp. 11-12.

^[8]
Duran vs. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 68; Tagumpay Minerals & Mining
Association vs. Masangkay, 46 SCRA 608; Baptista vs. Carullo, 72
SCRA 314; Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154.

^[9] Rollo,
pp. 2-3.

^[10]
Section 1, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court.

^[11]
Annexes “B” and “B-1”, Rollo, pp. 11-12.