BENEDICTO C. LAGMAN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME AND STYLE “MARCO TRANSIT”, PETITIONER, VS. CITY OF MANILA, ITS OFFICERS AND/OR AGENTS, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Benedlcto
C. Lagman originally filed, on 6 August 1964, with this Court a
petition for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration of his rights
under the so-called “provincial bus ban” ordinance (No. 4986, approved
on 13 July 1964 by the City Mayor) of respondent City of Manila, with
prayer for writs of preliminary and permanent injunctions to restrain
and enjoin said respondent, Its officers and/or agents, from enforcing
and implementing said ordinance. At first, this Court, in its
resolution dated 11 August 1964, dismissed said petition without
prejudice to action, if any, in the lower court; but, upon herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and supplemental petition to
convert said petition into one for prohibition, on the ground, among
others, that respondents have been actually enforcing said ordinance
effective 17 August 1964, this Court reconsidered its first resolution,
gave due course to the petition, and required respondents to answer.
This Court did not, however, issue the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for.

As disclosed by the record, the facts are:

Petitioner
was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service
Commission (by a decision, dated 20 March 1963, in FSC Case No.
61-7383) to operate for public service fifteen (15) auto trucks with
fixed routes and regular termini for the transportation of passengers
and freight, on the line Bocaue (Bulacan)-Parañaque (Rizal) via
Meycauayan, Harilao, Obando, Polo, Malabon, Rizal, Grace Pork, Rizal
Avenue, Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz Bridge, Taft Avenue, Libertad, Pasay
City and Baclaran, and vice versa. Within Manila, the line
passes thru Rizal Avenue, Plaza Goiti, McArthur Bridge, Plaza Lawton,
P. Burgos, Taft Avenue and Taft Avenue Extension. Pursuant to said
certificate, petitioner, who is doing business under the firm name and
style of “Marco Transit”, began operating twelve (12) passenger buses
along his authorized line.

On 17 June 1964, the Municipal
Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to Section 18,
paragraph hh, of Republic Act No. 409, as amended (otherwise known as
the Revised Chatter of the City of Manila), that reads:

“The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

* * * * * * *
(hh) To establish and regulate the size, speed, and operation of motor
and other public vehicles within the city; to establish bus stops and
terminals; and prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial utility
vehicles into the city, except those passing thru the city.”

* * * * * * *

enacted
Ordinance No. 4986, entitled “An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic On Roads
and Streets Within The city of Manila, and For Other Purposes”, which
the City Mayor approved, on 13 July 1964, effective upon approval
thereof. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance, insofar as it
affects the certificate of public convenience of petitioner, are quoted
below, to wit:

“SECTION 1. As a position measure to relieve the
critical traffic congestion in the City of Manila, which has grown to
alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best Interest of public
welfare and convenience, the following traffic rules and regulations
are hereby promulgated:

RULE I. DEFINITIONS

A.
Definition of Terns. – When used in this ordinance and in subsequent
ordinance having reference thereto, unless the context indicates
otherwise:

(a) The terns ‘provincial passenger
buses’ and ‘provincial passenger jeepneys’ shall be understood to mean
those whose route (or origin-destination) lines cons from or going to
points beyond Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Quezon City, Caloocan City and Navotas.

* * * * * * *

RULE II. ENTRY POINTS AND ROUTES OF PROVINCIAL PASSENGER BUSES AND JEEPNEYS

1. Provincial passenger buses and jeepneys (PUB and PUJ) shall be
   allowed to enter Manila, but only through Che following entry points
   and routes, from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. every day except Sundays and
   Holidays:

(a) Those coming from the north shall enter the city
through Rizal Avenue; turn right to Mt. Samat; right to Dinalupihan;
right to J. Abad Santos; left to Rizal Avenue towards Caloocan City;

* * * * * * *

(n) Those coning from the south through Taft Avenue shall
turn left at Vito Cruz; turn right to Dakota; turn right to Harrison
Boulevard; turn right to Taft Avenue; thence proceed towards Pasay City;

* * * * * * *

RULE III. FLEXIBLE SHUTTLE BUS SERVICE

1. In order that provincial commuters shall not be unduly
   inconvenienced as a result of Che implementation of these essential
   traffic control regulations, operators of provincial passenger buses
   shall be allowed to provide buses to shuttle their passengers from
   their respective entry control points, under the following conditions;

(a) Each provincial bus company or firm shall be
allowed such number of shuttle buses proportionate to the number of
units authorized It, the ratio to be determined by the Chief, Traffic
Control Bureau, based on his observations as to the actual needs of commuters and traffic volumes; in no case shall the allocation be more
than one shuttle bus for every 10 authorized units, or fraction thereof.

(b) No shuttle bus shall enter Manila unless the same shall have been
provided with identification stickers as required under Rule IV hereof,
which shall be furnished and allocated by the Chief, Traffic Control
Bureau to each provincial bus company or firm.

(c) All such
shuttle buses are not permitted to load or unload or to pick and/or
drop passengers along the way, but must do so only in the following
places:

(1) North

(a) J. Abad Santos corner Rizal Avenue, or vicinities

* * * * * * *

(2) South

(a) Harrison Boulevard, between Dakota & Taft Avenue

GENERAL PROVISIONS

* * * * * * *

SEC. 4. Any violation of the provisions of this ordinance and of any
other ordinance regulating traffic in the city, shall be punished by a
fine of not less than P20.00 nor nore than P20 .00, or by imprisonment
for not less than five (5) days nor more than six (6) months, or both
such fine or imprisonment In the discretion of the court.”

On 17 August 1964, the Mayor of respondent City of Manila, through
Its police agencies, began actual enforcement of said ordinance and
prevented petitioner from operating his buses, except two (2) “shuttle”
buses, along the line specified In his certificate of public
convenience.

Petitioner Lagman claims in his original and supplemental petitions
that the enactment and enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
Thus, he contends that the routes within Manila through which he has
been authorized to operate his buses are national roads or streets, and
the regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of which
(roads) are vested, under Commonwealth Act No. 548, in the Director of
Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and communications; but, since said ordinance was not proposed nor
approved by the executive officials mentioned in said Act, its
enactment and enforcement is a usurpation of the latter officials1
functions, and said ordinance is, therefore, unauthorized and illegal.

He also contends that the power conferred upon respondent City of
Manila, under said Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, the as
amended, does not Include the right to enact an ordinance such as the
one in question, which has the effect of amending or modifying a
certificate of public convenience granted by the Public Service
Commission, because any amendment or modification of said certificate
is solely vested by law in the latter governmental agency and only
after notice and hearing (Sec. 16 (m). Public Service Act); but since
this procedure was not adopted or followed by respondents in enacting
the disputed ordinance, the same is likewise illegal and null and void.

He further contends that the enforcement of said ordinance is
arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable because the city streets from
which he had been prevented to operate his buses are the cream of his
business.

He finally contends that; even assuming that ordinance No. 4986 is
valid, it is only the Public Service Commission which can require
compliance with its provisions (Sec. 17 (j), Public Service Act), but
since its implementation is without the sanction or approval of the
Commission, its enforcement is also unauthorized and Illegal.

In his memorandum, petitioner adds as contention therefor that
although his buses fall within the definition of the term “provincial
passenger buses” under the disputed ordinance – his route line having
termini outside the City of Manila and its immediate suburbs – they
merely “pass thru the city”; hence, its operation is covered within the
saving clause of the above-quoted Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No.
409, as amended, and he should not have been prevented from operating
his buses within the city streets specified in his certificate of
public convenience.

On the other hand, respondent City of Manila, in its answer to the
original and supplemental petitions, maintains that its power to
“prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial public utility
vehicles into the City, except those passing thru the city”, as
provided in its charter, is an explicit delegation of police power
which is paramount and superior both with respect to the administrative
power of the Director of Public Works, under Commonwealth Act No. 548,
to regulate and control the use of, and traffic on, national roads or
streets and, to the administrative authority of the Public Service
Commission, under Section 16 (m), of the Public Service Act, to amend,
modify or revoke certificates of public convenience.

It also maintains that the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548
have been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 917; and, even
assuming that the former has not been so repealed by the latter,
Ordinance No. 4986 does not contravene commonwealth Act No. 548
because, even assuming that a repugnancy or conflict exists between
this Act and Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, the
latter provision prevails over the former, Republic Act No. 409 being a
special law and of later enactment. Neither does Republic Act No. 409
contravene Section 16 (m) of the Public Service Act, Section 17 (j) of
the latter Act having imposed a duty in the Public Service Commission
to require any public service to comply with any ordinance relating
thereto.

Lastly, respondent, in its reply-memorandum, maintains that since
petitioner admittedly engages in business within the city limits by
picking up passengers therein, his buses do not merely pass thru the
city; and they are not, therefore, covered within the saving clause of
Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended.

In our opinion, the present petition for prohibition should be denied.

First, as correctly maintained by respondents, Republic Act No. 409,
as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, is a special law and of later enactment than Commonwealth Act
No. 548 and the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended), so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the
former act and the latter acts, Republic Act No. 409 should prevail
over both Commonwealth Acts Nos. 548 and 146. In Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino, 89 Phil. 560, 561, this Court said:

“for with or without an express enactment it is a familiar
rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary
repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter
will control the former without regard to the respective dates of
passage.”

It is to be noted that Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer an exclusive
power or authority upon the Director of Public Works, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on
national roads or streets. This being the case, section 18 (hh) of the
Manila charter is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548.

“It is a well settled principle that, because
repeals by implication are not favored, a special law must be taken as
intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence
of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.” (Baga vs. Philippine National Bank, 52 o. G. 6140).

“Where
a special act is repugnant to or inconsistent with a prior general act,
a partial repeal of the latter act will be implied or exception grafted
upon the general act.” (City of Geneseo vs. Illinois Northern Utility Co., 39 NE 2d, p. 26)

Second, the same situation holds true with respect to the provisions of
the Public Service Act. Although the Public Service Commission is
empowered, under its Section 16 (m), to amend, modify or revoke
certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, yet there
is no provision, specific or otherwise, which can be found in this
statute (Commonwealth Act No. 146) vesting power in the Public Service
Commission to superintend, regulate, or control the streets of
respondent City or suspend its power to license or prohibit the
occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this right or authority, as
hereinabove concluded, is conferred upon respondent city of Manila. The
power vested In the Public Service Commission under Section 16 (m) is,
therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to respondent City,
under said section 18 (hh). As held in an American case:

“Ordinances designating the streets within a municipality
upon which buses may operate, or prohibiting their operation in certain
streets do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission over motor bus common carriers, so long as the ordinances do
not prevent or unreasonably interfere with the utility’s operation
under the certificate or franchise granted by that Commission.” (Stuck vs. Town of Beech Grove, 163 N. E. 483; 166 N. E. 153).

That the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission
were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local
governments over motor traffic, in the streets subject to their
control, is made evident by section 17 (J) of the Public Service Act
(Comnonwealth Act No. 146) that provides as follows:

“SEC. 17. Proceedings of Commission without previous hearing.
– The Commission shall have power, without previous hearing, subject to
established limitations and exceptions, and saving provisions to the
contrary:

* * * * * * *

(j) To require any public service to comply with the laws of the Philippines, and with any provincial resolution or municipal ordinance relating thereto, and to conform to the duties imposed upon it
thereby, or by the provisions of its own charter, whether obtained
under any general or special law of the Philippines.” (Italics supplied)

The petitioner’s contention that, under this section, the respective
ordinances of the City can only be enforced by the Commission alone is
obviously unsound. Subsection (j) refers not only to ordinances but
also to “the laws of the Philippines,”and it is plainly absurd to
assume that even laws relating to public services are to remain a dead
letter without the placet of the Commission; and the section makes no distinction whatever between enforcement of laws and that of municipal ordinances.

The very fact, furthermore, that the Commission is empowered, but
not required, to demand compliance with apposite laws and ordinances
proves that the Commission’s powers are merely supplementary to those
of state organs, such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws
primarily rests.

Third, the implementation of the ordinance in question cannot be
validly assailed as arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Aside from
the fact that there is no evidence to substantiate this charge, it is
not disputed that petitioner has not been totally banned or prohibited
from operating all his buses, he having been allowed to operate two (2)
“shuttle” buses within the city limits.

And finally, respondents correctly maintain that petitioner cannot
avail of the saving clause of said section 18 (hh), he having admitted
that his buses engaged in business within the city limits by picking up
passengers therein; hence, they do not merely “pass thru the city”.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.

Concepcion, C. J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.