MANILA ROQUE BAIRAN, PETITIONER, VS. AGUSTIN TAN SIU LAY, FRANCISCO TAN, EXECUTOR AND HON. ANTONIO CAÑIZARES, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH IV, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RE…

Bairan versus Tan Siu Lay

The Case

This is an original petition for certiorari filed by Roque Bairan, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, against Agustin Tan Siu Lay, Francisco Tan as executor of the estate, and Judge Antonio Cañizares of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Bairan asked the Supreme Court to set aside a series of probate court orders: the order requiring him to post a surety bond of 100,000 pesos, the orders denying reconsideration, the orders declaring those orders interlocutory and therefore not appealable, and the order requiring him to surrender to the executor the possession of all estate properties in his hands. The case matters because it draws the working line between a final order, which may be appealed, and an interlocutory order, which may not — and because it shows that even a correct ruling on that line will not earn a petitioner the extraordinary writs when the challenged orders are themselves correct.

Procedural History

The setting is the testate estate proceedings for the deceased Tan Chiong Pun in the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by Judge Antonio Cañizares. Agustin Tan Siu Lay, one of the heirs, asked the probate court to require Bairan to post a bond of 250,000 pesos in connection with his administration of the subdivision. Over Bairan's objection, the court issued the order of January 4, 1961 requiring a surety bond of 100,000 pesos in favor of the estate. Bairan moved for reconsideration; the motion was denied on February 9, 1961. He then filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal, but on June 8, 1961 the court ruled that the order of January 4 was interlocutory and unappealable. Meanwhile, on motion of the executor, the court issued the order of June 17, 1961 requiring Bairan to surrender and deliver to the executor, within five days, the possession of all estate properties in his hands. Bairan attempted to appeal this order as well, but on July 31, 1961 the court again ruled that the order was interlocutory and not appealable, and on August 12, 1961 denied his motion for reconsideration. The court also issued an order threatening him with contempt and arrest for noncompliance. Bairan then came to the Supreme Court by original petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction, and the Court resolved the matter in this decision.

Facts

On October 13, 1947, Francisco Tan was appointed by his father, Tan Chiong Pun, as his attorney-in-fact to administer, supervise, control, and sell on installment basis a parcel of real property known as the Mabuhay Subdivision, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20912 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Earlier, on October 22, 1934, Francisco Tan, with the knowledge and consent of his principal, entered into an agreement with Roque Bairan appointing the latter as his substitute attorney-in-fact, with the same powers over the same property, the contract to last during and while there are lots left to be sold or there are still pending collections of prices or considerations of lots or portions thereof sold.

Tan Chiong Pun died on November 25, 1956. Testate proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Francisco Tan was appointed executor. On March 15, 1960, Agustin Tan Siu Lay, one of the heirs, petitioned the probate court to require Bairan to post a bond of 250,000 pesos, alleging among other things that Bairan had been retaining, without court authority, deductions for alleged administration and other expenses in the total amount of 120,000 pesos, and that the estate would have no assurance that he could make good any liability he might incur as trustee of the deceased.

Over Bairan's objection, the court required him to post a surety bond of 100,000 pesos in favor of the estate, conditioned upon payment to the estate of any amounts that may be found due from him in his individual capacity or as attorney-in-fact administering the estate property. Earlier, on his own motion, the court had issued an order allowing Bairan to surrender and deliver to the executor whatever property he desired, subject to proper inventory. When he failed to file the bond and failed to effect the surrender, the court, on motion of the executor, ordered him to deliver to the executor within five days the possession of all estate properties in his hands, noting that large sums of money belonging to the estate were accumulating in his hands without any security against loss. The court refused to give due course to his appeals from both orders on the ground that they were merely interlocutory.

Issues

• Whether or not the order of January 4, 1961 requiring the petitioner to post a surety bond of 100,000 pesos is final and therefore appealable, rather than interlocutory and unappealable.
• Whether or not the order of June 17, 1961 requiring the petitioner to surrender and deliver to the executor the possession of all estate properties in his hands is final and therefore appealable, rather than interlocutory and unappealable.
• Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the two orders, such that the writs of certiorari and prohibition should issue.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. It applies the settled rule distinguishing final from interlocutory orders, which the Court states in its own words:

It is settled that a court order is final in character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, leaving thereafter no substantial proceeding to be had in connection therewith except its execution; and, contrary wise, that a given court order is merely of an interlocutory character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceedings to be had in connection with its subject in the court by whom it was issued.

This rule governs whether the two probate orders could be appealed at all, and thus whether the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to give the appeals due course.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court disagreed with the respondent judge and held that the order of January 4, 1961 is final in character and appealable. The court had decided, over the petitioner's objection, that he must file a surety bond as prayed by his adversary. Upon the question of whether or not the petitioner should file a bond, there was nothing left to be done except to have the order carried out. It was therefore final and appealable within the period of appeal provided by law.

On the second issue, the Court likewise held that the order of June 17, 1961 is final in character and appealable. That order determined with finality the question of whether the petitioner should or should not surrender and deliver to the executor the possession of all estate properties found in his possession. After the court's affirmative ruling, there was nothing left to be done except to carry out the order.

On the third issue, however, the Court held that it was unnecessary to issue the writs prayed for, because the orders from which the petitioner attempted to appeal are correct and right. Considering that the petitioner was in possession of estate properties under his agreement with the executor, that he had authority to collect considerable sums of money from sales on installment, and that the estate had made claims against him for amounts he had deducted from the proceeds, it was perfectly within the jurisdiction of the respondent judge to require him to file a surety bond for the protection of the estate. There was no grave abuse of discretion. As to the order of June 17, 1961, the petitioner himself had made the court understand that he was willing, if not anxious, to surrender the properties, and the order was issued precisely in connection with a motion of his own expressing that willingness. The Court added that, generally speaking, it does not seem proper for a probate court to allow estate properties to be or to continue in the possession of parties other than the executor, who is the one entitled to have full possession thereof.

Doctrine

First, a court order is final if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, leaving no substantial proceeding to be had in connection therewith except its execution; it is interlocutory if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceedings to be had in connection with its subject. Second, applying that test, an order requiring a person administering estate property to post a surety bond for the protection of the estate, and an order requiring him to surrender and deliver estate properties in his hands to the executor, are final and appealable, because after each ruling nothing remains but execution. Third, the availability of certiorari and prohibition is discretionary with the Court; where the challenged orders are correct and right, the writs will be denied even if the lower court erred on the appealability of those orders. Fourth, a probate court should not allow estate properties to remain in the possession of parties other than the executor, who is entitled to full possession thereof.

Disposition

The writs prayed for were denied and the petition was dismissed with costs, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the case was set aside.

Remember This

Memorize the test: an order is final when it ends the particular matter and leaves nothing but execution, and interlocutory when it is provisional and leaves substantial proceedings still to be had. Examiners use this case to test the final versus interlocutory distinction in probate proceedings, and to remind candidates that certiorari will not issue where the challenged orders are correct and right.