YU PIAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

This
is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
granting the appellee a writ of habeas corpus and commanding the
appellant to release him from custody.

The petition alleges
that the petitioner, who is a Chinese, was granted a landing
certificate of residence by the Collector of Customs at the Port of
Manila on July 18, 1924; that, notwithstanding said certificate, he was
arrested and is being illegally detained by the respondent and in
danger of being deported to China; that said arrest and detention by
the respondent and the cancellation of his certificate without
sufficient reason constitute an abuse of authority.

The return of the respondent (omitting caption) is as follows:

“Comes
now the respondent Acting Insular Collector of Customs, thru the
undersigned, arid by way of return to the writ of habeas corpus issued
in the above entitled cause, respectfully states:

“1. That
Yu Pian is held in custody by virtue of a decision rendered, after
proper investigation, by a duly constituted board of special inquiry
sitting at the port of Cebu, ordering his deportation from the
Philippine Islands on the ground that he entered the Philippines thru
fraud and false representations, in violation of section 19 of the Act
of Congress, approved February 5, 1917, which decision was confirmed by
the Acting Insular Collector of Customs. The said decisions of the
board of special inquiry and the Acting Insular Collector of Customs
were made in the performance of their official duties pursuant to the
Immigration Laws of the United States in force in this jurisdiction.

“2. That the said Yu Pian is restrained of his liberty by the Acting
Insular Collector of Customs only for the purpose of enforcing the said
Immigration Laws.

“Wherefore, the Acting Insular Collector
of Customs, thru the undersigned, respectfully prays this Honorable
Court to deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, with costs
against the petitioner.

“Manila, February 16, 1932.

	“Delfin Jaranilla
		“Attorney-General”

The only evidence introduced by the petitioner is the original of his
said landing certificate of residence, across the face of which, in red
ink, are written the words “Cancelled, 1-18-32, See CBR”. The fiscal,
thereupon, moved for the dismissal of the case, which motion was denied
by the court and judgment rendered for the petitioner as aforesaid.

The appellant assigns as error that the court below erred in not
dismissing the case for lack of evidence as to the alleged abuse of
authority by the respondent in ordering the petitioner’s deportation as
set out in the return. The appellee has filed no brief.

The
court below seemed to be of the opinion that because the respondent
offered no proof of the fraud and false representations of the
petitioner in obtaining his certificate of residence, judgment must be
rendered for the petitioner because his possession of such a
certificate, previously issued to him, raises a presumption that he has
a right to remain in the Philippine Islands. The decision seems to
ignore the fact, which appears on the face of the certificate itself,
that it was cancelled by the customs authorities before the petition
for habeas corpus was filed. The true issue then for determination is
whether or not said cancellation was illegal or, as alleged in the
petition, an abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent who is
vested by law with the supervision and enforcement of the immigration
statutes.

In order to establish that there was such an abuse
of discretion, the burden rests upon the petitioner to show the same
from the record of the proceedings had before the said official. (See Ty Buan vs. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 937, 941; and Tan Me Nio vs. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 944, 946.)

The petitioner in this case, having failed to establish by proper
evidence that the cancellation of his landing certificate was arbitrary
or illegal, the petition should have been dismissed.

The judgment appealed from is reversed with costs against the appellee.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Ostrand, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.