ERNESTO DEL ROSARIO, CELSO CABRERA, MATIAS L. MARBELLA, PEDRO AMAGUIN, AND SANTIAGO PANGAN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. JACINTO CALLANTA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE …

Petition for certiorari to annul the orders of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte (in Crim.
Case No. 4410-III) dated October 26,
1964 and December 16,
1964, respectively, allegedly issued without jurisdiction or in
grave abuse of discretion.

From the extant records of this case, it appears that on
September 1, 1962, Glicerio N. Parado
filed a complaint before the Justice of the Peace Court of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte, accusing Ernesto del Rosario, Celso G. Cabrera, Pedro Amaguin, Matias L. Marbella and Santiago
S. Pangan^[1]
of libel, in connection with the publication in the August 29, 1962 issue of
the Manila Chronicle of a news item with the heading, “8 in Ilocos Robbery Held”, wherein it was reported that
among those picked up for questioning was Glicerio Parado.  The news
item, which quoted a certain Lt. Fulgencio Albano of the Criminal Investigation Section of the 1st PC
Zone as saying that Parado was suspected of having
headed the group that staged the robbery, was alleged to have exposed
complainant, who is a lawyer, to public ridicule and contempt, dishonor and
shame and caused him damage in the amount of P50,000.00.

The corresponding warrants for the arrest of the accused were
issued, and the latter posted bail bonds for their provisional liberty.

On March
10, 1962, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte (Crim. Case No. 4410) the necessary
information, in part reading, thus:

“That on or about August 29, 1962, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, Ernesto del Rosario, as Editor-in-Chief, Celso
G. Cabrera as Managing Editor, Matias L. Marbella as News Editor, and Santiago S. Pangan as Associate News Editor, respectively, of the
Manila Chronicle, a metropolitan newspaper of public and general circulation
with John Doe as Publisher of said news­paper and others whose names and
whereabouts have not as yet been
established, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
with malice and evident intent to besmirch and impeach the good name, virtue
and reputation of one Glicerio Parado,
a lawyer of credit and good standing, wilfully, unlaw­fully
and feloniously wrote, printed and published through the said newspaper an
abusive and defamatory article against said offended party, which partially in
words and phrases are as follows:

(The news item about a robbery-hold up in barrio Luncag, Dingras, locos Norte and
mentioning Parado as suspected leader of the group
that perpetrated the robbery, was quoted.).”

The arraignment of the accused was postponed several times (April
20, 1964, June 10, 1964, August 26, 1964 and September 29, 1964) apparently in
view of the representations of their counsel that a request for reinvestigation
was pending before the Provincial Fiscal. 
When the aforesaid request was denied (copy of which was received by
counsel for the accused on September 24, 1964), the accused filed with the
court a motion to dismiss the case, dated October 2, 1964, alleging lack of
jurisdiction and prescription.  It was
claimed that there was nothing in the information to indicate that the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte had jurisdiction over the case;
on the contrary, it was therein stated that the news report was written,
printed and published in the City of Manila; and arguing that since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, the running of the prescriptive period
was never interrupted, the accused concluded that the 2-year prescriptive
period within which to bring the action (computed from the publication of the
news report on August 29, 1962) had already expired.

The Provincial Fiscal opposed the motion, reasoning that if there
was any defect in the information at all, it was only the absence of allegation
that the offended party was residing in Ilocos Norte,
which defect is correctible by amendment or by evidence during the trial.  When an amended information, containing an
allegation that the offended party was a resident of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte, was filed on October 26, 1964, the court denied the motion to
dismiss and scheduled the arraignment
for December 16, 1964.  Failing to secure a
reconsideration of the aforesaid order, the accused instituted the present
proceeding.

The parties are agreed that the original information con­tained
no allegation of the residence either of the offended party or any of the
accused.  Although admittedly the mission was supplied with the
amendment of the information, petitioners contend that by that time (October 26, 1964), the period for
bringing the action has already elapsed. 
Furthermore, obviously apprised of the ruling of this Court that it is
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, not of the
information in the Court of First Instance, that interrupts the running of the
period of prescription of criminal responsibility,^[2]
petitioners now contest the sufficiency of the complaint filed by the
complainant in the Justice of the Peace Court of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte, claiming that it failed to confer
authority on the latter court to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation.

Under the Rules, a complaint or information is sufficient if it
can be understood from the recital thereof that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of the court, “unless the particular place wherein
it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense.”^[3]
Even assuming for the sake of argument that in libel, the place of commission
of the offense is an essential element of the crime, the disputed orders of the
court below must still be sustained.

It is true that the complaint contained no specific averment that
either the complainant or any of the accused is a resident of Ilocos Norte, or that there was publication of the alleged
libelous news item in that province. 
However, attached to the complaint was an affidavit of the complainant,
executed and sworn to before the Justice of the Peace of Dingras
on the same date the complaint was filed, stating that he is a resident of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, and that
the news item was read by a certain Councilor Napoleon Foz
in the afternoon of August 29, 1962 in the presence of many other residents of
that municipality.  The latter statement
is an allegation that publication of the supposed defamatory news report also
took place in the locality.  These facts,
which came to the knowledge of the Justice of the Peace who conducted the
preliminary investigation and which formed part of the records of the case, if
not of the complaint itself, cannot be disregarded.  Thus, in one case, wherein practically the
same question was raised, this Court ruled in this wise:

“x x x Prima
facie, the ‘facts charged’ are those described in the complaint, but they may be amplified or qualified
by others appearing to be additional circumstances, upon admissions made by the
people, which admissions could anyway be submitted by him as amendments to the
same information.  It would seem to be
pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion (to dismiss)
the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the
fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the
complaint.” (People v. Navarro et al., 75 Phil. 516, 518, 519;
underscoring supplied.)

For the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby
dismissed, with costs against the petitioners. 
The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles  and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
As Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, Associate Editor, News Editor and
Associate News Editor, respectively, of the Manila Chronicle.

^[2]
People vs. Olarte, G.R. No. L-22465, Feb. 28, 1967, and cases cited
therein, discussing previous adjudications and expressly overruling Peo. vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, Dec. 29, 1960 as
well as People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.

^[3]
Sec. 9, old Rule 106, now Sec. 9 of Revised Rule 110.