J. ANTONIO ARANETA, PETITIONER, VS. MADRIGAL & CO., INC., AND THE HONORABLE JOSE S. RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO G. LUCERO, AND ANGEL MOJICA, AS MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH DIVISION OF THE COURT…

These are two (2) original
actions for certiorari and mandamus against the Court of Appeals and Madrigal
& Co., Inc.

The records show that petitioner
J. Antonio Araneta had filed Civil Cases Nos. 37327
and 40703 of the Court of First instance of Manila against respondent, Madrigal
& Co., Inc., for the recovery of damages resulting from the destruction
caused in an orchard of Araneta, in Las Piñas, Rizal, by several fires
that had allegedly crept into said property from the adjoining orchard of
Madrigal; that, after a joint hearing of said two (2) cases, decision was, in
due course, rendered therein sentencing Madrigal to pay to Araneta, by way of damages, the aggregate sum of P24,996.00,
with interest thereon at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the
action until fully paid, and , the costs; that a reconsideration of said
decision having been denied, Madrigal filed the corresponding notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal, which was approved by the trial court; that
the appeals were thereafter docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. Nos.
35044-R and 35045-R; that, after the submission of the printed record on appeal
and of the briefs of both parties therein, Araneta
filed in the Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground
that, in violation of Rule 41, Section 6, of the present Rules of Court,
Madrigal’s records of appeal did not contain “such data as will show that the
appeal was perfected on time;” that said motion to dismiss the appeal was
eventually denied by the Court of Appeals; that the same, likewise, denied a
motion to reconsider the action it had thus taken; and that, thereupon, Araneta commenced these actions for certiorari and mandamus,
to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals denying his aforementioned
motion to dismiss the appeal and motion for
reconsideration.

By resolution dated
July 5,
1966, we,
at first, dismissed the petitions filed by Araneta
with this Court, “without prejudice, to action, if any, in the Court of
Appeals.” However, on motion for reconsideration filed by Araneta, we set aside said resolution and gave due course to
the petitions, as well as required respondent to answer
thereto.

In its answer, Madrigal does not
deny that its records on appeal in the basic cases do not comply with the
aforementioned requirement of the Rules of Court. It, however, maintains that
said records on appeal had been actually perfected within the reglementary period; that such fact had been proven to the
satisfaction of the Court of Appeals; and that, under Rule 41, Section 6, of the
Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals has discretion to give due course to
respondent’s appeals, upon proof of the seasonable perfection of said
appeals.

This pretense is, however,
inconsistent with out ruling in Government of the
Philippines vs. Luis Antonio, G. R. No.
L-23736 (October 19, 1965), in which we held:

“That the records of appeal
submitted to this Court violate the provisions of Rule 41, Section 6, as
contended by the appellee, is obvious from an
examination thereof. Nowhere is it stated therein the date when the appellants
or their counsel received notice of the appealed order of March 25, 1963
dismissing their petition for cancellation of appellee’s Certificates of Title and for a resurvey of Lot
2959-A of the Cuyapo Cadastre.

“It is thus impossible to
determine from the records of appeal, as submitted, whether or not the appeals
were taken within the periods prescribed by the rules. x x x.

“The deficiencies pointed out are
fatal. For the reason that in ordinary appeals the original record is not
forwarded to the appellate court, and because the dates when an applicant
received the notice of the pertinent orders or judgment under appeal, and of the
denial of his motion for reconsideration or new trial, are facts within the
conclusive knowledge of said appellant, the Revised Rules of Court place upon
the appellant the burden of showing that his appeal is timely, and for that
purpose prescribe (Rule 41, sec. 6) that the record of appeal shall include
‘such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time’. This requirement
is mandatory and jurisdictional, for unless appeal is perfected on time the
appellate court acquires no jurisdiction over the appealed case, and has power
only to dismiss the appeal (Bello vs. Fernando, G.R. No. L-16970, Jan. 30,
1962; Caisip vs. Catangon, G.R.
No. L-14684, August 26,
1960; Espartero vs. Ladaw, 49
Off. Gaz.,
1439). The certification of the record on appeal by the trial court after
expiration of the period to appeal can not restore the jurisdiction which has
been lost (Alvero vs. de la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 433,
and cases cited). The principle is confirmed by Rule 50, section 1, subpar. (a), heretofore
quoted.”

In this connection, it should be
noted that, prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court now in force, the
first sentence of Section 6 of Rule 41, was as follows: “The full names of all
the parties to the proceeding shall be stated in the caption of the record on
appeal, and it shall include the order or judgment from which the appeal is
taken, and, in chronological order, copies of all pleadings, petitions, motions
and all interlocutory orders relating to the appealed order or
judgment”.

This Court noticed, however, that
issues were often raised in appellate courts on whether the appeal had been
perfected on time or not, owing to the fact that the data pertinent thereto were
not set forth in the record on appeal. Inasmuch as the records of trial courts,
in cases appealed by record on appeal, are not forwarded to appellate courts,
the latter had no means of checking or verifying the conflicting allegations of
fact made, either in the briefs, or in the motion to dismiss the appeal and the
opposition thereto, filed by the parties. As a consequence, appellate courts had
to examine such evidence as the parties may have submitted thereto, in support
of their respective contentions. This entailed additional work and unnecessary
waste of time, that contributed to the delay in the
final determination of appealed cases. To eliminate such obstacles to the speedy
administration of justice, this Court deemed it best, not only to rephrase the
first sentence of said Section 6, so as to read:

“The full names of all the
parties to the proceedings shall be stated in the caption of the record on
appeal and it shall include the order or judgment from which the appeal is
taken, and, in chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions,
motions and all interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed order or
judgment and necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved”, but,
also, to add, at the end thereof, the clause: “together with such data as will
show that the appeal was perfected on time”.

Obviously, this amendment would
become useless and its purpose completely defeated, if we gave thereto the
interpretation advocated by the main respondent herein. In other words, we would
have the same issues and the same waste of time that were sought to be
eliminated by the amendment. Hence, our ruling in Government vs.
Antonio (supra), which, it
should be noted, was made, not in a decision, but, in a resolution, so that the
public may know immediately – instead of waiting for the decision on the merits,
which might require more time – the effect of said amendment, and the injurious
consequences of a failure to grasp its full import could thus be
minimized.

It is urged that said ruling
should not affect retroactively the cases at bar, inasmuch as the records on
appeal therein were filed and approved almost one year prior thereto, or in
November, 1964. We should not overlook, however, the fact that the record on
appeal in Government vs. Antonio, was filed even
earlier. Besides, the amendment of Section 6 of Rule 41 had been in force since
January 1,
1964. The
case cited merely expounded on its meaning, which we hereby
reiterate.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions complained of
are hereby set aside, and respondent Court of Appeals directed to dismiss the
appeal taken in the aforementioned cases, with costs against respondent Madrigal
& Co., Inc.

IT IS SO
ORDERED.

Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., on leave.