G.R. No. 24489. September 21, 1925
ARSENIO VIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR AND CLARENCIO ADOLFO, RESPONDENTS.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
for the annulment of the latter’s election for the office of municipal
president of Magarao, Province of Camarines Sur, and the issuance of a
decree declaring him elected, instead of the protestee.
On
June 19, 1925, the protestee Arsenio Viola filed a demurrer in the form
of special appearance, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
to entertain the protest for the reason that in the motion of protest
it was not alleged that the protestant, as well as the protestee, was a
candidate registered and voted, and prayed that the contest be
dismissed.
On July 10, 1925, the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur ruled that the facts alleged in the protest were
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court to take cognizance of,
and decide, the protest, and overruled the demurrer, ordering the
protest to be set for trial on July 22, 1925.
On July 25,
1925, the protestee Arsenio Viola came to this court and instituted an
original proceeding against the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur and the protestant Clarencio Adolfo, to obtain a decree adjudging
the said Court of First Instance to have acquired no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of said protest, and issuing an order prohibiting said
Court of First Instance from continuing to take cognizance thereof. He
also prayed that in the meantime a preliminary injunction be issued
against the respondents.
On July 31, 1925, the respondents,
through their attorneys, filed a demurrer to the petition on the ground
that the facts alleged therein do not constitute a cause of action, and
they prayed for the dismissal thereof.
The legal questions
raised in this proceeding are several. Logical order requires us to
take up first the question whether in taking cognizance of election
contest a Court of First Instance exercises general or special and
limited jurisdiction. This question has already been decided by this
court in a clear and precise manner in the cases of Tengco vs. Jocson (43 Phil., 715); Palisoc vs.
Tamondong and Medina Cue (43 Phil., 789), and we need not deal with it
again, except to say that the mere fact that in section 27 of Act No.
3210 was omitted the provision contained in section 481 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, to the effect that motions of protest
shall be heard “not upon pleadings or by action,” does not change the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over these cases from
special and limited into a general one; because it is not the procedure
to be followed in the handling of judicial cases, whether ordinary or
election contest, that determines the nature of the jurisdiction of a
court, but the law conferring the same. While the courts of first
instance are higher courts of general jurisdiction, yet in taking
cognizance of election contests they exercise special jurisdiction
conferred by a special law (section 479, Administrative Code, as
amended by section 44 of Act No. 3030, and section 25 of Act No. 3210),
under certain and specific conditions, among which are the following,
to wit: (1) That the protest be presented “upon motion by any
registered candidate voted for;” (2) “that the contest shall be filed
with the court within two weeks after the proclamation.” Upon the
fulfillment of these conditions depends the exercise of the special
power conferred by the Election Law on the courts of first instance to
take cognizance of election contests.
It is also contended
by the respondents that it is not absolutely necessary that the facts
upon which the jurisdiction of a court is based be stated in the motion
of protest, but it is enough if they appear in the record. This
question has already been decided also by this court in the case above
cited, and others subsequent thereto, and to reinforce the decisions
rendered therein, we have to add only that “Where the jurisdiction of a
court depends upon the existence of facts, it has no right or power to
proceed or act upon a pleading which does not substantially set forth
such facts * * *.” (City of Charleston vs. Littlepage, 51 L. R.
A; [N. S.], 353.) And it cannot be otherwise, because if jurisdiction
is not presumed where a court of general jurisdiction exercises a
special legal power and in a manner which is also a special legal one,
and if under these circumstances said courts are, with regard to the
power exercised, on the same footing as the courts of inferior and
limited jurisdiction (15 C. J., 831), it is necessary that in the
motion of protest the facts, upon the existence of which depends the
exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance over
election contests, be substantially alleged, otherwise these courts
cannot determine whether or not they have acquired jurisdiction to try
and decide the case.
It is also maintained by the
respondents that the doctrine laid down in the Tengco-Jocson case is
untenable for the reason that the word “registered” does not mean but
“the candidate having presented his certificate of candidacy or that he
is eligible to the office in dispute,” and not precisely that his name
was registered in any book or registry, which on the other hand is not
provided by the law.
The law requires that the certificates
of candidacy for municipal offices be filed with the municipal
secretary, who must issue a receipt to the party in interest and
furnish certified copies thereof to the election precincts of the
municipality and the Executive Bureau (section 405 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3210), and as
the person in charge of the custody of the municipal archives, it is
the ministerial duty of said municipal secretary to file said
certificates of candidacy (section 2212 [a] of the
Administrative Code). For official purposes, the filing is equivalent
to registration, and that is undoubtedly what the legislator meant to
say in using the word “registered” in various sections of the Election
Law.
As to the proposition that the word “registered”
denotes “eligibility,” the respondents are quite right, because in
order that a candidate may be eligible it is an indispensable requisite
that he be registered, except that there is a difference in that when
the word “registered” is employed, a conclusion of fact is expressed,
and when the word “eligible” is used, a conclusion of law is stated,
and it is well known that in any pleading conclusions of fact, and not
of law, must be alleged.
With respect to the word
“registered” as meaning only that “the candidate has filed his
certificate of candidacy,” the theory does not seem to us correct. The
Election Law itself, in dealing with the eligibility for any municipal
office, says that no person shall be eligible unless within the period
fixed by the law he files a duly verified certificate of candidacy
(section 404 of the Administrative Code, as amended by section 3 of Act
No. 3030); in providing for the case of death or inability of a
candidate, it says that the deceased or incapacitated must be a
candidate with certificate of candidacy duly filed (section 405 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3030); and in
speaking of the person to be certified as elected, it says that only
those who have obtained the highest number of votes and filed their
certificate of candidacy in accordance with the provision of section
404 of the Election Law shall be certified elected (section 471 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by section 41 of Act No. 3030).
The phrases “duly verified,” “duly filed,” and “filed in accordance
with the provisions of the law,” employed in the Election Law in
connection with the phrase “certificate of candidacy” clearly show that
to the mind of the legislator this phrase without said qualifications
is not sufficient to indicate that a candidate is “eligible” or that he
is “registered.” The word “acreditar” (verify), according to the new
dictionary of the Spanish language, means * * * To prove in a positive
manner, to show, to evidence clearly and beyond doubt, to establish by
evidence, circumstances, and so forth * * *. Therefore in the eyes of
the law, in order that a person may be eligible, it is not enough that
he should hold a certificate of candidacy, but it is necessary that it
be shown in an evident manner that said certificate of candidacy meets
all the requirements as to form, time, filing, and recording, that is
to say, that it is “registered,” which is the word employed by the
legislator to mean that all said requirements have been complied with.
The other qualifying phrases employed by the law in speaking of the
certificate of candidacy have the same scope and meaning. The fact that
in various sections of the Election Law it uses simply the words
“certificate of candidacy” does not show that the legislator has deemed
said words to be sufficient to mean that a candidate is “registered” or
that he meets all the legal requirements in order to be eligible, but
it does so undoubtedly for the purpose of avoiding repetitions. The
mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is not sufficient in order
that a candidate may be eligible, because the municipal secretary or
the Executive Bureau, who must know the law, may reject it if they find
that it does not meet all the requirements prescribed by the law, and
only when the corresponding receipt has been issued and the certificate
filed can it be presumed that it has, been duly verified and filed.
Furthermore the facts alleged in the motion of protest now before us
are almost identical with those alleged in the protest in the case of
Tengco vs. Jocson, supra, wherein the words
“candidates who have filed their respective certificates of candidacy
and obtained votes,” are used, and the law with regard to the essential
requisites for the exercise of the special jurisdiction of the courts
of first instance in election contest, has not changed; consequently,
there is no reason of a juridical nature for altering the doctrine laid
down in said case of Tengco vs. Jocson, supra, and followed in other subsequent cases.
For all of the foregoing we are of the opinion that the use of the word
“registered” in the Election Law, as amended by Act No. 3210, is
proper, and that the words “voted candidate, with his corresponding
certificate of candidacy,” used in the motion of protest now before us
are not equivalent to said word “registered,” and consequently they do
not meet one of the essential requisites prescribed by the law in order
that the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur might acquire
jurisdiction to try and decide said protest.
In view of the
broadness of the questions discussed at the hearing upon the demurrer,
we regard said demurrer as an answer and decide the case on the merits.
For the foregoing the respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur is ordered to refrain and abstain absolutely from any further
proceeding in the election contest of Clarencio Adolfo vs. Arsenio Viola, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING
VILLAMOR, J., with whom concur Avanceña, C. J., Street and Ostrand, JJ.:
The
petitioner brought this action for prohibition (certiorari, says the
petitioner) in order to have the respondent judge abstain from taking
cognizance of the municipal election contest filed by the other
respondent, Clarencio Adolfo, in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur against the election of the petitioner, as municipal
president of Magarao of the same province.
The petitioner alleges: (a)
That on June 19, 1925, he filed with the court a special appearance for
the sole and exclusive purpose of assailing the jurisdiction of the
respondent judge over the motion of protest on the ground that it did
not allege that the contestant and the contestee were candidates
registered and voted in the election in. dispute; (b) that
while it is true that in the motion of protest there appeared a phrase
which says “with their corresponding certificate of candidacy,” yet
this mere statement did not confer jurisdiction upon the respondent
judge, for it was necessary that it be alleged that said certificate of
candidacy was registered; (c) that the respondent judge
overruled the objection to his jurisdiction, and was attempting to try
and decide said election contest; and (d) that the petitioner
cannot appeal from the ruling of the respondent judge, and has no other
adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The respondents filed a demurrer to the petition on the ground that the
allegations therein contained were not sufficient to constitute a cause
of action for the institution of this proceeding.
The
attorneys for both parties have made extensive arguments before the
court, and submitted printed and typewritten briefs prepared with
indisputable skill. All their arguments, however, hinge around this
question: Whether or not the case that gave rise to the present
proceeding must be decided according to the doctrine established in the
case of Tengco vs. Jocson (43 Phil., 715). And this is the decisive point submitted to the consideration of the court.
The court decided that the doctrine laid down in Tengco vs. Jocson, supra,
must rule in the case now before us, and therefore the writ of
prohibition applied for must issue. With due respect to the opinion of
the majority I registered my vote against it on the ground which I am
now briefly to state.
There is no doubt that it is necessary to follow the doctrine of stare decisis to maintain certainty and uniformity in the jurisprudence. But it must be taken into account that stare decisis
is the phrase employed to announce the doctrine that “when a court has
once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases where the facts are substantially the same * * *.” (Moore vs. City of Albany, 98 N. Y., 396, 410; Hart vs. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 72 N. Y. Supp., 797, 798; 65 App. Div., 493.)
In order to see whether the facts alleged in the protest which is the
subject-matter of this proceeding, with respect to the personal
qualifications of the protestant, now respondent, are analogous to
those alleged in the case of Tengco vs. Jocson, supra, it is convenient to have before us the allegations in both cases. In the case of Tengco it was alleged:
“1. That the contestant and the contestee are of age, and residents of the municipality of Malolos, Bulacan.
“2.
That in the election held in the municipality of Malolos, Bulacan,
about the 6th of June, 1922, the municipal board of canvassers of said
municipality of Malolos, illegally proclaimed the contestee, Mariano
Tengco, elected for the office of Municipal President of Malolos, which
illegality is as follows.” (Here comes the statement of the facts
showing the illegality.)
The allegations in the instant case are:
“1. That the contestant is a qualified elector and one of the
candidates voted in the general elections held in the municipality of
Magarao, Province of Camarines Sur, on June 2, 1925, within the
jurisdiction of this court for the office of municipal president of
said municipality.“2. That according to the election
return made by the municipal board as a board of canvassers, attached
hereto and made a part hereof, the protestee, the contestant and Tomas
Bonit were voted for the office of municipal president of Magarao, the
protestee with 270 votes, the protestant with 268 and Tomas Bonit with
236, all of whom were candidates for said office with their
corresponding certificate of candidacy.” (Here follows a specification
of the grounds of the protest.)
A mere
comparison of the allegations in the one and the other case will show
that in the protest against Tengco there was really no allegation that
the protestant was a candidate registered and voted, as required by Act
No. 3030 which has in effect amended the Election Law, and for this
reason it was held in that case that on account of the absence of the
allegation of the jurisdictional fact as to the qualifications of the
protestant of having been a candidate registered and voted, the court
below had no jurisdiction to entertain said contest and consequently
the writ of prohibition applied for must issue.
In the
instant case, however, it is alleged that the contestant is one of the
candidates voted and that all of the persons who received votes in said
election, that is to say, the contestant and the protestee and one
Tomas Bonit, were candidates for said office with their corresponding
certificate of candidacy. This difference is essential and
distinguishes completely the case involved in this proceeding from that
of Tengco vs. Jocson, supra, and this same difference of allegations suggests, in my opinion, a different solution.
There can be no doubt that the respondent Clarencio Adolfo in drawing
his protest against the protestant has not employed with technical
precision the sacramental words of the law “registered candidate voted
for;” but analyzing with liberal criterion the two paragraphs of his
protest above quoted, as we have done in studying the case of Ferrer vs.
Gutierrez David and Lucot (43 Phil., 795), I am forced to conclude that
the protestant, now respondent Clarencio Adolfo, has alleged the
jurisdictional fact that said protestant was a registered candidate
voted in the general election held June 2, 1925. Otherwise, how can it
be conceived that the protestant and the protestee and one Tomas Bonit
had received 268, 270, and 236 votes, respectively, without having been
registered candidates voted for the office of municipal president of
Magarao, if the Election Law provides that “Votes for persons who have
not filed certificates of candidacy for any municipal office shall be
counted in the count of votes as scattering votes”? (Section 35,
Election Law, Act No. 3030.) There is, therefore, the presumption
arising from the fact of having received votes in that election that a
candidate who has thus received votes had previously registered his
candidacy in accordance with the law, and the allegation that the
protestant Clarencio Adolfo was a candidate voted for the office of
municipal president with his corresponding certificate of candidacy is
equivalent, in my judgment, to the allegation that said protestant now
respondent was a registered candidate voted as aforementioned.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the present proceeding must be
dismissed in order that the respondent judge may proceed with the trial
of the election protest of Adolfo vs. Viola, and decide it afterwards upon its own merits.