THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES, VS. NELLY P. CORTEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

A complaint for grave slander was filed on January 16, 1964 by Julita
Santos against Nelly P. Cortez in the Court of First Instance of Manila. It was
alleged therein:

“That on or about the 14th day of November, 1963, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and pu­blicly utter and proffer slanderous words and
expressions which are grave and of insulting nature, considering that the
complainant is a married woman
with good reputation, such as ‘Matanda kang walang hiya,
anak mo na lamang nagpapaasawa ka pa, kaya ikaw ay hiniwalayan
ng asawa mo dahil sa gawain
mo, ang sabi ng asawa ko
ay nagpaasawa ka sa kanya, iyon pumunta
ka roon sa Kalunya mo’ and other words of similar import against Julita Santos, thereby bringing the latter into public
disgrace, contempt and ridicule.”

At the arraignment on January
30, 1964, the defendant, waiving the right to be assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The case was then set for hearing at
8:30 A.M. of February 6, 1964.  On said date, however, on petition of Atty.
Angel Aquino, counsel de oficio of the accused, to enable him to
prepare for the defense, the hearing was postponed to 8:30 A.M. of March
3, 1964.

From this point, the record of the trial court shows that on the
date scheduled for hearing, the court rendered a decision which, after quoting
the charge, proceeded to state as follows:

“Upon being arraigned assisted by her counsel de oficio, Atty. Angel Aquino, the
accused voluntarily and spontaneously entered the plea of guilty and insisted thereto notwithstanding the
information furnished her by the Court regarding the consequences of her plea.

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused NELLY P. CORTEZ guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the crime of grave slander, defined and penalized in Art. 358 of
the Revised Penal Code, and appreciating in her favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary plea of guilty, hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law, and to pay the costs of these proceedings.

“SO ORDERED.” (Record, p. 16)

The same day, the accused filed a notice of appeal to the Court
of Appeals, from said decision convicting her. 
The Court of Appeals, on September
3, 1964, certified said appeal to this Court as involving only ques­tions of law.

Appellant in her
brief now contends that she did not plead guilty to the complaint and that no plea of guilty had thereafter been
entered of record as required by the Rules. 
Appellant would rely on the fact that a page of the trial court’s record
(page 15), which she alleges to have contained the stenographic recording of
the trial of March 3, 1964, is missing, adding that the loss appears to have
occurred while the case was in the Court of Appeals.  It is
argued that said loss has rendered it impossible for appellant to prove
her claim that she never pleaded guilty to the complaint.  She stresses that the only plea of record is
that of “not guilty” entered on January 30, 1964. 
And, with the conformity of the Solicitor General (See Appellee’s brief, p.3), she now asks for a remand of the
case for trial.

Fortunately, there are other data of record showing that
defendant really pleaded guilty in the lower court.  Thus, in appellant’s motion of April 30,
1964, with her annexed affidavit (Annex “G”) praying for admission of
attached documents as part of the record, and her supplemental motion of May 19, 1964, asking that she be allowed
to present evidence, in addition to her plea of guilty, in order to obtain a
lesser penalty, both filed in the
Court of Appeals, and
appearing in the Rollo of this case, defendant admits that she pleaded guilty but argues
that  the court should have allowed her
to present evidence in  spite of her plea
of guilty, to determine
the graveness or lightness of the offense charged as well as the corresponding
penalty to be imposed.  Thus, she stated
in the affidavit:

“2. That I have interposed said appeal of the lower Court’s
judgment of conviction not for
the purpose of seeking its reversal but only for the
purpose of seeking a modification of
the penalty imposed
which I believe is rather harsh and severe or excessive;

xxx            xxx       xxx

“With respect to the lawyer offered to me by the Honorable
Judge, I declined to avail of his services, besides I was then already dead-set to lead guilty.  In
fact, my only conversation with the court-appointed lawyer was when I asked him
what the penalty would be in the event I enter a plea of guilty and he assured
me that I will only be made to
pay a fine not exceeding P20.00 or P30.00. 
Thus, with this added
inducement coming from no less than a lawyer, I did not even hesitate in expressing to the Honorable Judge my
willingness to plead guilty.”

It is clear, therefore, that defendant did not question the fact
that she pleaded guilty, but even admitted it, until page 15 of the record was missing; thereafter, she started to deny said
plea of guilty.

Considering the foregoing circumstances and the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed (Sec. 5[m], Rule 131, Rules
of Court), this Court can reach no other conclusion but that the statement in
the appealed decision, that the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment, truly
reflects what transpired.  And even
assuming that defendant’s plea of guilty, altho made,
was not entered in the record, the failure to so enter
the same does not affect the validity of the proceeding held. (Sec. 1, Rule
118, Rules of Court.)

As regards the correctness of the penalty, the slander, as quoted
in the complaint, is patently of a serious and insulting nature. The penalty
for slander, if of a serious and insulting nature, is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional
in its minimum period (Art. 358,
Revised Penal Code).  The court a
quo, therefore, imposed the right
penalty.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant.  Let a copy of
this decision be transmitted to the Honorable, Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals, for any investigation he may wish to order regarding the missing
page of the trial court’s record.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.