IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, EXECUTOR AND APPELLEE, VS. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT, MAR…

Edward E. Christensen, a
citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a
will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954.
In that same decision the court declared that Maria Helen Christensen
Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of
the deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court, and was
affirmed In its decision of February 14, 1958 (G. R. No. L-11484).

In
another incident relative to the partition of the deceased’s estate,
the trial court approved the project submitted by the executor in
accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court found to
be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the
order of approval, and this Court, on January 31, 1963, reversed the
same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will
should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the case to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by
said law (G. R. No. L-16749).

On October 29, 1964 the Court
of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the project of
partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the
properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy
Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney,
and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator
had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and
Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.
The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had
been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the
deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of
certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the
lower court and distributed to the legatees.

The case is once
more before us on appeal, this time by Lucy Duncan, on the sole
question of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should
pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the
inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced
to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia,
equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate.

The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others, the following clauses which are pertinent to the issue in this case:

“3.
I declare *** that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

“4. I
further declare that I now have ne living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.

* * * * * * *

“7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in
any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and
who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited In trust for the said
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.'”

* * * * * * *

“12.
I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well beloved daughter, the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as
aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during
her lifetime: Provided, however, that should the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY at any time prior to her decease having living issue,
then and in that event, the life Interest herein given shall terminate,
and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my daughter,
the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY the rest, remainder and residue
of my property with the same force and effect as if I had originally so
given, devised and bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that
should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without living issue,
then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest,
remainder and residue of my property, one-half (½) to ay well-beloved
sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124
Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-half (½) to
the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, namely:
Mrs. Carol F. Ruggaver, of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.; and Joseph
Raymond christensen, of Manhattan Beach, California, U.S.A., share and
share alike, the share of any of the three above named who may
predecease me, to go in equal parts to the descendants of the deceased;
and, provided further, that should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise C.
Borton die before my own decease, then, and in that event, the share of
my estate devised to her herein I give, devise and bequeath to her
children, Elizabeth Borton de Treviño, of Mexico City, Mexico; Barbara
Borton Philips, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and Richard Borton,
of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., or to the heirs of any of them who
may die before my own decease, share and share alike.”

The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been
preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line,
resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to
Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:

“ART. 854. The preteritlon or omission of onet some, or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.”

On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of
preterit ion, but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which
says: “Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title
less than the legitime belonging to him nay demand that the same be
fully satisfied.” Appellant also suggests that considering the
provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his
relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless,
although less than the amount of her legitlme, she was in effect
defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918, which
reads:

“ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the
cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not
proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall
annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited; but the devisee and legacies and other testamentary
dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not Impair the
legitlme.”

Thus, according to appellant, under both Articles 906 and 918, Helen
Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the
estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.

Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil
Code; and Article 906, of Article 815. Commenting on Article 815,
Manresa explains:

“Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede
presumirse ignorancla o falta de memoria en el testador; on el de dejar
algo al heredero forzoso, no. Este no se encuentra privado
totalmente de su legitima; ha recibido por cualquier titulo una porcion
de los bienes hereditarios, porcion que no alcanza a completar la
legitima, pero que influye poderosamente en el anlmo del legislador
para decidirle a adopter una solucion blen diferente de la señalada
para el caso de pretericion.”

“El testador no ha olvidado
por completo al heredero forzoso; le ha dejado bienes; pero haciendo un
calculo equivocado, ha repartldo en favor de extrafios o en favor de
otros legieimarios por via de legado, donaclon o mejora mayor cantldad
de la que la ley le consentla disponer. El heredero forzoso no puede
perder su legit ima, pero tarapoco puede pedlr mas que la misma. De
aqul su derecbo a reclamar solamente lo que le falta; el conplemento de
la porcion que forzosaaente le corresponde.”

“*** Dejar el
testador por cualquler tltulo, equivale a disponer en testamento por
titulo de herencla, legado o mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de
alguna cantldad o porcion de bienes menor que la legitima o Igual a la
misma. Tal Sentido, que es el mas propio en el articulo 815, no pugna
tampoco con la doctrina de la ley. Cuando en el testamento se deia
algo al heredero forzoso. la preterlclon es incomplete : es maa
formularia que real. Cuando en el te-stamento nada ae deja al
legitimario, hay verdadera preterlclon.” (6 Manresa, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 437.)

On the difference between preterition of a compulsory heir and the
right to ask for completion of his legitime, Sanchez Roman says;

“La desheredacion, como expreaa, es siempre voluntaria; la
pretericion puede serlo, pero se presume lnvoluntaria la omlsion en que
consiste, en cuanto olvida o no atiende el testador en su testamento a
la satisfaccion del derecho a la legitima del heredero forzoso
preterido, presclndiendo absoluta y totalmente de el y no
mencionandole en ninguna de aus disposicioneg tefltamentarlas, o no
inatituyendole en partealguna de la herencla. ni por titulo de heredero
ni por el de legatario aunque le mencionara o norabrara sin dejarle mas o menos bienes. Si le dejara algunos, por pocos que sean e insuficientes para cubrir su legitima,
ya no seria caso de pretericlon. aino de complement o de aquella. El
primer supuesto o de pretericion se regula por el artlculo 814, y
produce aceion de nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo,
o de complement; o de legitima, por el 815 y solo origlna la ace ion ad
suplementum, para completar la legitima.” (Sanches Roman. Tomo VI, Vol. 2, p. 1131)

Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will,
either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father,
son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. Manresa continues:

“Se necesita, pues: (a) Que la omislon se refiera a
uo beredero forzoso; (b) Que la omision sea conr pleta; que el heredero
forzoso oada reciba en el testamento.

“B. Que la omieion sea
completa Esta cendlclon se deduce del mismo Articulo 814 y resulta con
evldencia al relacionar esce articulo con el 815. El heredero forzoso a
quien el testador deja algo por cualquler titulo en su testamento, no
se halla proplamente omitido, pues se le nombra y se le reconoce
participaclon en los bienes heredltarlos. Podria dlscutlrse en el
Articulo 814 si era o no necesarlo que se reconoclese el derecho del
heredero como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvaoece esta duda.
Aquel se ocupa de prlvaclon completa o total, taclta; este, de la
prlvaclon parcial. Los efectos deben ser y son, como veremos,
completamente distiotos.” (6 Manresa pp. 428).

“La prlvaclon
de la legitlma puede ser total o parclal. “Privar totalmente de la
legltlma es negarla en absoluto al legltlmarlo, despojarle de ella por
complete A este caso se reflere el articulo 814. Prlvar parclalmente de
la legitlma, es manguarla o reduclrla, dejar al legltlmarlo una porcl6n
menor que la que le corresponde. A este caso se reflere el articulo
815. El 813 slenta, pues, una regla general, y las consecuencias del
quebrantamiento de esta regla se determlna en los artlculos 814 y 815.”
(6 Hanresa p. 418).

Again Sanchez Roman:

“QUE LA OMISION SEA TOTAL. — Aunque el articulo 814 no
consigns de modo expreso esta clrcunstancla de que la preterlclon o
falta de mencion e institucion o dlapoBicion testamentaria a su favor,
sea total, completa y absoluta, asl se deduce de no hacer distlncion o
salvedad alguna empleandola en terminos generales; pexo sirve a
confirmarlo de un modo Indudable el sigulente articulo 815, al deoir
que el heredero forzoso a qulen el testador haya dejado, por cualquier
titulo, menos de la legitima que le correspoada, podrlapedlr el
complemento de la mlsma, lo cual ya do son el caso ni los efectos de la
ureterlclon. que anula la institucion, sino simplemente los del
8uplemento pecesarlo para cubrir su legitima.” (Sanchez Roman Tomo VI,
Vol. 2.0 p. 1133).

The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir
may be limited only to the completion of his legitime (instead of the
annulment of the institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has
been left to him in the will “by any title,” as by legacy, be granted
to him in his capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero?
In other words, should he be recognized or referred to in the will as
heir? This question is pertinent because in the will of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an heir – indeed
her status as such is denied – but is given a legacy of P3,600.00.

While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave an
affirmative answer to the question, according to both Manresa (6
Manresa 7th ed. 436) and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI, vol. 2.0 – p. 937),
that view was changed by Article 645 of the “Proyecto de Codigo de
1851,” later on copied in Article 815 of the Spanish Civil Code, which
is now Article 906 of our own Code. Sanchez Roman, in the citation
given above, comments as follows:

“RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO BE LA LEGITIMA.- Se
inspira el Codigo en esta materia en la doctrlna clasica del Derecho
romano y patrio (2); pero con alguna racional modificacion. Concedlan
aquellos precedentes legales al heredero forzoso, a quien no se le
dejaba por titulo de tal el completo de su legitima, la accion para
invalidar la institucion hecha en el testamento y reclamar y obtener
aquella mediante el ejercicio de la querella de inoficioso, y
aun cuando resultara favorecldo como donatario, porque se atendia, no
solo a la deficiencia de la cuantia de lo que se le hubiere dejado por
otro titulo que no fuera el de heredero, sino al honor de aue se le
privaba no dandole este caracter. y solo cuando era instituido heredero
en narte o cantidad Inferior a lo que le correspondiera por legitima.
era cuando bastaba el elercicio de la accion ad suplementum para
completarla. sin necesidad de anular las otras instituciones de
heredero o demas disposiciones contenidas en el testamento.

El Articulo 814 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se ajusta a la unica necesidad que le inspira, cual es la de que se complete la legitima del heredero forzoso, a quien por cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo que le corregponda, y se le otorga tan solo el derecho de pedir el complemento
de la misma sin necesidad de que se anulen las disposiciones
testamentarlas, que se reduclran en lo que sean inoficiosas, conforme
al artlculo 817, cuya interpretaclon y sentido tienen ya en su apoyo la
saneion de la jurisprudencia (3); siendo condicion precisa que lo que
se hubiere dejado de menos de la legitima al heredero forzoso, lo haya sido en el testamento, o sea por disposition del testador, segun lo revela el texto del articulo, “el heredero forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado, etc., esto es, por titulo de legado o donacion mortis causa en el testamento y no fuera de el.” (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 – p. 937).”

Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain dated January 16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932,
respectively. In each one of those cases the testator left to one who
was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legltime, but without
refer- ring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed
the rest of the estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815
applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. (6 Manresa,
pp. 438, 441.)

The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the
expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as may be gathered
very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge
Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy
of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to
possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial
declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards
her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his
estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly
recognized by him.

The decision of this Court in Neri et al. vs. Akutin, 74
Phil. 185, is cited by appellees in support of their theory of
preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it referred
to a will where “the testator left all his property by universal title
to the children by his second marriage, and (that) without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to
them or, at least, some of them.” In the case at bar the testator did
not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a
legacy of P3,600.00.

The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of
339 shares of stocks in the Christensen Plantation Company and a
certain amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to
Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share
as of the moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil
Code), she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or
Increments thereof subsequently accruing. These include the stock
dividends on the corporate holdings. The contention of Lucy Duncan that
all such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the will
cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right of
ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime.

One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it
has been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the
Institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan
in the event she should die without living issue. This substitution
results in effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she
is entitled only to the income from said estate, unless prior to her
decease she should have living issue, in which event she would inherit
in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other
relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding this
point, since it is not one of the issues raised before us, we might
call attention to the limitations Imposed by law upon this kind of
substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden the
legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the legitime must
descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.

WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated October 29,
1964, approving the project of partition as submitted by the
executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is remanded with
instructions to partitionthe hereditary estate anew as indicated in
this decision, that is, by giving to oppositor-appellee Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia no more than the portion corresponding to her as
legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate,
after deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those
imposed in the will of the decedent, In accordance with Article 908 of
the Civil Code. Costs against appellees in this instance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P.,  Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

---

RESOLUTION

July 30, 1966

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Oppositor-appellant has filed an ex-parte petition dated July 11,
1966, making reference to an alleged oversight and asking for the
corresponding correction, in the last paragraph before the dispositive
part of our decision, which reads as follows:

“One point deserves to be here mentioned, although
no reference to it has been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant.
It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to
Lucy Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. This
substitution results in effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of
the will she is entitled only to the income from said estate, unless
prior to her decease she should have living issue, in which event she
would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the
other relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding
this point, since it is not one of the issues raised before us, we
might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind
of substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden
the legitlroe (Art. 864, Civil Code), which means that the legitime
must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.” (Decision, June 30,
1966, pages 14-15; underscoring ours).

Oppositor-appellant points out that the matter of substitution of
heirs was taken up and discussed in her brief, particularly in pages 28
to 32 thereof. This is indeed quite true, but the reference to and
discussion of the rights of the substitute heirs (called American heirs
in the brief) appears to be merely for the purpose of refuting the
theory advanced by appellees and not for the purpose of having the
rights of said heirs defined in so far as, under the terms of the will,
they may affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant. This point of
course was not and could hardly have been squarely raised as an issue
inasmuch as the substitute heirs are not parties in this case. We have
nevertheless called attention “to the limitations imposed by law upon
this kind of substitution,” because in the brief for
oppositor-appellant, at page 45, she makes the conclusion “that the
testamentary provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the Last Will and
Testament of Edward E. Christensen are valid under Hiilippine law and
must be given full force and effect;” and to give them full force and
effect would precisely affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant.

Wherefore, the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our
decision quoted above is amended by eliminating the following phrase in
the first sentence: “although no reference to it has been made in the
brief for oppositor-appellant .”

Concepcion, C. J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.