IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, EXECUTOR AND APPELLEE, VS. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT, MAR…

Aznar versus Christensen Duncan

The Case

This is a contest over the estate of Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California who made the Philippines his domicile and died leaving a will. The executor, Adolfo Aznar, sought approval of a project of partition; Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan, the daughter expressly recognized in the will, opposed it, and Maria Helen Christensen Garcia, whom the testator refused to acknowledge but to whom he left a money legacy, stood on the other side. The question is whether a compulsory heir who was not totally omitted but was left a legacy smaller than her legitime may demand the annulment of the institution of heir, or only the completion of her legitime. The case matters because it draws the sharp line between preterition, which annuls the institution of heir, and mere defective disinheritance or incomplete legitime, which merely entitles the heir to the deficiency.

Procedural History

The will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao, which in the same decision declared Helen Garcia a natural child of the deceased. That declaration was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Later, in another incident on partition, the trial court approved a project of partition applying the law of California; the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that Philippine law governs the validity of the will's provisions, and remanded for partition under Philippine law. On remand, the trial court issued an order approving a new project of partition dividing the estate equally between Lucy Duncan and Helen Garcia, on the theory that Helen Garcia had been preterited and the institution of Lucy Duncan was therefore annulled. Lucy Duncan appealed to the Supreme Court on the sole question of whether the estate should be divided equally or whether her inheritance should merely be reduced to cover Helen Garcia's legitime of one fourth of the estate.

Facts

Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California domiciled in the Philippines, executed a will on March 5, 1951. In the will he declared that he had only one child, Maria Lucy Christensen, later Mrs. Bernard Daney, and expressly stated that he had no other descendants. He gave Maria Helen Christensen, who had been baptized Christensen but whom he declared was in no way related to him and had never been adopted, a legacy of three thousand six hundred pesos, payable in monthly installments of one hundred pesos. He left the residue of his estate to Lucy, first as income for life, with full ownership vesting if she should have living issue, and with substitute heirs named should she die without issue.

The will was probated, and Helen Garcia was later judicially declared a natural child of the deceased. On remand after the Supreme Court held that Philippine law governs the will, the trial court approved a project of partition dividing the properties equally between Lucy Duncan and Helen Garcia, on the theory that Helen Garcia had been preterited and the institution of Lucy Duncan was annulled, saving only the legacies to other persons. Lucy Duncan appealed, contending that there was no preterition because Helen Garcia had been left a legacy, and that at most her own share should be reduced to satisfy Helen Garcia's legitime.

Issues

• Whether or not there was preterition of Helen Garcia that would annul the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir under Article 854 of the Civil Code.
• Whether or not the case is instead governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, entitling Helen Garcia only to the completion of her legitime.
• Whether or not Helen Garcia is entitled to a share of the fruits and stock dividends accruing after the death of the decedent.

Applicable Provisions

Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

This is the provision invoked by the trial court and the executor, and its application turns on whether the omission was total.

Article 906 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

This is the provision the appellant invokes, and it governs where the heir was given something, though less than his legitime.

Article 918 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devisee and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime.

The appellant suggests this applies by analogy, since the testator denied the relationship yet left a legacy, amounting to defective disinheritance.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no preterition. Preterition requires a total omission of the compulsory heir from the will. Here the testator did not entirely omit Helen Garcia; he left her a legacy of three thousand six hundred pesos. Relying on Manresa and Sanchez Roman, the Court explained that where the testator leaves the forced heir something by any title, though less than the legitime, there is no true preterition but only an incomplete provision, giving rise to an action for completion, not annulment.

On the second issue, the Court held that Article 906 governs. It rejected the classical Roman view that the legacy must be given in the heir's capacity as heir, noting that this view was changed by the Spanish Civil Code provision from which Article 906 is taken. The Court also noted that this solution accords with the testator's expressed wishes, since he refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia and limited her to a legacy. The case of Neri versus Akutin was distinguished because there the testator left nothing at all to the omitted heirs.

On the third issue, the Court held that since Helen Garcia became owner of her legitime at the moment of the decedent's death, she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all fruits and increments subsequently accruing, including stock dividends. Lucy Duncan's contention that all dividends pertain to her under the will cannot be sustained, as it would impair Helen Garcia's ownership of her legitime.

Doctrine

Preterition under Article 854 requires the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from the will. If the testator leaves the heir anything by any title, even less than the legitime, there is no preterition; the remedy is not annulment of the institution of heir but completion of the legitime under Article 906. The heir's legitime vests at the moment of the decedent's death, and with it the right to the corresponding fruits and increments.

Disposition

The order of the trial court approving the project of partition was set aside, and the case was remanded with instructions to partition the estate anew, giving Helen Garcia no more than her legitime of one fourth of the hereditary estate after deducting debts and charges, with costs against the appellees.

Remember This

Memorize the line: total omission is preterition and annuls the institution of heir; partial provision, even by legacy, is merely incomplete and entitles the heir only to the completion of the legitime. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between Article 854 and Article 906, and the rule that the legitime vests at death and carries its fruits.