NG HAY YAM, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila denying the petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.

The only question that needs to be determined on this appeal is whether
the respondent abused his authority and discretion in refusing to
recognize the Section VI Merchant’s Certificate issued by the American
Consul at Amoy, China, on August 4, 1931, to the petitioner, in
pursuance of the Act of Congress of May 6, 1882, as amended by the Act
of July 5, 1884 (22 Stat. L., 58; 23 Stat. L., 115).

The
petitioner’s contention that the immigration authorities in Manila must
accept such a certificate and cannot go behind any statements of fact
therein, if accepted, would virtually transfer to United States consuls
in China the final decision as to the right of entry of a Chinese
subject into the United States and the Philippine Islands, in the face
of the statutes vesting that authority in the Secretary of Labor and
(in the Philippines) the Insular Collector of Customs. The argument of
counsel is controverted by the petitioner’s own declaration in the
certificate:

“I realize that if I am one of
a class inadmissible to the United States under any of the provisions
of the immigration laws of the United States, or if my classification
as a non-immigrant alien is not approved upon arrival in the P. I., I
may be deported or detained by the immigration authorities, and I am
prepared to assume the risks of such deportation or detention.”

The customs authorities refused to recognize the petitioner’s Section
VI Merchant’s Certificate because it contains false statements. In his
certificate before the consul, the petitioner stated that he had been a
merchant in China “from 1925 to date” (August 4, 1931), whereas the
records in the office of the respondent show that on May 6, 1927, he
entered the Philippines under the name of Uh He Yiam and remained here
till August 24, 1929. Furthermore, the bond he gave for his temporary
liberty at that time allowed him to remain for a period of only six
months. He violated the condition of his bond and remained here for
more than two years, managing the business of a cousin.

In view of these facts and the undoubted right of the respondent to go behind the prima facie Section VI Merchant’s Certificate, we affirm the judgment with costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Ostrand, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.