MARCOS VERCELES, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE EMILIO ARANETA DIAZ, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LA UNION, GREGORIO NUVAL, CLEMENTE FE, AND FIDEL DE PERALTA, RESPONDENTS.

This is an original action instituted in this court for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus directed to the respondent judge, commanding him to
set aside his order dismissing the election contest presented by the
herein petitioner against Gregorio Nuval and others, to reinstate said
case and proceed therewith until final judgment.

The
respondents demur to the petition on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute sufficient cause of action, for they contend
that said protest was rightly dismissed by the respondent judge,
because he had not acquired jurisdiction over the case on account of
the fact that in the protest it was not alleged that the protestees
were registered candidates.

In support thereof they cite the doctrine laid down in the case of Tengco vs. Jocson (43 Phil., 715), where the following was held:

“The
‘motion of protest’ in election contest cases must allege that it is
presented by a ‘registered candidate voted for,’ under the provisions
of section 44 of Act No. 3030. Unless the motion of protest shows that
it is presented by a ‘registered candidate voted for,’ the Court of
First Instance acquires no jurisdiction to hear and determine said
motion.”

In the case before us, it appears
that as shown by Exhibit A attached to the petition for mandamus and
made a part thereof, the protestant alleged in his motion of protest
that he was a qualified elector and one of the registered candidates
voted for in the general elections in question. That is to say that in
said motion there is the allegation of the jurisdictional fact declared
indispensable in the doctrine laid down in the case of Tengco vs. Jocson aforecited.

So that, so far as concerns the allegation with regard to the status of
the petitioner in said election contest, the court has acquired
jurisdiction. But the respondents contend that said allegation of being
a registered candidate is indispensable not only with regard to the
contestant but also as to the contestee.

But the case cited by them (Tengco vs.
Jocson) does not impose such requisite. And it cannot do so, inasmuch
as said doctrine, according to its own text, is based on the provisions
of section 44 of Act No. 3030 then in force, and this legal provision,
just as its amendments contained in section 25 of Act No. 3210, does
not require that in the motion of protest it be alleged that the
protestee was a registered candidate.

The respondents cited section 27 of said Act No. 3210, the first four paragraphs of which are as follows:

“Sec.
27. Section four hundred and eighty-one of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven, as amended by Act Numbered Three thousand and
thirty, is hereby amended to read as follows:

” ‘Sec. 481. Mode of procedure in court cases.—Proceedings
for the judicial contest of an election shall be upon written contest
with summons, which shall be served as hereinafter prescribed: Provided,
That if the contest refers to the office of councilor, it shall be
sufficient to summon the candidates proclaimed elected by the municipal
board of canvassers.

” ‘In such proceedings the
registration list as finally corrected by the board of inspectors shall
be conclusive as to who was entitled to vote at such election.

”
‘The aforesaid summons shall be served by delivery by the sheriff of a
copy of the summons and the contest to each of the registered
candidates voted for personally, or in case of their not being found,
by leaving such copies at their, usual place of residence, in the hands
of some person resident therein and of sufficient discretion to receive
the same; such notice shall be considered as having been served if the
acknowledgment of the service made as hereinbefore prescribed shall
appear on the back of the summons.’ “

And the respondents argue that this provision, directing the sheriff to
make personal delivery of the copy of the summons and the protest to
each of the candidates registered and voted for, means that
the motion of protest must allege that the protestees were registered
candidates, that such a fact is jurisdictional and the failure to
allege it is fatal to the jurisdiction of the court.

In the
first place, the aforecited provision, as indicated by the heading of
the section containing it, has reference to the procedure, unlike
section 479 which prescribes the jurisdictional elements that must be
present in a motion of protest.

In the second place, the
rule that, in serving the summons, the sheriff must make service only
upon the registered candidates is not absolute. If it were so it cannot
be conceived why in dealing with the contest concerning the election of
a councilor the same section requires only that the summons be served
upon the candidates proclaimed elected, without using the word
“registered.”

To hold that an election contest must contain
as an indispensable and jurisdictional fact the allegation that the
protestee is a registered candidate, is tantamount to making the
Election Law now in force inconsistent and inadequate. As there is no
doubt that the failure to present certificate of candidacy is one of
the grounds for a judicial contest, under such an interpretation of the
law, it would be impossible to formulate an election contest against a
candidate proclaimed elected by mistake or through fraud, and not duly
registered.

And to hold that the law means that the sheriff
must summon only those candidates registered, would result in entirely
closing the doors to every judicial remedy for a candidate who presents
an election contest against a candidate proclaimed elected and not
registered, for then, on account of the very illegality of his status
as candidate, he cannot be summoned and his election would, therefore,
be incontestable.

We cannot give the law such absurd
effects. There is no valid reason for it. Every law carries with it the
presumption that it is perfect, and without solid grounds in law, it is
not proper to attribute to it defects, inconsistencies or
contradictions.

“It is presumed that the
legislature does not intend an absurdity, or that absurd consequences
shall flow from its enactments. Such a result will therefore be
avoided, if the terms of the act admit of it, by a reasonable
construction of the statute.” (Oates vs. First National Bank of Montgomery, 100 U. S., 239; State vs. Clark, 29 N. L. Law, 96; Henry vs. Tilson, 17 Vt., 479; Gilkey vs. Cook, 60 Wis., 133; 18 N. W., 639.)

“The
mind of the legislature is presumed to be consistent; and in case of a
doubtful or ambiguous expression of its will, such a construction
should be adopted as will make all the provisions of the statute
consistent with each other and with the preexisting body of the law.”
(Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 98.)

There is reason to require that he who institutes an election contest
should allege in his protest that he meets all the requirements not
only to be proclaimed elected, but also to be held legally eligible. He
claims the office and must allege that he has a right to it, if he
wants the competent court to pay him any attention. That is not,
however, the case as regards the protestee. A protest is filed against
him for the very reason that he does not meet all the requirements to
be proclaimed elected, or to be legally eligible. And one of the fatal
defects which a protestee may have is that of not having been
registered. It follows from this that, while there is reason for
requiring in the motion of protest the allegation that the protestant
is a registered candidate, yet not only is there none for requiring
such an allegation as regards the protestee, but that there is enough
reason for not requiring it.

And in the particular case now
before us, there is, besides, the circumstance that two of the
protestees submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, by appearing and
filing pleadings, Clemente Fe, an intervention (Exhibit B), and
Gregorio Nuval, an answer and counter-protest (Exhibit C). So that with
regard to them the court having already acquired jurisdiction over the
protest, which alleged the legal status of the protestant, has acquired
also over the protestees by voluntary submission of the latter, who
cannot now lawfully withdraw from said jurisdiction.

“Where
the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, a general
or voluntary appearance by defendant is so far equivalent to the
service of process as to confer on the court jurisdiction of his
person, and thereafter he is estopped to object for the want of such
jurisdiction. * * * ” (4 C. J., pp. 1350, 1351.)

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the lower court acquired full
jurisdiction over the protest now before us and over the protestees,
and that it is its duty to proceed with the case until its
determination.

And as the grounds of the demurrer are such,
and are thus decided in such a way, that any answer would be useless,
so this case is finally adjudicated upon the merits, and the Judge of
First Instance of La Union is commanded to set aside his order in the
election contest presented by the petitioner (civil case No. 1301 of
his own court) whereby said protest was dismissed, and to reinstate
said case and take the proper proceedings until its termination and
decision on the merits. No special pronouncement as to costs is made.

The writ is granted. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.