FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MAURICIO ALILLANA AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines,
a domestic corporation engaged
in producing copra, on July 19, 1947
took Mauricio Alillana into employment, as truck
loader.  In 1956 he was assigned as
washer.  Four months later, he became
shell collector therein, performing duties of this nature:  To pick up unshelled coconuts from a mov­ing
conveyor; place them in a “caritilla” and
hand them to the shellers; four times during the
8-hour work, he and some assistants had to personally rotate the pulley to keep
the conveyor running when it gets stuck up by coconut shells.

On April 21, 1958,
Alillana suffered from pains at the ribs; he was
found with bronchitis and went on leave. 
On May 9, 1958, however, he was allowed by the company to
resume his work.

Starting May 31, 1958, he from time to time com­plained of
cough, with chest and back pains, for which he was treated.  Referred for physical and X-ray exami­nations,
on July 6, 1958, his condition was found to be as
follows:  “Far advanced pulmonary
tuberculosis at the left lung, associated with bronchitis.” The next day,
on July 7, 1958, he
retired from the company.  Franklin Baker
Co. paid him P288.16 under its
non-occupational sickness and disability benefit plan for the period from July 7, 1958
to October 29, 1958; and
P669.12 as retire­ment benefits.

Alillana subsequently filed a claim for
disability compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  On February
28, 1963, the Regional Office hearing officer awarded disability
benefits.  Franklin Baker Co. elevated
the case to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

The Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, on October 11, 1963, affirmed the award, slightly
reducing the amount to P3,015.06.  Section 14 was applied, on tempo­rary total
disability, i.e., 60% of his average weekly wage of P27.01, times
the maximum of 208 weeks less a brief period when he
had “odd-lot” or sporadic employment.

On July 25, 1964,
Franklin Baker Co. paid said award of P3,015.06.  Satisfaction thereof was acknowledged by Alillana in writing (Annex “C” to Petition).

Thereafter, on August 10,
1964, alleging continuing disability from his ailment, Alillana filed a motion in the same case for additional
compensation.  The Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, on September 16, 1964,
ordered a physical examination of Alillana.  And on September 7, 1965, after said
physical examination by one of the Com­mission’s doctors, finding Alillana still suffering from temporary total disability
due to his ailment, the Work­men’s Compensation Commission issued an order for
additio­nal compensation of P984.94, thus raising the total award to the then
statutory maximum of P4,000.

Franklin Baker Co. moved for reconsideration.  On October
13, 1965, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission en banc
denied the motion, stating that the period of disability -can be extended
beyond 208 weeks under Sec. 18 of the Act.

Hence, this petition was filed by the Franklin Baker Co., to
raise on appeal from the Workmen’s Compensation Commission’s orders the
issue:  Does the Workmen’s Com­pensation
Commission have power under Sec. 18 to extend the period of disability under
Sec. 14 of the Act?

Section 14 provides:

“Sec. 14.  Total disability.  – In case the injury or sickness causes total
disability for labor, the employer, during such disability but exclusive of the
first three days shall pay to the injured employee a weekly compen­sation
equivalent to sixty per centum of his average weekly wages; but not more than
thirty-five pesos nor less than ten pesos per week, except in the case provided
for in the next fol­lowing paragraph. 
Such weekly payments shall in no case continue after the disability has
ceased, nor shall they extend over more than two hundred and eight weeks, nor
shall the aggregate sum paid as compensation exceed in any case four thousand
pesos.  But no award of permanent
disability shall take effect un­til after two weeks have elapsed from the date
of injury.”

In Avecilla Building Corporation vs.
Workmen’s Com­pensation Commission, L-10668,
September 26, 1957, this Court already ruled that said maximum period of 208 weeks
can be extended under Section 18, as amended by Republic Act 772:

“Speaking of this right of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner to reopen a case already decided by him, it is an innovation
introduced by Rep. Act 772, particularly,
Sec. 13 thereof, amending Section 18 (last par.) of the original Workmen’s
Compensation Law, namely, Act 3428.  Before amendment, the last paragraph
of Section 18 read thus:

“‘The total compensation prescribed in this and the next
preceding section and the total compensation prescribed in sections fourteen
and fifteen of this Act shall, together, not exceed the sum of three thousand
pesos.’

As amended, the said last paragraph now
reads as follows:

“‘The total compensation prescribed in this and the next
preceding section and the total compensation prescribed in sections fourteen
and fifteen of this Act, shall, together, not exceed the sum of four thousand
pesos:  Provided, however,
that after the payment has been made for the period specified by the Act
in each case, the Workmen’s Compensation Commis­sioner may from time to time
cause the examination of the condition of the dis­abled laborer, with a view to
extending, if necessary, the period of compensation which shall not, however,
exceed the said amount of four thousand pesos.’

“One change introduced is the increase from P3,000 to P4,000 of
the total compensation pro­vided in the original provision.  The more impor­tant change, however, is that
contained in the proviso, which is the last part of the paragraph.  This legal provision empowering Workmen’s
Compen­sation Boards or Commissioners to reopen a case is contained in the
Workmen’s Compensation Acts of many of the States of the American union,
including the Territory of Hawaii.  The reason for this legal provision is explained
by Ar­thur Larson in his authoritative work enti­tled, The Law of Workmen’s
Compensation, Vol. 2, page 330, as
follows:

“‘In almost all states, some kind of provision is made for
reopening and modify­ing awards.  This
provision is a recogni­tion of the obvious fact that, no matter how competent a
commission’s diagnosis of claimant’s condition and earning prospects at the
time of hearing may be, that condi­tion may later change markedly for the
worse, or may improve, or may even clear up altogether.  Under the typical award in the form of
periodic payments during a spe­cified maximum period or during disability, the
objectives of the legislation are best accomplished if the commission can
increase, decrease, revive or terminate payments to correspond to claimant’s
changed condition.  Theoretically, then,
commissions ought to exercise perpetual and unlimited jurisdic­tion to reopen
cases as often as necessary to make benefits meet current conditions.  But the administrative problem lies in the
necessity of preserving the full case records of all claimants that have ever
re­ceived any kind of award; against the pos­sibility of a future
reopening.  Moreover, any attempt to
reopen a case based on an injury ten or fifteen years old must neces­sarily
encounter awkward problems of proof, because of the long delay and the difficul­ty
of determining the relationship between some ancient injury and a present
aggrava­ted disability.  Another argument
is that insurance carriers would never know that kind of future liabilities
they might in­cur, and would have difficulty in computing appropriate
reserves.’

“It will be
noticed, however, that while in the several states of the union, the reopen­ing
is intended for the benefit of both employer and employee in the sense that, in
case of ag­gravation or deterioration of the disability of the employee, the
period of compensation should be extended up to a certain limit, or in case the
condition of the employee improves or the disability disappears altogether, the
period of compensation is shortened or compensation stopped, our law, under
Section 18, is a little one-sided and is all for the benefit of the employee,
for the reason that as may be gathered from the pro­viso, the Commissioner may
from time to time cause examination of the condition of the dis­abled laborer, with
a view to extending, if necessary, the period of compensation.  In this respect there is room for improvement
of the law as to make it more equitable to both par­ties,
labor and management.  Furthermore, while
in the several states of the American Union, the time within which the
Commissioner or Board may reopen a case is limited anywhere from one year to
several years, our law contained in the proviso in question, sets no time
limit.  The dis­advantage of making this
period within which the case may be reopened, too long, or as in our law, with
no limit at all, is touched upon by Larson in the latter part of his
commentary, as above-reproduced, namely, that in case such a period is too
long, there may be difficulty in completing and preserving the record of the in­jury,
or determining the relationship, if any, between the aggravation or
deterioration of the employee’s disability and some ancient injury, to say
nothing of the fact that insurance com­panies which are interested in similar
cases, by having insured employees of companies against injuries, may find
difficulty in adjusting their finances, such as putting up reserve funds to
take care of future liabilities.

“But there is no question that under Sec­tion 18 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, the Commissioner was authorized to re­open
the case of Carpeso and to direct that the
compensation to him by petitioner be increased or continued.  The claim of petitioner that it had not been
given an opportunity to traverse the claim that Carpeso’s
condition had deterio­rated, is not supported by the record.”

Clearly, therefore, the Workmen’s Compensation Com­mission did
not incur in any error in extending to cover beyond 208 weeks the period of Alillana’s disability com­pensation, up to a total of not
more than P4,000.

Alillana’s having signed a satisfaction
receipt can not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any
agreement to receive less compensation than what the worker is entitled to recover
under the Act (Sec. 29).

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the Workmen’s Com­pensation
Commission are hereby affirmed.  No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.