LAURENTIO ARMENTIA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ERLINDA PATRIARCA, FLORENCIA SOMECIERA, JULIANA ARMENTIA, JOSE SOMECIERA AND SOFRONIO FLORES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE REGISTER OF DEE…

Plaintiff Laurentio Armentia, and Juliana and Marta Armentia, were brother
and sisters of the full blood. Jose Someciera is the acknowledged natural son of
their deceased mother. Defendant Florencia Someciera is a daughter of Jose
Someciera. Defendant Erlinda Patriarca is a grand-daughter of Juliana Armentia.
Marta Armentia was married to Gregorio Bueno who died sometime in 1942.

By notarial document, Annex A of the complaint, dated July 22, 1955, Marta
Armentia did two things: First, she adjudicated to herself a parcel of land [Lot
5482, Pototan cadastre, (Iloilo)] with the improvements thereon, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title 21323—and which she inherited from her deceased
husband—pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the 1940 Rules of Court;^[1] and second, for and in consideration of
P99.00, which she acknowledged to have received from Erlinda Patriarca, 13 years
of age, single, and Florencia Someciera, 20 years of age, single, she sold to
them the property just mentioned. The foregoing document was, on July 22, 1955,
recorded in the registry of deeds. Whereupon, Torrens title 21323 was cancelled
by Transfer Certificate of Title 18797 in the names of Erlinda Patriarca and
Florencia Someciera.

Marta Armentia died intestate and without forced heirs on May 28, 1960.

On September 17, 1960, Laurentio
Armentia commenced suit^[2] against
Erlinda Patriarca and Florencia Someciera as principal defendants.^[3] The complaint, as amended, and reamended,
avers: That the sale made by Marta in favor of Erlinda and Florencia “is null
and void because it is simulated and fictitious and if not null and void it is
voidable because the said defendants were minors at the time the contract was
executed and could not then have given their consent to the sale”; that “the
said sale was fraudulently executed, and after the supposed sale, Marta Armentia
remained in possession of the house and lot, as owner paying the taxes on the
land until she died”; that “even assuming hypothetically that there was
consideration in the supposed sale, the consideration was grossly inadequate”;
that “plaintiff only came to know of the supposed sale in Annex A one week
before the suit was filed”; that “at the time of the alleged sale in Annex A”,
the “house was already standing on the land”, and that “after its execution
Marta Armentia repaired the house”; and that “the defendants Erlinda Patriarca,
Plorencia Someciera, Juliana Armentia and Jose Someciera are personally
possessing the land and the house in question”. The complaint further avers that
Marta Armentia also left a “Singer” sewing machine. Paragraph 8 thereof says
that said sewing machine is “now in the possession of Erlinda Patriarca and
Florencia Someciera”. However, paragraph 20 of the very same complaint speaks of
said sewing machine as “now in the possession of the defendants Erlinda
Patriarca, Florencia Someciera, Jose Someciera and Juliana Armentia”.^[4]

The complaint winds up with the prayer that the deed of sale be “declared
inexistent or in the alternative annulled”; that plaintiff Laurentio Armentia
and defendant Juliana Armentia, as heirs of Marta Armentia, be declared owners
of the land in dispute; that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel Torrens
title 18797 in the names of Erlinda Patriarca and Florencia Someciera, and, in
lieu thereof, to issue a new title in the names of Laurentio Armentia and
Juliana Armentia; that the house and lot and sewing machine be partitioned and
plaintiff’s share be delivered to him; and that should partition not be
feasible, said properties be sold and plaintiff given his share.

The complaint was met by defendant’s motion to dismiss upon two grounds: (1)
lack of cause of action and (2) prescription.

On November 21, 1960, over plaintiff’s opposition, the lower court dismissed
the case for the reason that plaintiff’s action to annul the sale had
prescribed. A move to reconsider was thwarted by the court in its order of
December 17, 1960.

The case is now before us on plaintiff’s appeal in forma pauperis.

1. Plaintiff’s attack is primarily directed at the sale. Plaintiff charges that
   the contract therefor was fraudulently executed, but in the same breadth
   characterizes it as simulated and fictitious. These statements are but
   conclusions of law. Controlling, of course, is the statement of ultimate
   facts.^[5]

   Let us then look at the factual-recitals. Particularly striking is the fact
   that plaintiff does not dispute the self-adjudication made by Marta Armentia in
   the deed. Plaintiff does not impugn the genuineness of Marta’s signature
   thereon. He solely puts in issue that portion of the document where the sale
   appears to have been made to Erlinda Patriarca and Florencia Someciera.

   To drive home his averment of nullity, plaintiff summons to his aid the
   following circumstances: At the time of the sale, the vendees were still minors
   and the consideration was grossly inadequate; after the sale, Marta Armentia
   repaired the house, continued possession of the premises, paid the taxes thereon
   until her demise.

   Hypothetically admitting the truth of these allegations, the conclusion is
   irresistible that the sale is merely voidable. Because Marta Armentia executed
   the document, and this is not controverted by plaintiff. Besides, the fact that
   the vendees were minors, makes the contract, at worst, annullable by them. Then
   again, inadequacy of consideration does not imply total want of consideration.
   Without more, the purported acts of Marta Armentia after the sale do not
   indicate that said sale was void from the beginning.

   The sum total of all of these is that, in essence, plaintiff’s case is
   bottomed on fraud, which renders the contract voidable.

2. May plaintiff annul the sale on the theory of fraud? Plaintiff was but a
   brother of the deceased Marta Armentia. True, he is an intestate heir of Marta;
   but he is not a forced heir. Upon the other hand, Marta was free to dispose of
   her properties the way she liked it. She had neither ascendants nor descendants.

   By Article 1397 of the Civil Code, “[t]he action for annulment of contracts
   may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily”.
   This must be construed in conjunction with Article 1311 of the same code
   providing that “[c]ontracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
   and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
   contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
   provision of law”, and that “the heir is not liable beyond the value of the
   property he received from the decedent”. Plaintiff is not a forced heir. He is
   not obliged principally or subsidiarily under the contract. Marta Armentia did
   not transmit to him by devise or otherwise any rights to the property, the
   subject thereof. On the contrary, Marta voluntarily disposed of it. No creditors
   are defrauded; there are none. No legitimes are impaired. Therefore, plaintiff
   has no cause of action to annul or to rescind the sale.

   In point is Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana, 87 Phil. 787. The facts there may
   well be analogized with those of the present. In the Concepcion case,
   plaintiff Monico Concepcion was the only surviving legitimate brother of
   Perpetua Concepcion, who died without issue and without leaving any will. In her
   lifetime, or more precisely, on June 29, 1945, said Perpetua Con- cepcion, “in
   connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, sold and
   conveyed three parcels of land for a false and fictitious consideration
   to the defendant, who secured transfer certificates of title of said lands
   issued under her name; and that the defendant has been in possession of the
   properties sold since the death of Perpetua Concepcion, thereby causing damages
   to the plaintiff in the amount of not less than two hundred (P200) pesos.”^[6] On motion to dismiss, the lower court
   threw the complaint out of court upon the ground that “the plaintiff is not a
   party to the deed of sale executed by Perpetua Concepcion in favor of the
   defendant”; that even on the assumption “that the consideration of the contract
   is fictitious, the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendant”; that
   under Article 1302 of the old Civil Code, “the action to annul a contract may be
   brought by any person principally or subsidiarily bound thereby;” that
   “plaintiff is not bound by the deed of sale executed by the deceased in favor of
   the defendant”; and that he has “no obligations under the deed.”

   The following reproduced in haec verba from the Concepcion
   opinion is illuminating:

   “(2) As to the appellant’s second and last contention, under the law action
   to annul a contract entered into with all the requisites mentioned in article
   1261^[7] whenever they are tainted with
   the vice which invalidate them in accordance with law, may be brought not only
   by any person principally bound or who made them, but also by his heir to
   whom the right and obligation arising from the contract are transmitted.
   Hence if no such rights, actions or obligations have been transmitted to the
   heir, the latter can not bring an action to annul the contract in
   representation of the contracting party who made it. In Wolfson vs.
   Estate of Martinez, 20 Phil., 340, this Supreme Court quoted with approval the
   judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 18, 1901, in which it was held
   that ‘he who is not a party to a contract, or an assignee thereunder, or does
   not represent those who took part therein, has under articles 1257 and 1302^[8] of the Civil Code no legal capacity to
   challenge the validity of such contract.’ And in Irlanda vs. Pitargue
   (22 Phil. 383) we held that ‘the testamentary or legal heir
   continues in law as the juridical personality of his predecessor in interest,
   who transmit to him from the moment of his death such of his rights, actions and
   obligations as are not extinguished thereby’.

   The question to be resolved is, therefore, whether the deceased Perpetua
   Concepcion has transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising from the contract
   under consideration in order that he can bring an action to annul the sale
   voluntarily made by her to the defendant with a false consideration.

   We are of the opinion and so hold, that the late Perpetua Concepcion has
   not transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising from the contract of
   conveyance or sale of her lands to the defendant, and therefore the plaintiff
   cannot file an action to annul such contract as representative of the
   deceased.

   According to the complaint the deceased, in connivance with the defendant and
   with intent to defraud the plaintiff, (that is, in order not to leave the
   properties above mentioned upon her death to the plaintiff) sold and conveyed
   them to the latter, for a false and fictitious consideration. It is,
   therefore obvious, that the conveyance or sale of said properties to the
   defendant was voluntarily made by the deceased to said defendant. As the
   deceased had no forced heir, she was free to dispose of all her properties as
   absolute owner thereof, without further limitation than those established by
   law, and the right to dispose of a thing involves the right to give or convey
   it to another without any consideration. The only limitation
   established by law on her right to convey said properties to the defendant
   without any consideration is, that she could not dispose of or transfer her
   property to another in fraud of her creditors. And this court, in Solis
   vs. Chua Pua Hermanos (50 Phil. 636), through Mr. Justice Street, held
   that ‘a voluntary conveyance, without any consideration whatever, is prima
   facie good as between the parties, and such an instrument can not be
   declared fraudulent as against creditors in the absence of proof, that there was
   at the time of the execution of the conveyance a creditor who could be defrauded
   by the conveyance, 27 C.J., 470′.

   “The reason why a forced heir has the right to institute an action
   of rescission is that the right to the legitime is similar to a credit of a
   creditor. As the same Spanish author [Manresa] correctly states in
   commenting on article 1291^[9] of the
   Civil Code: ‘The rights of a forced heir to the legitime are undoubtedly similar
   to a credit of a creditor in so far as the rights to the legitime may be
   defeated by fraudulent contracts, and are superior to the will of those bound to
   respect them. In its judgment of October 28, 1897, the Supreme Court of Spain
   held that the forced heirs instituted as such by their father to the latter fs
   testament have the undeniable right to institute an action to annul contracts
   entered into by the father to their prejudice. As it is seen the action is
   called action of nullity, but it is rather an action of rescission taking
   into account the purpose for which it is instituted and the confusion of ideas
   that has prevailed in this matter. The doctrine we shall expound in commenting
   on articles 1302 and 1306 [10] will confirm what we have just stated1. (Manresa,
   Codigo Civil, 4th edition. Vol. 8, pp. 667 and 668.)^[11]

   Our opinion in Concepcion needs no further elaboration. It would suf-
   fice to say that plaintiff here has no cause of action.

3. But even if a right of action be conceded, plaintiff’s case fails just the
   same. An action to annul a contract based on fraud must be filed within four
   years from the discovery thereof.^[12] In
   legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the
   time the document was registered in the office of the register of deeds. For,
   the familiar rule is that registration is notice to the whole world, including
   plaintiff.^[13] As afore stated, the
   document in question was recorded on July 22, 1955. Action was started only on
   September 17, 1960, The four-year period has elapsed. And, plaintiff’s cause of
   action, if any, is time-barred.
4. All that remains is the small item of plaintiff’s share in the “Singer”
   sewing machine which was not the subject of the sale aforesaid. The Court
   may well take judicial notice^[14] of the
   fact that such share does not exceed P5,000.^[15] Plaintiff’s separate action—if any he
   had—to obtain said share, should have been addressed to the Municipal Court.

PREMISED ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
appealed order of November 21, 1960 dismissing the second amended complaint is,
as it should be, affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Ruiz Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result in a separate
opinion.

^[2] Civil
Case No. 5555 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, entitled “Laurentio
Armentia, plaintiff, vs. Erlinda Patriarca, et al.,
defendants”.

^[3] Juliana Armentia
and Jose Someciera are named defendants because these two were “unwilling to
join” plaintiff in the complaint. Sofronio Flores is sued in his capacity as
Register of Deeds of Iloilo.

^[4]
In the original complaint and in the first amended complaint, plaintiff states
that the sewing machine was in the possession solely of defendants Erlinda
Patriarca and Florencia Someciera.

^[5] Vivar vs. Vivar, L-18667, August
31, 1963; Jornales, et al. vs. Central Azucarrera de Bais, et al.,
L-15287, September 30, 1963; Almendra, et al., vs. Alvero, L-19820,
September 20, 1965; Remitere, et al., vs. Yulo, et al., L-19751,
February 28, 1966; Dy Poco vs. Commissioner of Immigration, et al.,
L-22313, March 31, 1966.

^[6] p.
789; italics supplied.

^[7] Now
Article 1318 of the Civil Code.

^[8] These two are now Articles 1311 and 1397,
respectively, of the Civil Code.

[9] Now Article 1381, Civil
Code.

^[10] Article 1302,
supra; Article 1306 now is Article 1412, Civil Code.

[11] Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana,
supra, pp. 791-793, 793-794; emphasis supplied.

^[12] Articles 1146(1) and 1391, Civil Code.
Mauricio vs. Villanueva, et al., L-11072, September 24, 1959.

^[13] Section 51, Land Registration Act.
Mauricio vs. Villanueva, et al., supra; Gerona, et al. vs.
de Guzman, et al., L-19060, May 29, 1964, citing: Diaz vs. Gorricho,
L-11229, March 29, 1958; Avecilla vs. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958;
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962;
Lopez vs. Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964.

^[14] People vs. de la Cruz, 43 O.G.
No. 8, pp. 3202, 3207.

^[15]
Maximum limit of the civil jurisdiction of the Municipal Court on September 17,
1960, when suit here was started. Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 88, as amended
by R. A, 2613, approved August 1, 1959. Said maximum limit was raised to P10,000
by R. A. 3828, approved June 22, 1963.