G.R. No. L-28359. December 26, 1967
ABDULLAH SANGKI, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NORTHERN COTABATO, AND SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, RESPONDENTS. CONSTANCIA SALUDO, …
SANCHEZ, J.:
The original jurisdiction of this Court is invoked on
certiorari. Petitioner Abdullah Sangki, official candidate of the Nacionalista
Party for Governor, and intervenors Constancia Saludo and Jose
Torres, official candidates of the same party for Vice-Governor and Board
Member, respectively, all of the province of Northern Cotabato,
seek the rejection of the election returns from all the eighteen (18) precincts
of the municipality of Pagalungan and eleven (11) precincts
(Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 22, 24, 32, 35, 45 and 51) of the fifty-three (53)
precincts of the municipality of Pikit, both of the
said province of Northern Cotabato.
Petitioner prays that a writ of preliminary injunction issue to
restrain respondent provincial board of canvassers (a) from including in its
canvass the election returns from all the questioned precincts; and (b) from
proclaiming respondent Salipada K. Pendatun, official candidate of the Liberal Party for
Governor, from being proclaimed Governor-elect.
On December 7, 1967,
we issued the corresponding restraining order in petitioner’s favor.
Intervenors Constancia
Saludo and Jose Torres also sought preliminary
injunction. Their petition came
late. For, the winning candidates
(except for Governor) were proclaimed before respondent board of canvassers
could be restrained.
The case is now before us for resolution, after hearing, on the
preliminary injunction issue.
The arguments center, and in fact the merits of the controversy
as tendered by the petition and the returns, rest, upon the relevance to this
case of the doctrine of statistical improbabilities judicially
forged in Lagumbay vs. Climaco L-25444, January 31, 1966.
Petitioner’s trenchant claim is that in all the eighteen
precincts of Pagalungan, the election returns
reported zero votes for him at the same time that these returns showed that all
the votes counted were in favor of respondent Salipada
K. Pendatun; that in twelve of these eighteen
precincts, all the votes actually cast were tallied in favor of respondent Pendatun; that in the eleven precincts of Pikit heretofore enumerated, petitioner likewise received
identical zero votes while all the voters actually voting unanimously cast
their votes for Pendatun; and that in six of these
eleven precincts, the total number of registered voters equals the number of
ballots given to respondent Pendatun. Intervenor-co-petitioner
Constancia Saludo had
allegedly obtained zero votes in all the precincts above-mentioned, except one
in Pagalungan, where she was credited with two votes.
Intervenor-co-petitioner Jose Torres, candidate for
board member, appeared to have received zero votes, too, in the same precincts
except in one precinct in Pikit, where he garnered
100 votes.
The present proceedings, commenced on December 5, 1967, came about because, on December 2, 1967, the Commission on
Elections [Comelec] by a two-to-one vote declined to
review the November 30, 1967
resolution of the respondent board of canvassers. That resolution denied the petition to reject
the aforesaid returns, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In refusing review thereof, Comelec ‘s majority opinion, Commissioner Manuel Arranz dissenting, adhered to the view that it has no power
to direct the board of canvassers to reject said returns as its authority
“in matters of the provincial and local canvass is only supervisory in
character.”
As we go into the bases for the statistically improbable
doctrine hammered out in Lagumbay vs. Climaco, supra, and assess the merits of
petitioner’s and intervenors‘ position, we readily
read meaningful differences in factual setting between this case and that of Lagumbay.
In Lagumbay, the declaration
that the election returns therein questioned were “utterly improbable and
clearly incredible,” and thus, should be rejected, emphasized that the
number of registered voters in about fifty precincts equal the number of
ballots reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate
of one party only – the Liberal Party.
Here, respondent Pendatun points out, which is
not denied by petitioner nor intervenors, that the
number of registered voters in the questioned precincts of Pagalungan
and Pikit is not the same as the number of
ballots cast and tallied for the position of Governor, Vice-Governor, and
other candidates of the Liberal Party.
In Lagumbay, too, all the
Liberal Party candidates were credited with exactly the same number of votes
while all the Nacionalista Party candidates received
nothing. Here, only candidates Abdullah Sangki and Constancia Saludo were shown to have received zero votes; other
candidates of the Nacionalista Party for other
positions voted upon were not blanked in the disputed returns. A fact which stands in bold relief is that
candidate Magnolia Antonino for Senator – who is not
of the Liberal Party – received in all the questioned precincts a liberal share
of the votes.
In Lagumbay, there was
uncertainty as to what happened to the vote of the Nacionalista
Party inspector in the disputed precincts, because the absence of his vote was
unexplained. Here, respondent Pendatun explained, through affidavits of a good number of
the Nacionalista Party inspectors themselves attached
to his answer, that some did not vote because they were not able to register as
voters; that two Nacionalista Party inspectors in Pagalungan did not vote for candidates Sangki
and Saludo but for the Liberal Party candidates for
Governor and Vice-Governor because they “are more qualified than the
former two who are foreign to our Municipality;” and that other Nacionalista Party inspectors believed that the Liberal
Party candidates “are more qualified than the Nacionalista
Party candidates. These averments, we
are constrained to say, reduce this particular point to a question of fact.
To support their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, petitioner and intervenors concede that
their right to the relief demanded must be “clear and unmistakable.”
But the foregoing would suffice to demonstrate that the right of petitioner to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is, after all, far from being
“clear and unmistakable.” Indeed, the bare fact that candidates for
public office had received zero votes is not enough to make the returns
statistically improbable. In the Lagumbay decision itself, Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, who delivered the majority opinion, did not say
that when one candidate receives nothing in an election return, such a
circumstance alone will make said return statistically improbable. For, in stressing the factual premise, this
Court there took note of the fact that “this is not an instance wherein one
return gives to one candidate all the votes in the precinct, even as it
gives exactly zero to the other.” Rather, the fact accentuated is
that all the eight candidates for Senators of one party garnered all the votes,
each of them receiving exactly the same number; whereas all the eight
candidates of the other party got precisely nothing.
Also, the Lagumbay decision did
not really foreclose the possibility that a party inspector might vote for a
candidate of an opposing party. This may
be read directly from the following statement therein: “It is, of course,
‘possible’ that such inspector did not like his party’s senatorial line-up; but
it is not probable that he disliked all of such candidates, and it is
not likely that he favored all the eight candidates of the
Liberal Party.” Deducible from this is that a no-vote for a particular
candidate in election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial
evidence that those election returns are “obviously
manufactured.” In Lagumbay, that circumstantial evidence was overwhelming. The same does not hold true in this case; we
cannot, with certainty, conclude from the facts before us that the returns questioned
were “not true returns of legal votes actually cast, but simply manufactured
evidences of an attempt to defeat the popular will.”[1]
To be sure, it cannot be said here – as this Court did intimate
in Lagumbay – that respondent board of
canvassers may legally deny “prima facie recognition to such
returns on the ground that they are manifestly fabricated or falsified;”
or that “the fraud is so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur – the thing speaks for itself)”, such
that “there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie
value.”
The factual background of this case suggests that we should not
unduly expand the reach of the statistically improbable doctrine carved out of
the facts obtaining in Lagumbay. Rather, we should say that respondent board
of canvassers – sustained by Comelec – in refusing to
reject canvass of the returns from the disputed precincts, properly performed
the functions allocated to it by law. It
did well in not overstepping its authority.
The following from Dizon vs. Provincial
Board of Canvassers, is worth remembering:
“The board of official canvassers to whom the ‘boards of
election of the several divisions return their certificate showing the number
of votes cast for each candidate, is liable to err in overestimating its
powers. Whenever it is suggested that illegal votes have been received or that
there were other fraudulent practices at the election, it is apt to imagine
that it is its duty to inquire into these alleged frauds and to decide on the
legality of the votes. Its duty,
however, is almost wholly ministerial to take the returns as made from the
different voting precincts, add them up, and declare the result. Questions of illegal voting and fraudulent
practices are passed on by another tribunal.
The canvassers are to be satisfied of the genuineness of the returns,
that is that the papers presented to them are not forged and spurious, that
they are returns, and are signed by the proper officers; but when so satisfied
they may not reject any returns because of informalities in them or because of
illegal and fraudulent practices in the election. The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing
board is to ascertain and declare the apparent result of the voting. All other
questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting
elections or in quo warranto proceedings.”[2]
Aptly then does the Lagumbay
decision itself indicate to petitioner and intervenors
the remedy in law – the corresponding protest in the proper forum, in this
case, the courts of justice.
We are thus totally unprepared to grant the injunctive relief
herein prayed for.
For the reasons given, we vote to lift the restraining
order heretofore issued herein, and to deny the petition for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Ruiz Castro, J., did not take
part.
[1]
Mitchell vs. Steven, 33 Am. Rep., 175, 176 cited in the
Lagumbay case, supra.