THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, MANDALUYONG BUS COMPANY, COMPLAINANT-APPELLANT, VS. SOLOMON LIZARDO Y ALEJANDRE, ACCUSED.

The record discloses that Solomon Lizardo
was charged with slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence be­fore the
Municipal Court of Manila, Traffic Branch (Crimi­nal Case No. E-059289) by
reason of the injuries sustained by the driver of a car owned by the Mandaluyong Bus Company when said car was hit by another
driven by Lizardo, After trial upon a plea of not
guilty, the court, on February 13, 1961 acquitted him on the ground that his
guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

It appears further that on May 16, 1960, Lizardo was also
charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Cri­minal Case No. 52452)
with the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence, arising out of
the same accident for which he had been charged in the physical injuries
case.  Upon arraignment he pleaded not
guilty, but after due trial, the court, on August 30, 1962, found him guilty as
charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, to indemnify the Mandaluyong Bus Co. in the same amount, with subsidiary
imprisonment not to exceed six months, in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

On December 3, 1962, claiming that the decision in Criminal Case
No. 52452 for damage to property had never been promulgated, an Assistant
Fiscal of Manila filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that pursuant to an office memorandum dated September 26, 1962 of the City
Fiscal of Manila based upon the ruling laid down in People vs. Pascual Silva, G. R. No. L-15974, cases of slight, less
serious, serious physical injuries, damage to property and homicide thru
reckless imprudence arising out of one and the same incident should be filed
and pro­secuted under one information.

On December 4 of
the same year, the court issued an order granting the motion and setting aside
its decision of August 30, 1962.

On January 3, 1963 the Mandaluyong Bus
Co., moved for a reconsideration
of said order on the ground (1) that the ruling in People vs. Silva was not
applicable to the present case, especially to its civil aspect; and on the
further ground (2) that the court had lost jurisdiction to alter, modify, or
set aside its decision of August 30, 1962 which had become final and executory fifteen days after its promulgation on September
24, 1964 (the date – according to movants – of its
presumed promulgation), no appeal having been taken therefrom
by the accused.  This motion having been
denied, the Mandaluyong Bus Co. took the present
appeal from the aforesaid order of December
4, 1962.

The fate of the present appeal depends entirely upon whether or
not the decision of the trial court of August 30, 1962 had been promulgated in
accordance with law.  If it was, it is
obvious that said court no longer had juris­diction to set it aside and dismiss
the case, and, as a consequence,
its order of December 4, 1962
would be an absolute nullity.  But if said decision had not yet been duly
promulgated on December 4, 1962,
the inevitable con­clusion would be that the case was still under the control
of the trial court and the latter had lawful authority to set aside its former
decision and render another.

Aside from appellant’s assertion that the decision aforesaid was
duly promulgated on September 24, 1962,
the record discloses no indubitable proof of such fact.  From the circumstance that said decision was
set for promulga­tion first on September 11 and, for one reason or another not
disclosed by the record, reset for September 24, 1962, appellant draws the
conclusion that the promulgation must have taken place, because it must be
presumed that official duty in connection with the matter had been regularly
per­formed.  We are not convinced by this
argument.  In the first place, the fact
that the promulgation of the decision was postponed from September 11, 1962 to September 24 of the same
year may be presumed to have been due to the non­appearance of the accused,
which is, generally, the reason for the postponement of the promulgation of
decisions in criminal cases.  In the
second place, the prosecuting attor­ney, in filing the motion for dismissal,
must be presumed to have acted under his oath of office and after due in­vestigation
of the true condition of the record.  And
last­ly, the trial court, in entertaining the motion for dis­missal and in
granting it, must likewise be presumed to have acted regularly and after
consulting the record of the case to determine whether it still had
jurisdiction to set aside the decision of August 30, 1962. 
All these cir­cumstances force Us to conclude
that, in truth and in fact, the decision dated August 30, 1962 had not yet been duly promulgated when the
trial court issued its order of December 4 of the same year setting said
decision aside.

Coming now to appellant’s contention that the lower court erred
in applying to the present case our ruling in People vs. Silva supra, We find that the same is without merit.  In said case We held
that a defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions based on the
same act by splitting the same into various charges.

In the present it
is not denied that Felizardo was charged with slight
physical injuries in connection with the accident in which the automobile driven by him hit another car driven by
an employee of herein appellant, but he was acquitted.  Subsequently, he was charged with damage to
property through reckless imprudence arising out of the same accident.  This situation is precisely what our ruling
in the Silva case was intended to pre­vent and prohibit.  It cannot be said, therefore, that the trial
court erred in dismissing the latter charge.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING the order appealed
from is affirmed, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.