FRANCISCA LAZO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. AND SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

On November 17, 1949, Francisca Lazo
bought five hun­dred (500) square meters of land situated in Barrio Tata­lon, Quezon
City for P1,500.00 from the late Agustin de Torres, husband of Rufina Guerrero. 
This land was part of the Tatalon Estate which
was the subject of a compro­mise agreement on March 16, 1953, subsequently approved by the Court
of First Instance, between the Deudors (one of whom
was Rufina Guerrero as widow and successor of Agustin
Torres) and J.M. Tuason & Co.  The Deudors, in
consideration of P1,201,063.00 gave up their claim
over the estate, but in the agreement it was provided that J.M. Tuason & Co., will recognize the contracts of sale en­tered
into by the Deudors over the said lands.  The Deudor buyers
(a list of them was furnished J.M. Tuason & Co.)
may, it was stipulated, continue the contracts of sale by paying J.M. Tuason & Co., the current prices under conditions set
up by the latter.

Later, on March 23, 1957, J.M. Tuason
& Co. sought before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, to eject Francisca Lazo from the land through
an action for recovery based on alleged ownership.^[1]
As a result, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on November 13, 1959, ordering
Lazo to vacate the land, remove her cons­tructions
and pay P120.00 monthly rental
from April 1948 until
restoration of the land.  Subsequently,* after the judgment became final, execution of the
judgment was or­dered.  Lazo moved on March
7, 1961 to stay the execution but four days
later her motion was denied.  She
appealed this order of denial but the Court of First Instance dis­allowed her
appeal.  After her motion for
reconsideration was denied, Lazo filed in the Court
of Appeals a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction2 to
compel the Court of First Instance to approve her appeal.  The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition
on the ground that an order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable.

On January 27, 1962,
upon motion of J.M. Tuason & Co., and after the
finality of the Court of Appeals’ decision, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of demolition against Lazo.  She however moved to stay the enforcement of
the writ and was given until April 1,
1962 to vacate the premises voluntarily – otherwise, the sheriff
will de­molish her house.

On February 20, 1962,
Lazo, in a petition for prohi­bition with preliminary
injunction before the Court of Ap­peals3 sought to enjoin the enforcement of
the decision in
Civil Case No. Q-4193 and the enforcement of the demo­lition
order issued on January 27, 1962.  Again the Court of Appeals denied her
petition, holding that the decision in Civil Case No. Q-4193, having become
final and execu­tory, a writ of prohibition will not
lie to restrain enforcement of the writ
of execution issued pursuant to the decision. 
It also ruled that the order denying the motion to suspend the
enforcement of the writ of execution and an order of demolition may not be
reviewed by a writ of certiorari.

On March 27, 1962,
Lazo filed a new suit before the same Court of First
Instance4 for the annulment of the judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-41930 on the ground of fraud, seeking to enjoin its
execution and the declaration of the orders of execution and demolition as null
and void.  She also prayed for
specific performance on the part of J.M.
Tuason & Co., praying that the latter be
ordered to execute a deed of sale of the land in her favor as per compromise
agreement of March 16, 1953, at P7.00 per square meter.

In support of her
allegations of fraud she alleged that: 
As a Deudor vendee she sought the execution of
a new contract of sale in her favor in accordance with the agreement but was
told to wait until the approval of the subdivision plan of the Tatalon Estate; that upon her re­ceipt of the notice of the
ejectment case, she went to the office of Gregorio Araneta, Inc., managing partner of J.M. Tuason & Co., and demanded an explanation; that the head of the
Investigation Department told her not to worry and to just give the case to a
lawyer, then forget it; that from then on she was assured that the case was a
mere formality devised to drive out the squatters, and any decision therein
would not really be executed against her. 
Thus, even when judgment was given she did not take any step to vacate
or appeal the judgment.  Later, she
received a demolition order dated January 27, 1962.

J.M. Tuason & Co., opposed the
petition and later moved for its dismissal on the grounds that the complaint
stated no cause of action or that if there was a cause of action, the same was barred
by prior judgment.  The Court of First
Instance dismissed the case despite Lazo ‘s oppo­sition to the motion to dismiss, for the reason
that the complaint stated no cause of action because the plaintiff had lost her
preferential right according to the case of J.M. Tuason
& Co. v. Sanvictores, L-16836, January 30, 1962.5 Besides,
plaintiff herself asked for extension up to April 1, 1962 to vacate the premises which the court
interpreted as her admission that she was satisfied with the judgment against
her.6

From this order of dismissal Lazo
appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn certified the case to Us on questions of law.

Anent the questions of
sufficiency of cause of ac­tion and bar by prior judgment, it must first be
determined whether the complaint to annul on ground of fraud should be allowed
in the first place.  While Francisca Lazo claimed she never took steps to vacate or appeal the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-4193 because she was assured it would not be
executed against her anyway, yet, when execution of the judgment was ordered on
Jan. 12, 1961, she never
questioned the judgment on the grounds for
which she now wants the same annulled. 
The execution order was indicative of the intent to ease her out of the
land, in disregard of the alleged assurance to the contrary.  If she still relied on such alleged
assurance, the writ of demolition issued January 27, 1962 against her undoubted­ly
left no doubt about the intentions of J.M. Tuason
& Co.  Still, she sought only
suspension of the enforcement of the writ of demolition.  She asked, as found by the lower court, that
she be given until April 1, 1962 to vacate the premises – a fact that plainly
supports the conclusion that she acquiesced to the judgment sought to be
executed.  She unduly delayed too long
before alleging fraud in the circumstances leading to the rendition of the
judgment against her, when she could have asserted the same right after the
order of execution was given.  Such undue
de­lay from at least Jan. 12, 1961 up to March 27, 1962, considering the
continuous threat of her ejectment, mili­tates
against her case.  And such circumstances
of delay can be discerned from the face of the complaint, in the light of its
reference to the records of Civil Case
No. Q-4193.  Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff
in enforcing a
right is persuasive of a want of merit, since it is human nature for one to assert his rights once threatened or
invaded, and may according go the circumstances
be destructive of the right itself.7 These
considerations negate the need of any further dis­cussion on the issues raised.

The same renders the complaint subject to dismissal for lack of
cause of action (Sec. 1[f], Rule
8, old Rules of Court) or
release, waiver and abandonment thereof (Sec. 1[g] Rule 8, old and Sec.1 [a] Rule 16, new, Rules of Court), as regards that part seeking
to annul the deci­sion in Civil CaseNo.Q-4193
on the ground of fraud.

As to the portion of the complaint seeking to enforce an alleged preferential right to buy
the land under the compromise agreement, the same is barred by res judicata, as
it should have been interposed as a compulsory
coun­terclaim in Civil Case No. Q-4193 (De Jesus v.
J.M. Tuason & Co., L-22184, Oct. 20, 1966).

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby af­firmed.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Civil Case No. Q-4193.

* On January 12, 1961.

2 CA-G.R. No.    29369-R.

3 CA-G.R. No.    30550-R.

4 Civil Case No.
Q-6315.

5 In this case We
held that the preferential right claimed under the Compromise Agreement was in
the nature of
a compulsory counterclaim which should be raised in the ejectment suit itself (alleging ownership in the Court of
First Instance), otherwise it is barred af­ter finality of judgment in the ejectment suit.

6 Record on Appeal, p. 106.

7 Buenaventura
v. David, 37 Phil. 435, 441.