LAZARO B. RAYRAY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CHAE KYUNG LEE, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from a decision of the
Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.

Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment
of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch
as, the latter’s whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of
Pusan,
Korea, summons was served by
publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that
defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer, and that a
date be set for the reception of his evidence. Before acting on this motion, the
lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila, pursuant to Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of determining
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists.
Said officer having found no such collusion, the case was heard on the merits.
In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff’s
complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify
a marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the
relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this decision having been denied,
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the
Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the
appeal.

In relation thereto, the court
a quo found that it had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff’s marriage to the defendant,
it having been solemnized in Seoul,
Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous.
In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it
must have jurisdiction over: (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the
person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or
quasi-in-rem, the res.^[1]

The subject-matter of the present
case is the annulment of plaintiff’s marriage to the defendant, which is within
the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,^[2] and, in
Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations.^[3]

The same acquired jurisdiction
over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the filing of
the complaint herein.^[4] Defendant was placed under the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication.^[5]

This is an action in rem, for
it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the
whole world. The res in the present case is the
relation between said parties, or their marriage tie.^[6] Jurisdiction over the same depends upon
the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of
marriage, or the locus celebrationis.^[7] plaintiff herein is a citizen of the
Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our
jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and – under plaintiff’s
theory -still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower
court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff
herein.

Indeed, marriage is one of the
cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and affects two
persons. One is married, never in abstract or in a vacuum, but, always to
somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the marriage status of a person
necessarily reflects upon the status of another and the relation between them.
The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over
the res, in an action for annulment of marriage,
provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the
forum.^[8] Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled
in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the
res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the
subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into
the legality of the marriage between the parties herein.

As regards the substantial
validity of said marriage, plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in
Pusan, Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was
operating a night club; that they lived together from November 1952 to April
1955; that they were married in Pusan, Korea, on March
15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before
the wedding she obtained the “police clearance” Exhibit A, written in Korean
language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she
could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left
the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October,
1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its
translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February 16,
1953, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he
confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her reply was that
it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he
inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she
had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there
was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they
were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.

The lower court considered
plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to establish that defendant was married to
another person prior to March 15,
1953, and
we agree with this conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A is not signed. It merely
purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan
National Police. Secondly, the record does not show who prepared it, much less
that he had personal knowledge of the truth of the entry therein concerning
defendant’s status on February 15,
1953. It
should be noted, that defendant was a native, not of
Pusan, but of
Seoul,
Korea. Hence, Exhibit A could, at
best, be no more than hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly
confronted the defendant with the contents of Exhibit B, defendant did not say
that she had been married before. Plaintiff declared that she admitted having
previously lived with several other men, adding, however, that she had no
impediment, thus, in effect, negating the alleged previous
marriage.

Thirdly, if Exhibit A was
obtained on February 16,
1953, in
order to establish defendant’s qualification to contract marriage, why is it
that the wedding took place, despite the entry in said
document to the effect that defendant was married already? There is no competent
evidence to the effect that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the
presumption is that the foreign law is identical to the lex fori, or, in the
case at bar, the Philippine law.^[9] In fact, the statement, imputed by
plaintiff to the defendant, to the effect that, although she had cohabited
before with other men, there was no impediment to her marrying him, clearly
suggests that a previous marriage on her part would have been, in her opinion, a
legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiff. Then too, the marriage
certificate Exhibit D contains spaces for the entry of data on whether any of
the contracting parties had been previously married; whether the prior marriage
had been dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there had been such decree,
the date thereof. Surely, these data would be absolutely irrelevant if polygamy
were sanctioned in Korea. And, again, why is it that
Exhibit D states that defendant had had no previous
marriage?

Last, but not least, plaintiff
cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless full faith and credence are
given to his testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records show that he
would not hesitate to lie when it suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when
plaintiff contracted marriage with the defendant, he said that he was single,
although, he admitted, this was a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in
Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or Valdez,^[10] But, then he would, also, have us
believe that his marriage with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because
Adelaida and he did no more than sign, on a small
window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain documents
the contents of which he did not read.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
plaintiff-appellant. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ.,
concur.

 Barrera, J., on leave.

^[1] Banco
Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
(1918) 37 Phil. 921; Perkins vs. Dizon (1939) 69 Phil.
186; Perkins vs. Roxas (1941) 72 Phil. 514; Reyes vs.
Diaz (1941) 73 Phil. 484; I Moran, Rules of Court (1963 ed.) pp.
32-34.

^[2] Republic Act 296, Sec. 44(e).

^[3] Republic Act 409, Sec. 39-A(c)
(as added by Republic Act 1401, Sec. 1)

^[4] Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney
General (1911) 20 Phil. 523; 21 C.J.S. Sec. 82, Courts, p. 122; see, also,
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 113, Comment (e).

^[5] Rule 14, Sec. 17, Rules of
Court; Bing Gee vs. Chan Lai Young Gee (1949)
(Cal.) 202 P2d 360; Piper vs. Piper
(1907), 91 Pac. 198; Buzzi vs. Buzzi, 205
Pac. 2d 1125 (1949)
(Cal.).

^[6] Goodrich, Jurisdiction to Annul
a Marriage, 32 Harvard Law Review, 806, 810; Leelar,
Conflict of Laws (1959), p. 305; Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 1512, Vol.
3.

^[7] 15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, sec.
15; I Beale Conflict of Laws (1935), p. 468; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 355;
4 Am. Jur. 2d, Annulment of
Marriage, Sec. 60, p. 481; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 115; Anno 128 ALR 69.

^[8] 4 Am. Jur., Sec. 65 Annulment of
Marriage, pp. 484-485.

^[9] International Harvester Co. vs.
Hamburg-American Line, (1918) 42 Phil. 845; Beale: Conflict of Laws, Vol. 3,
Sec. 622A.2; Rabel, Conflict of Laws: A Comparative
Study, Vol. 4, p. 493.

^[10] Incidentally, he would not have
so lied had he believed that bigamy or polygamy is not forbidden in
Korea.