RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ANGEL R. DE GUZMAN, LEON DAGAMAC, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, RESP…

In this appeal from the resolution of the Social Security Com­mission
(in Case No. 174) holding it liable for payment to therein petitioning
employees, of sickness benefits under the Social Security Act, appellant Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc., is raising the sole
issue of whether or not payment to injured employees, by the employer, of compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act precludes further recovery by the same employees of sickness
benefits under the Social Security law.

The facts of this case are not controverted.

On different dates in 1960, Angel de Guzman, Leon Dagamac, Leonardo Santos and Amador de Guzman, employees of
Bachrach Transportation Co., Ltd. and compulsory
members of the Social Security System, were confined for injuries sustained in
the course of
their employment.^[1]
Accordingly, the employer paid them the corresponding compensation for the duration of their confinement, pursuant to the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.^[2] However, in addition thereto, the employees
demanded for sickness benefits under the Social Security Act.  And, when the employer refused to grant the
later claim, on the ground that the receipt by the employees of compensation
for their injuries barred recovery of further benefits under the Social
Security law, the employees instituted appropriate proceeding in the Social
Security Commission.  On January
18, 1963, the
Commission granted their prayer and issued the resolution which is the subject
of the present appeal.

Appellant’s argument against the ruling of the Commission – that
the subject employees, as members of the System, are entitled to sickness
benefits under the Social Security Act notwithstanding their receipt of
compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation law – is anchored on the following provision of the latter enactment, thus:

“SEC. 5.  Exclusive right to
compensation. — The rights and remedies granted by this act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compen­sation
shall  exclude all other rights and remedies accru­ing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and
other laws, because
of said injury.

xxx                                           xxx                                           xxx.”,

(As amended by Rep. Act 772; underscoring
supplied.)

it being
contended that the Social Security Act comes within the coverage of the phrase
“other laws”.

The issue posed herein is not new.  In the case of Benguet Consolidated Inc. vs. Social Security System, G. R. No. L-19254,
promulgated on March 31, 1964,
this Court, passing upon the same question, ruled:

“To our mind, all that this provision (Sec. 5 of Act 3428, as
amended), means is that there should be no double recovery against the same
employer for the same death or injury. 
But this is not the case in respect of social security benefits, because
to allow the recovery of said benefits does not mean allowing a double recovery against the same
employer.  An action for recovery of
sickness benefits under the Social
Security Act for the employee’s confine­ment which is compensable under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law, is not a recovery against
the employer for sickness benefit.  The
fact that the law (Section 14) requires that sickness benefits shall be
advanced by the employer is of no moment, as the obligation of the employer to
advance such benefits is only to expedite payment of sickness benefits.  Note that the employer is subsequently
reimbursed by the System of the benefits advanced by him in the amounts fixed by the law. 
Although the employer in the case of sickness benefits bears the
burden of 20% of the benefits advanced by him, since the System reimburses only
80% thereof, this burden of 20% is imposed, not as a lia­bility because of an
injury which is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, but to
preclude connivance in, or the filing of fraudulent claims for
reimbursement.  This 20% of the sickness
benefits imposed on the employer is more in the nature of an administrative
expense and not really a compensation for an injury.”

The rationale for the exclusion of social
security benefits from the application of Section 5 of the Workmen’s
Compensation law was succinctly stated in the same case as follows:

“The philosophy underlying the Workmen’s Compensation Act is
to make the payment of the benefits provided for therein as a responsibility of
the industry, on the ground that it is industry which should bear the resulting
death or injury to employees engaged in the said industry.  On the other hand, social security sickness
benefits are not paid as a burden on the industry, but are paid to the members
of the System as a matter of right whenever the hazards provided for in the law
occurs.  To deny payment of social
security benefits because the death or injury or confinement is compensable
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act would be to deprive the employees –
members of the System of the statutory benefits bought and paid for by them,
since they contribute their money to the general common fund out of which
benefits are paid.  In other words, the
benefits provided for in the Workmen’s
Compensation Act accrues to the employees
concerned due to the hazards involved in their employment and is made a burden
on the employment itself. 
However, social security benefits are paid to the System’s members, by
reason of their membership therein for which they contribute their money to a
general common fund.  x x x.”

It may be added that whereas social security benefits are in­tended
to provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks for which they
are established, e. g., disability, sickness, old age or death,^[3]
irrespective of whether they arose from or in the course of the employment or
not, the compensation receivable under the Workmen’s Compensation law is in the
nature of indemnity for the injury or damage suffered by the employee or his
dependents on account of the employment.^[4]
The nature and source of the two
benefits are so clearly different and dissimilar that they cannot be considered
alternate remedies.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the resolution appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed.  Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Coccepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
   Name of Employees              Period of Confinement

Angel de Guzman                  May 6 to May 19, 1960

Leon Dagamac                      June
2 to July 6, 1960

Leonardo Santos                   April 5 to April 18, 1960

Amador Vicente                    February 28 to May 19, 1960

^[2]
Equivalent to 60% of their average weekly wages (Sec. 14, Act 3428, as amended
by Com. Act 210 and Rep. Act 772).

^[3]
Sec. 2,
Rep. Act 1161.

^[4]
Esguerra vs. Muñoz
Palma, 104 Phil. 582.