MANILA ROQUE BAIRAN, PETITIONER, VS. AGUSTIN TAN SIU LAY, FRANCISCO TAN, EXECUTOR AND HON. ANTONIO CAÑIZARES, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH IV, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RE…

Original petition for certiorari filed by Roque Bairan, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to set aside the following orders
of the Hon. Antonio Cañizares, as judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in Special Proceedings No. 31360: (1) order of January 4, 1961 requiring
petitioner to post a surety bond in the sum of P100,000.00; (2) order dated
February 9, 1961 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof; (3)
order dated June 8, 1961 to the effect that the order of January 4, 1961 was
interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable; (4) order of June 17, 1961
requiring petitioner to surrender and deliver to the executor the possession of
all the estate properties in his hands for failure to file the aforementioned
bond; (5) order dated July 31, 1961 likewise declaring the order of June 17,
1961 to be merely interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, and (6) the
order dated August 12, 1961 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On October 13, 1947, respondent Francisco Tan was appointed by his father,
Tan Chiong Pun (now deceased), as his attorney-in-fact, to administer,
supervise, control and to sell on installment basis a certain real property,
otherwise known as the “Mabuhay Subdivision”, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 20912 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. On October 22, 1934 said
respondent, with the knowledge and consent of his principal, entered into an
agreement with petitioner whereby the latter was appointed as his substitute
attorney-in-fact, to administer, supervise, control and to sell on installment
basis the abovementioned property, the contract to last “during and while there
are lots left to be sold or there are still pending collections of prices or
considerations of lots or portions thereof sold”.

When Tan Chiong Pun died on November 25, 1956, testate proceedings for the
settlement of his estate were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, then presided by the herein respondent judge (Special Proceedings No.
31360), and Francisco Tan was appointed executor of the estate.

On March 15, 1960, the other respondent, Agustin Tan Siu Lay, one of the
heirs of the deceased, filed a petition with the probate court to require
petitioner to post a bond of P250,000.00 in connection with his administration
of the subdivision mentioned heretofore, alleging: that on September 9, 1957,
the executor, Francisco Tan, had filed a motion praying that Bairan be allowed
to collect the outstanding accounts pertaining to the Habuhay Subdivision and
for the approval of the basic contract of administration dated October 22, 1954
(Agreement for the appointment of Bairan as Substitute Attorney-In-Fact, etc.),
but resolution thereof was held in abeyance by the court pending examination of
petitioner In connection with his report and accounting covering the period from
October 22, 1954, when he took over the administration of the said property, up
to and Including May 31, 1959; that out of the amounts collected by petitioner
from the sale on Installment of the lots comprising the subdivision, the latter,
without court authority, had been retaining as deductions alleged administration
and other expenses, in the total amount of P120,000.00; that the outstanding
collectible amount covering the period from June 1959 to February, 1960, was
around P200,000, from which amount petitioner would continue to deduct the sums
authorized under the contract of October 22, 1954; and that, unless he was
required to post a bond of P250,000.00, the estate would have no assurance that
petitioner will be able to make good any liability he may incur as trustee of
the deceased.

Despite petitioner’s objection, the respondent judge issued the order of
January 4, 1961, requiring him to post a surety bond of P100,000.00 in favor of
the estate “conditioned upon the payment by said Roque Bairan to the estate of
any amount or amounts that may be found due from him in his individual capacity
and/or as attorney-in-fact administering the estate property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 20912 (Now Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27613) of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal”. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied on February 9, 1961.

On February 21 of the same year, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal in connection with the order of January 4, 1961
requiring him to file a bond in the sum of P100,000.00, but the respondent
judge, in his order of June 8, 1961, ruled that said order was interlocutory and
unappealable.

Meanwhile, upon motion of petitioner, the respondent; judge issued an order
dated November 12, 1960 allowing him “to surrender and deliver to the executor
whatever property or properties he desires to so surrender and deliver; and the
executor is hereby directed to accept the same under proper inventory, subject
to the condition that such delivery to and acceptance by the executor will not
in any way impede or hinder the continuation of the hearing before Commissioner
Antillon on the above-mentioned reports and accounts”.

On February 24, 1961, respondent Francisco Tan filed a report and motion with
the court praying that Bairan be required to deliver and/or turn over all his
collections as Administrator of the “Mabuhay Subdivision”, covering the period
between the month of September, 1960 and January, 1961, inclusive, and the
collections from February 1961 and successively thereafter until these
proceedings are terminated, without prejudice to the delivery of those already
collected by him, together with all the unauthorized deductions made, all
of which were covered by his accounts then pending hearing in Court, and were
objected to by the Executor and all the heirs to testate estate. On June 17,
1961, the respondent judge issued the following order:

“After a consideration of the report and motion filed on February 24, 1961,
by the Executor, the answer thereto filed on March 2, 1961, by Roque Bairan, the
counter-reply filed by Roque Bairan, the compliance filed on March 20, 1961 by
the executor, and it appearing from the record of this proceeding that said
Roque Bairan has not up to now filed the bond called for in the order of January
4, 1961, that the surrender and delivery of the estate properties (cash or
otherwise) have not as yet been effected by him despite the order of November
12, 1960, and despite, further the willingness of the Executor to take delivery
thereof under proper inventory, and that, in the meantime, large sums of money
belonging to the estate are accumulating in his hands without any security
against loss, the Court hereby orders said Roque Bairan to surrender and deliver
to the executor, within five (5) days from the notice of this order, the
possession of all the estate properties in his hands, and the executor shall
take delivery thereof under proper inventory in accordance with the terns of the
aforementioned order of November 12, 1960.”

On July 6, 1961, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the above-quoted
order and on the following day he also filed an appeal bond and record on
appeal, but on July 31 of the same year, the respondent judge likewise ruled
that said order was interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, and on August
12, 1961, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. Finally, on
July 31, 1961, the respondent judge issued an order threatening to hold
petitioner in contempt and have him arrested should he fail to comply with his
order of June 17, 1961, on or before August 15, 1961.

The principal orders involved in this appeal are that of January 4, 1961 –
which requires petitioner to file a surety bond in the sum of P100,000.00—and
the order of January 17 of the same year – which requires him to surrender and
deliver to the executor the possession of all the properties of the estate found
in his hands. Petitioner attempted to appeal from both but the respondent judge
refused to give due course to his appeals upon the ground that said orders were
merely of an Interlocutory character.

We disagree with the view adopted by the respondent judge.

It is settled that a court order is final In character if it puts an end to
the particular matter resolved, leaving thereafter no substantial proceeding to
be had in connection therewith except its execution; and, contrary wise, that a
given court order is merely of an interlocutory character if it is provisional
and leaves substantial proceedings to be had in connection with its subject in
the court by whom it was issued.

It will be noted that in connection with the order of January 4, 1961, the
court decided, over petitioner’s objection, that the latter must’ file a surety
bond as prayed by his adversary. Thus, upon the question of whether or not
petitioner should file a bond, there was nothing left to be done except to have
the order aforesaid carried out. It is clear, therefore, that said is final in
character and, as such, is appealable within the period of appeal provided by
law.

On the other hand, the order of June 17, 1961 similarly determined with
finality the question of whether petitioner should or should not surrender and
deliver to the executor the possession of all estate properties found in his
possession. Obviously, after the court’s affirmative ruling on the matter, there
was nothing left to be done in the premises except to carry out the order of the
court. It is similarly clear, therefore, that said order is final in character
and, therefore, appealable within whatever period is provided by law for the
purpose.

But while we believe that petitioner’s contention on the matter of the nature
of the two orders mentioned heretofore is correct, we have come to the
conclusion that it is unnecessary to issue the writs prayed for because the
orders from which petitioner attempted to appeal are correct and right.

Considering the fact that petitioner, in accordance with his agreement with
the executor of the estate, was in possession of estate properties; that in
connection with the sale thereof on installment he had authority to collect
considerable sums of money, and that, as a matter of fact, the estate had made
claims against him for amounts that he had deducted from the proceeds of the
sales actually collected by him, it was perfectly within the jurisdiction of the
respondent judge to require him to file a surety bond for the protection of the
estate. In doing so it seems clear that his Honor did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion.

It appears in connection with the order of June 17, 1961 that petitioner
himself had made the respondent judge understand that he was willing, if not
anxious, to surrender to the executor the possession of the properties of the
estate found in his hands, and that the aforesaid order—now complained of—was
issued precisely in connection with a motion of his own where he had expressed
such willingness. Consequently, in ordering him to deliver said properties to
the executor, the respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.
As a matter of fact, it does not seem proper, generally speaking, for a probate
court to allow estate properties to be or to continue in possession of parties
other than the executor, who is the one entitled to have full possession
thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are denied and the petition
under consideration is dismissed, with costs. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued herein is hereby set aside.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.