MARINO A. BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. JUAN DE BORJA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN AND G. A. MACHINERIES, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Original petition in this Court
by Marino A. Bautista for writs of certiorari and prohibition to annul an order
denying his two motions to dismiss private respondent’s complaint, and another
order refusing to reconsider the preceding one, both issued by respondent judge
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 2486 entitled “G. A. Machineries, Inc., plaintiff, versus Marino A.
Bautista, defendant”, and to prohibit respondent judge from requiring petitioner
to enter into the trial of said Civil Case No. 2486 and from further proceeding
with said case.

From the record, we find that on
28 December 1961 G. A. Machineries, Inc., commenced said case No. 2486 by a
complaint alleging, inter alia, that on or
about 27 January 1960 defendant purchased from plaintiff certain personal
properties described therein, all valued at P83,800.00, for which the former
made a down payment of P12,570.00 and agreed to pay the balance of P71,230.00 in
eleven (11) monthly installments starting from 28 February 1960, as evidenced by
the sales contract attached therein; that defendant executed a chattel mortgage
contract over the same personal properties to secure the payment of the unpaid
balance of the purchase price, covered by several promissory notes, copy of
which mortgage contract and notes are attached; that the parties agreed that in
case defendant should violate any condition thereof, and/or fail to pay any due
and demandable note, plaintiff would be entitled to take possession of said
personal properties, to extra-judicially foreclose said mortgage, in which event
defendant is liable to pay 25% of the total amount due as liquidated damages and
attorney’ s fees; that defendant failed to pay his obligations; that plaintiff
applied to the Sheriff of Cotabato for the
extra-judicial foreclosure of said mortgage but the latter could not proceed
with the auction sale because defendant failed and refused, despite demands made
therefor, to deliver and surrender said personal
properties. Whereupon, plaintiff prayed that defendant be ordered (a) to deliver
said personal properties, and/or that the provisional remedy of replevin be issued upon the filing of the requisite bond;
(b) to pay the sum of P20,217.52, as liquidated damages and attorney’s fees; and
(c) in the event of non-delivery of said personal properties, to pay the sum of
P71,230.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from 28 February
1960 until the same is fully paid; plus costs of the suit.

In due time, after summons,
defendant Marino A. Bautista filed, on 2 April 1962, a motion to dismiss the
above-mentioned complaint, on the grounds that (a) there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, which Marino A. Bautista,
together with a certain Leopoldo Jalandoni, as plaintiffs, filed against G. A. Machineries,
Inc., as defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila and docketed
therein as its Civil Case No. 27110, for accounting and damages; and (b) that
the filing of the complaint by G. A. Machineries, Inc., in Bulacan constitutes multiplicity of suits, which is not
allowed by the Rules of Court.

Plaintiff submitted, on
24 April
1962, its
opposition to said motion, to which opposition defendant Bautista presented, on
30 April
1962, his
reply. To this reply defendant Joined a supplemental motion to dismiss, setting
forth as additional ground therefor that venue was
improperly laid, since plaintiff and defendant have expressly stipulated in
their sales and chattel mortgage contracts that “in case of any litigation
arising (t)herefrom or in
connection (t)herewith, the venue of action shall be in the City of Manila,
Philippines”.

On 8 May
1962, the
trial court acted on the original motion to dismiss and issued an order ^[1], the dispositive part of which reads:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby suspends further
proceedings in this case as well as suspends the period within which the
defendant should file his responsive pleadings until after final determination
of Civil Case No. 47110 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Leopoldo Jalandoni vs. G. A.
Machineries, Inc.”

Apparently, the parties did not
immediately receive copies of the abovequoted order,
because plaintiff, on 11 May
1962,
filed opposition to the supplemental motion to dismiss, while defendant replied
to the opposition on 15 May
1962.

On 17
September 1962, the clerk of the trial court
notified the parties that the case was set for hearing on 12 October
1962.

On this last mentioned date, the
trial court reconsidered and set aside the order of 8 May
1962
suspending the proceedings; denied defendant’s supplemental motion to dismiss;
and, at the same time, reset the case for hearing on November
1962.

On 15
October 1962, defendant moved to reconsider
the orders of 12 October
1962 and
to cancel the scheduled hearing in view of the fact that he had not yet filed
his answer to the complaint and, therefore, the issues had not been joined.
Plaintiff opposed said motion and countered with a motion to declare defendant
in default.

On 22
October 1962, defendant filed a
manifestation, advising the trial court that he intends to file a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court for the purpose of annulling the
now questioned orders and reiterating his motion to cancel or hold in abeyance
the scheduled hearing on 13 November
1962.
Defendant attached to this manifestation his answer to the complaint, which
requested to be admitted to obviate the possibility of his being declared in
default.

On 13
November 1962, the trial court denied both
defendant’s motion for reconsideration and plaintiff’s motion to declare
defendant in default; however, it admitted defendant’s answer and, at the same
time, allowed plaintiff to present its evidence ex parte for failure of defendant and his counsel to appear at
the hearing.

Plaintiff was unable to finish
presenting its evidence on the same day and the trial court continued the
hearing of the case for 11 December 1962, at which later date defendant and his
counsel again failed to attend; but they sent, instead, a copy of the petition
filed in this Court. Notwithstanding, the trial court allowed
plaintiff to proceed and terminate presenting its evidence and had the case
submitted for decision.

The record also disclosed that
petitioner filed, on 11 December 1962, the instant petition which was, at first,
dismissed for lack of supporting papers; but later, upon motion, the dismissal
was reconsidered and the petition given due course. This Court did not, however,
issue any writ of preliminary injunction to stop the proceedings in the court
below, since it was not asked in the petition.

Petitioner Bautista now contends
that respondent judge acted with patent and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying his original and supplemental
motions to dismiss private respondent’s complaint and in allowing it to proceed
ex parte with the trial of Civil Case No. 2486. It is
insisted that when G. A. Machineries, Inc., filed its complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, venue was improperly laid,
since they (plaintiff and defendant therein) expressly stipulated in the sales
and chattel mortgage contracts that any action arising between them in
connection therewith should be instituted in the City of Manila, and this
express stipulation amounts to a clear, valid and effective waiver on the part
of plaintiff to Invoke the right of election granted it, as plaintiff, under the
Rules of Court, to choose the venue; and that this stipulation was embodied in
their contracts for his (Bautista” s) benefit and advantage because he has his
principal office, and conducts principally his business, in the City of
Manila.

Lastly, the petitioner avers that
as soon as he manifested his decision to file a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the proper court, for the purpose of questioning the validity of
the orders now complained of, respondent judge should have desisted or refrained
from proceeding with the trial of said Civil Case No.
2486.

Respondent G. A. Machineries,
Inc., on the other hand, maintains that the express agreement on venue invoked
by petitioner was intended solely for its convenience and benefit, and it still,
therefore, retained the privilege or option to choose the venue granted it under
Section 4, Rule 5, of the old Rules of Court (now Section 3, Rule 4, Revised
Rules of Court), and since its (the corporation’s) residence or domicile is in
Polo (now Valenzuela), Bulacan, the Bulacan Court of First Instance may properly take cognizance
of said Civil Case No. 2486.

Respondent further maintains that
since jurisdiction over the subject-matter or over the person is not in issue in
the case at bar; that as improper venue does not constitute jurisdictional
issue; that respondent judge has not been shown to have committed any grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motions to dismiss; and that as the
remedy of appeal is available to petitioner, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition would be unavailing and ineffective remedies in the case at
bar.

The parties do not dispute that,
in the written contracts sued upon, it was expressly stipulated that “in case of
any litigation arising (t)herefrom or in connection (t)herewith, the venue of
action shall be in the City of Manila, Philippines”. We note that neither party
to the contracts reserved the right to choose the venue of action as fixed by
law (i.e., where the plaintiff or defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff (par. (b), Section 2, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court) ,as is usually done if the parties purported to retain that
right of election granted by the Rules. Such being the case, it can reasonably
be inferred that the parties intended to definitely fix the venue of action, in
connection with the written contracts sued upon, in the proper courts of the
City of Manila only, notwithstanding that neither party is a resident of Manila.
The Rules expressly sanction such stipulation by providing that ” by written
agreement of the parties the venue of action may be changed or transferred from
one province to another” (Section 3, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court), and, as
aptly held in the case of Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. De Leon, 56 Phil. 169,-

“By said agreement the parties
waived the legal venue, and such waiver is valid and legally effective, because
it was merely a personal privilege they waived, which is not contrary to public
policy or to the prejudice of third persons. It is a general principle that a
person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation is
expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of such nature that its
renunciation would be against public policy.”

It appearing that the action was
brought in a place other than that fixed by the parties in their valid written
contracts; that the ground of improper venue is clear and patent on the record
of the case, the written contracts having been attached and made an integral
part of the complaint; that the impropriety of the venue was properly and timely
raised in a motion to dismiss; and that a writ of prohibition is a proper remedy
when a trial court erroneously denies a motion to dismiss based on the ground of
improper venue ^[2]; we are
constrained to rule that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s motions to dismiss based on the above-stated
ground.

With the above conclusion, it
becomes unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed
for is hereby granted, and the respondent trial court is ordered to dismiss the
complaint of G. A. Machineries, Inc., without prejudice to the filing of said
complaint in the proper court. Costs against private
respondent G. A. Machineries, Inc.

SO
ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez
and Ruiz
Castro, JJ.,
concur.

^[1] The order stated that plaintiff
did not file any opposition, when it did, in fact, submit one; and the trial
court failed to resolve the supplemental motion to dismiss, apparently because
it had not yet been received.

^[2] In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg, 84 Phil 674; Tiangco vs.
Cabrera, 86 Phil. 502; and Portillo vs. Reyes, L-17707, 27 October 1964, this
Court granted the writ of prohibition and ordered, upon a motion based on
improper venue, the dismissal of the complaint.