AMBROCIO DE LA CRUZ AND PAULINA SIGURADO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. PRIMITIVA BERROYA AND ELISA MANALO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On June 17, 1963, appellants commenced Civil Case No. 54255 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to enforce the subsidiary civil liability under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code of the herein appellees, Primitiva Berroya and
Elisa Manalo, alleging that sometime on January 6, 1960, the latter’s jeepney,
while running along Juan Luna St., Tondo, Manila, driven by Igmidio Senin, hit
appellants’ child, resulting in his death; that Senin was charged in the Court
of First Instance of Manila with the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence
(Criminal Case No. 50955) and, after due trial, was found guilty and sentenced
to suffer the corresponding penalty of imprisonment and to indemnify appellants
in the amount of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
that on appeal, the Court of Appeals, while modifying the penalty of
imprisonment, affirmed the award of civil indemnity; that, after the decision
had become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued against the
driver for his civil liability but the same was returned unsatisfied.

Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) That the claim or demand set forth therein had been released, as evidenced
by the do cument thereto attached entitled “Release of Claim” executed by
appellants on January 8, 1960, wherein it was stated that “for the sole
consideration of Seven Hundred and fifty Pesos (P750.00) Philippine currency the
receipt I whereof is hereby acknowledged, I/we Ambrocio de la Cruz and Paulina
Sigurado x x x x do hereby release and forever discharge Igmedio Senin, E.N.P.
Berroya Trans. Inc. of and from all actions, claims, demands and rights of
action whatsoever that now exist or may hereafter develop and particularly on
account of all known, unknown, and unanticipated injuries, damages and/or losses
arising out of and as a consequence of an accident that occured on or about 8:30
P.M., January 6, 1960 x x x”; and (2) that the cause of action did not accrue
against them on the ground that the owner and operator of the jeepney concerned
was E.N.P. Berroya Trans., Inc., appellees being merely officers of said
corporation.

In their opposition to said motion, appellants alleged that, the release not
having been set up during the hearing of the aforesaid criminal case, appellees
were barred from raising the same in the present case, in accordance with
Section 6 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaims. They
also prayed to be allowed to amend their complaint by changing the surname of
appellee herein Elisa Manalo to Elisa Nolasco.

Finding appellees’ motion meritorious, the court, on July 22, 1963, issued
the appealed order of dismissal. Hence the present appeal.

Appellants now claim that the lower court erred in dismissing their
complaint, firstly, because the alleged release of their claim is not a proper
ground for a motion to dismiss but should have been pleaded as a matter of
defense, and secondly, that said defense, if invoked in appellees’ answer, was
already barred because it was not raised—as a compulsory counterclaim—in the
criminal case filed against the driver Igmidio Senin.

We find both contentions to be without merit.

Under the provisions of Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (h) of the Rules of
Court, payment, release, waiver, etc. of the claim sought to be enforced is a
ground upon which a motion to dismiss may be based. In the present case
appellees relied upon release of the claim in their motion to dismiss to which
they attached the written release of claim. It does not appear that appellants
had ever put in issue, as required by the Rules, the genuineness of said public
document according to whose terms appellants had completely considered
themselves fully paid as far. as their right to indemnity was concerned.

It is true that appellees were not expressly named in the abovementioned
instrument, but it is clear that the release of the party primarily
liable necessarily means likewise the release of those who might be held
subsidiarily liable. With respect to the second issue, we need only say
that the release of the claim is not in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim
but a matter of defense. Consequently, appellants’ contention that the release
may not now be invoked by appellees because it is barred, the same not having
been invoked as a compulsory counterclaim in the criminal case against the
driver, is without merit.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order being in accordance with law,
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.