FRANCISCO TABADA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, AND MOISES VERGARA, RESPONDENTS.

On
June 11, 1925, Moises Vergara filed a protest with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan against Francisco Tabada, wherein he prayed,
among other things, that he (Moises Vergara) be declared and proclaimed
elected as municipal president of Umingan, Pangasinan, instead of
Francisco Tabada.

Under the date of June 20, 1925, the
protestee, Francisco Tabada, filed a demurrer to the motion of protest
on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to entertain
said protest, for the reason that the respondent did not allege in his
motion of protest that he and the protestee were “registered and voted
candidates,” but simply “voted candidates, with certificates of
candidacy.”

After hearing the attorneys of both parties upon
the demurrer, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta, presiding judge of
Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on June 24,
1925, entered an order overruling the demurrer and ordering the
protestee to answer the protest within the period prescribed by the
rules of court.

Not satisfied with said order, the
protestee, Francisco Tabada, filed a petition with this court for a
writ of prohibition against the Honorable Francisco Zandueta, Judge of
First Instance of Pangasinan, and Moises Vergara, wherein he prays for
judgment, declaring that the Court of First Instance, with the
Honorable Francisco Zandueta, presiding judge of Branch II thereof, has
no jurisdiction to entertain and decide said protest, and ordering the
issuance of a writ of prohibition addressed to the respondent judge or
other judge of the Court of First Instance of said province, commanding
him to refrain and abstain absolutely from trying said election contest
and from taking any further proceeding, with the costs against the
respondents.

The respondents filed a demurrer to this
petition on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to
justify the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

The
question raised by the demurrer and the arguments, written as well as
oral, is whether or not the words “only candidates voted, with
certificates of candidacy” employed in the motion of protest of the
respondent Moises Vergara, are equivalent to the words “registered and
voted candidates,” and sufficient to give the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan jurisdiction to entertain and decide the contest in
question.

This question was raised in the case, of a similar nature, of Viola vs. Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur and Adolfo (p. 849, ante), wherein the majority of this court said the following:

“It
is also maintained by the respondents that the doctrine laid down in
the Tengco-Jocson case is untenable for the reason that the word
‘registered’ does not mean but ‘the candidate having presented his
certificate of candidacy or that he is eligible to the office in
dispute,’ and not precisely that his name was registered in any book or
registry, which on the other hand is not provided by the law.

“The
law requires that the certificates of candidacy for municipal offices
be filed with the municipal secretary, who must issue a receipt to the
party in interest and furnish certified copies thereof to the election
precincts of the municipality and the Executive Bureau (section 405 of
the Administrative Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3210), and
as the person in charge of the custody of the municipal archives, it is
the ministerial duty of said municipal secretary to file said
certificates of candidacy (section 2212 [a] of the Administrative
Code). For official purposes, the filing is equivalent to registration,
and that is undoubtedly what the legislator meant to say in using the
word ‘registered’ in various sections of the Election Law.

“As
to the proposition that the word ‘registered’ denotes ‘eligibility,’
the respondents are quite right, because in order that a candidate may
be eligible it is an indispensable requisite that he be registered,
except that there is a difference in that when the word ‘registered’ is
employed, a conclusion of fact is expressed, and when the word
‘eligible’ is used, a conclusion of law is stated, and it is well known
that in any pleading conclusions of fact, and not of law, must be
alleged.

“With respect to the word ‘registered’ as meaning
only that ‘the candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy,’ the
theory does not seem to us correct. The Election Law itself, in dealing
with the eligibility for any municipal office, says that no person
shall be eligible unless within the period fixed by the law he files a
duly verified certificate of candidacy (section 404 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 3030) ; in
providing for the case of death or inability of a candidate, it says
that the deceased or incapacitated must be a candidate with certificate
of candidacy duly filed (section 405 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 3030); and in speaking of the person to
be certified as elected, it says that only those who have obtained the
highest number of votes and filed their certificate of candidacy in
accordance with the provision of section 404 of the Election Law shall
be certified elected (section 471 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by section 41 of Act No. 3030).

“The phrases ‘duly
verified,’ ‘duly filed,’ and ‘filed in accordance with the provisions
of the law,’ employed in the Election Law in connection with the phrase
‘certificate of candidacy’ clearly show that to the mind of the
legislator this phrase without said qualifications is not sufficient to
indicate that a candidate is ‘eligible’ or that he is ‘registered.’ The
word ‘acreditar’ (verify), according to the new dictionary of the
Spanish language, means * * * To prove in a positive manner, to show,
to evidence clearly and beyond doubt, to establish by evidence,
circumstances, and so forth * * *. Therefore in the eyes of the law, in
order that a person may be eligible, it is not enough that he should
hold a certificate of candidacy, but it is necessary that it be shown
in an evident manner that said certificate of candidacy meets all the
requirements as to form, time, filing, and recording, that is to say,
that it is ‘registered’ which is the word employed by the legislator to
mean that all said requirements have been complied with. The other
qualifying phrases employed by the law in speaking of the certificate
of candidacy have the same scope and meaning. The fact that in various
sections of the Election Law it uses simply the words ‘certificate of
candidacy’ does not show that the legislator has deemed said words to
be sufficient to mean that a candidate is ‘registered’ or that he meets
all the legal requirements in order to be eligible, but it does so
undoubtedly for the purpose of avoiding repetitions. The mere filing of
a certificate of candidacy is not sufficient in order that a candidate
may be eligible, because the municipal secretary or the Executive
Bureau, who must know the law, may reject it if they find that it does
not meet all the requirements prescribed by the law, and only when the
corresponding receipt has been issued and the certificate filed can it
be presumed that it has been duly verified and filed.

“Furthermore
the facts alleged in the motion of protest now before us are almost
identical with those alleged in the protest in the case of Tengco vs. Jocson, supra,
wherein the words ‘candidates who have filed their respective
certificates of candidacy and obtained votes,’ are used, and the law
with regard to the essential requisites for the exercise of the special
jurisdiction of the courts of first instance in election contest, has
not changed; consequently, there is no reason of a juridical nature for
altering the doctrine laid down in said case of Tengco vs. Jocson, supra, and followed in other subsequent cases.

“For
all of the foregoing we are of the opinion that the use of the word
‘registered’ in the Election Law, as amended by Act No. 3210, is
proper, and that the words ‘voted candidate, with his corresponding
certificate of candidacy,’ used in the motion of protest now before us
are not equivalent to said word ‘registered,’ and consequently they do
not meet one of the essential requisites prescribed by the law in order
that the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur might acquire
jurisdiction to try and decide said protest.”

It was also intimated in the arguments that, as Francisco Tabada
answered the motion of protest after the overruling of his demurrer by
the court, said court acquired jurisdiction over his person by
voluntary submission, and consequently over the protest also.

The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the parties by the
plaintiff’s invocation of the exercise of its powers, and its
assistance to compel the defendant to render him what is ‘due him under
the law, and by service of summons on, or voluntary submission of, the
defendant (15 C. J., 798). The jurisdiction, whether general or
special, over the subject-matter in litigation, is conferred by statute
or the constitution, and is never acquired by consent or by submission
of the parties. The requirement that the election protest be filed “by
a registered candidate voted for” refers to the capacity to commence an
election contest, as well as to the jurisdiction of the court to take
cognizance of, and decide, said contest, and without this requisite no
candidate may file any protest, nor any court take cognizance thereof.
Inasmuch as in taking cognizance of election contests, the courts of
first instance exercise special limited jurisdiction (Tengco vs. Jocson, 43 Phil., 715; Palisoc vs. Tamondong and Medina Cue, 43 Phil., 789; Viola vs. Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur and Adolfo, p. 849, ante),
they cannot entertain an election contest, unless the facts, upon which
the exercise of such jurisdiction depends, are pleaded; and as one of
said essential requisites is that the contestant be a registered and
voted candidate, such fact must be alleged in the motion of protest in
order that the court may determine whether or not it has acquired
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contest. The mere submission of
the protestee, who was a registered and voted candidate, does not give
the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the protest; nor does it
acquire jurisdiction over his person by reason of such submission,
unless it has jurisdiction over the subject-matter in litigation (15 C.
J., p. 808, par. 104). The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan in election contests being, as it is, a special one, it
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Francisco Tabada,
notwithstanding that the latter had submitted to it, for it had not
acquired jurisdiction before by the filing of the motion of protest,
because the motion did not allege the essential facts giving it
jurisdiction.

Since in the pleadings, as well as in the
briefs, all the facts are stated and all the questions that are
necessary for, and relevant to, the decision of the case on the merits
discussed, we do not believe it necessary that any answer should be
filed.

For all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that
the Honorable Francisco Zandueta, respondent, who presides over Branch
II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, has not acquired
jurisdiction to try and decide the protest in question, and said judge
or any other of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan is ordered to
refrain and absolutely abstain from taking any further proceeding in
the election contest presented by Moises Vergara against Francisco
Tabada, without costs. So ordered.

Johnson, Malcolm, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., with whom concur Avanceña, C. J., Street and Ostrand, JJ., dissenting: I dissent for the reasons set out in my dissenting opinion in the Viola case, (p. 849, ante), wherein the meaning of the allegation “only candidates voted, with certificates of candidacy” was discussed.