THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, MANDALUYONG BUS COMPANY, COMPLAINANT-APPELLANT, VS. SOLOMON LIZARDO Y ALEJANDRE, ACCUSED.

Lizardo versus Mandaluyong Bus Company

The Case

This is an appeal by the Mandaluyong Bus Company from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing a criminal charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence against Solomon Lizardo. The bus company was the offended party, its car having been struck by the vehicle Lizardo drove. The case matters because it fixes the rule against splitting a single reckless act into several separate prosecutions, and because it shows how the Supreme Court reasons about whether a decision was ever validly promulgated — that is, officially announced — when the record is silent on the point.

Procedural History

Two criminal cases arose from one accident. In the Municipal Court of Manila, Traffic Branch, Lizardo was charged with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. After trial on a plea of not guilty, that court acquitted him on February 13, 1961, finding his guilt not established beyond reasonable doubt.

In the Court of First Instance of Manila, Lizardo was separately charged with damage to property through reckless imprudence arising from the same accident. After trial, that court found him guilty on August 30, 1962 and sentenced him to pay a fine of 1,000 pesos, to indemnify the Mandaluyong Bus Company in the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment not exceeding six months in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

On December 3, 1962, an Assistant Fiscal of Manila moved to dismiss the case, invoking an office memorandum of the City Fiscal of Manila based on the ruling in People versus Pascual Silva, that cases of physical injuries, damage to property, and homicide through reckless imprudence arising from one and the same incident should be filed and prosecuted under one information. On December 4, 1962, the court granted the motion and set aside its decision of August 30, 1962. The bus company moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and it then appealed to the Supreme Court from the order of December 4, 1962.

Facts

An automobile driven by Solomon Lizardo hit another car owned by the Mandaluyong Bus Company and driven by its employee. The driver of the bus company car sustained injuries.

For those injuries, Lizardo was prosecuted for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Municipal Court of Manila, and was acquitted in February 1961 for failure of proof beyond reasonable doubt. For the damage to the bus company's car, he was later prosecuted for damage to property through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Manila, arising from the very same accident, and was convicted in August 1962.

The conviction was never shown by the record to have been validly promulgated. The promulgation had been set first for September 11, 1962 and then reset for September 24, 1962, for reasons not disclosed. On the strength of the Silva ruling, the fiscal moved to dismiss, and the trial court set aside its own decision before the end of that year.

Issues

• Whether or not the decision of August 30, 1962 had been duly promulgated before the trial court issued its order of December 4, 1962 setting that decision aside.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in applying the ruling in People versus Silva and in dismissing the charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory text; it rests on the Court's own ruling in People versus Silva, which it states as follows:

A defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions based on the same act by splitting the same into various charges.

This is the rule that governs whether the second charge could be maintained at all.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the decision of August 30, 1962 had not yet been duly promulgated when the trial court set it aside. The fate of the appeal, the Court said, depended entirely on that question: if the decision had been promulgated, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to set it aside and dismiss the case, and the order of December 4, 1962 would be an absolute nullity; but if it had not been duly promulgated, the case was still under the control of the trial court, which had lawful authority to set aside its former decision and render another.

The Court found no indubitable proof of promulgation. It rejected the bus company's argument that regular performance of official duty should be presumed from the resetting of the promulgation date. The postponement from September 11 to September 24, 1962 could be presumed due to the non-appearance of the accused, which is generally the reason for postponing promulgation in criminal cases. The prosecuting attorney must be presumed to have acted under his oath of office and after due investigation of the true condition of the record. And the trial court, in entertaining and granting the motion to dismiss, must likewise be presumed to have acted regularly and after consulting the record to determine whether it still had jurisdiction. These circumstances forced the conclusion that the decision had not yet been duly promulgated.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court did not err in applying the Silva ruling. Lizardo had been charged with slight physical injuries from the same accident and was acquitted; he was then charged with damage to property through reckless imprudence arising out of the same accident. This situation, the Court said, is precisely what the Silva ruling was intended to prevent and prohibit — the splitting of one act into various charges.

Doctrine

A defendant may not be harassed by several prosecutions that split a single reckless act into separate charges. Where physical injuries and damage to property arise from one and the same incident of reckless imprudence, they must be prosecuted together, not successively.

A decision that has not been duly promulgated does not become final and executory, and the trial court retains control of the case and may set the decision aside. Conversely, once a decision is validly promulgated and the period to appeal lapses without appeal, the court loses jurisdiction to alter or set it aside, and any order doing so is an absolute nullity.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed from, with costs, sustaining the dismissal of the charge against Lizardo.

Remember This

One reckless act, one prosecution: the State may not split a single incident into separate charges for physical injuries and for damage to property. Examiners use this case on the Silva doctrine against splitting charges, and on the jurisdictional cut-off that turns on whether a decision was validly promulgated.