ERNESTO DEL ROSARIO, CELSO CABRERA, MATIAS L. MARBELLA, PEDRO AMAGUIN, AND SANTIAGO PANGAN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. JACINTO CALLANTA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE …

Del Rosario versus Callanta

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Ernesto del Rosario, Celso Cabrera, Matias Marbella, Pedro Amaguin, and Santiago Pangan — editors of the Manila Chronicle — against Judge Jacinto Callanta, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the trial court: the order denying their motion to dismiss a libel charge, and the order setting their arraignment. They argue that the information was defective because it did not allege that the offense was committed within the court's territorial jurisdiction, and that by the time the defect was cured by amendment, the crime had already prescribed. The case matters because it teaches how a defect in an information is cured, how the place of commission affects jurisdiction in libel, and when the prescriptive period for a criminal offense is interrupted.

Procedural History

Glicerio Parado filed a complaint for libel before the Justice of the Peace Court of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Warrants of arrest were issued and the accused posted bail. The Provincial Fiscal then filed the corresponding information in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Arraignment was postponed several times while a request for reinvestigation was pending before the Provincial Fiscal. When that request was denied, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription. The trial court denied the motion and, after the Fiscal filed an amended information alleging that the offended party was a resident of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, scheduled the arraignment. The accused failed to obtain reconsideration, so they elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari.

Facts

On August 29, 1962, the Manila Chronicle published a news item with the heading "8 in Ilocos Robbery Held." The article reported that among those picked up for questioning in connection with a robbery in Dingras, Ilocos Norte was Glicerio Parado, a lawyer. It quoted a certain Lieutenant Fulgencio Albano of the Criminal Investigation Section as saying that Parado was suspected of having headed the group that staged the robbery. Parado claimed the article exposed him to public ridicule and contempt and caused him damages of 50,000 pesos.

On September 1, 1962, Parado filed a complaint for libel before the Justice of the Peace Court of Dingras. Attached to the complaint was his affidavit, sworn before the Justice of the Peace on the same date, stating that he was a resident of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, and that the news item was read by a certain Councilor Napoleon Foz in the afternoon of August 29, 1962, in the presence of many other residents of that municipality.

The Provincial Fiscal filed the information in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information stated that the news report was written, printed, and published in the City of Manila, and it contained no allegation of the residence of either the offended party or any of the accused. The accused moved to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction and that the two-year prescriptive period, counted from the publication on August 29, 1962, had already expired. The Fiscal opposed the motion, arguing that any defect was curable by amendment. An amended information alleging that the offended party was a resident of Dingras, Ilocos Norte was then filed. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and set the arraignment.

Issues

• Whether or not the information was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, considering that it did not allege the residence of the offended party or the place of publication in that province.
• Whether or not the complaint filed before the Justice of the Peace Court of Dingras was sufficient to interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for the crime of libel.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9 of the old Rule 106, now Section 9 of the Revised Rule 110, provides:

A complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from the recital thereof that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense.

This provision governs the sufficiency of the information and determines whether the defect alleged by the petitioners is fatal or merely formal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the information was sufficient. Under the Rule, a complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its recital that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense. Even assuming that in libel the place of commission is an essential element, the Court still sustained the trial court's orders. The complaint before the Justice of the Peace, though it contained no specific averment of residence or of publication in Ilocos Norte, was accompanied by the complainant's affidavit stating that he resided in Dingras and that the news item was read there by Councilor Napoleon Foz before many residents. These facts were known to the Justice of the Peace who conducted the preliminary investigation and formed part of the records of the case. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in People versus Navarro:

Prima facie, the facts charged are those described in the complaint, but they may be amplified or qualified by others appearing to be additional circumstances, upon admissions made by the people, which admissions could anyway be submitted by him as amendments to the same information.

The Court added that it would be pure technicality to hold that the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts admitted to be true simply because they were not described in the complaint.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the complaint before the Justice of the Peace failed to interrupt the prescriptive period. Since the complaint was sufficient, having been amplified by the attached affidavit, the filing of that complaint interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. The defect in the information was cured by the amendment, and the action had not yet prescribed.

Doctrine

A complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its recital that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense. The facts charged in a complaint may be amplified or qualified by other circumstances appearing in the records, such as an affidavit attached to the complaint, and these facts may be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss. It is pure technicality to disregard facts admitted to be true simply because they were not described in the complaint. The filing of the complaint in the municipal court, not the information in the Court of First Instance, interrupts the running of the prescriptive period for criminal responsibility.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, with costs against the petitioners, and the preliminary injunction previously issued was dissolved.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the facts charged in a complaint may be amplified by other circumstances in the record, so a defect in the information is cured by amendment and does not erase the interruption of prescription caused by the filing of the complaint. Examiners like to use this case on the sufficiency of an information, the place of commission in libel, and the rule that it is the filing of the complaint in the municipal court that interrupts prescription.