IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF GERTRUDES JOSEFINA DEL PRADO, THRU HER NATURAL GUARDIAN CORAZON ADOLFO CALDERON, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPP…

This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the order of the
Court of First Instance of Davao granting the
petition of petitioner-appellee, Gertrudes
Josefina del Prado, for a change of name.

On July 23, 1959,
Gertrudes Josefina del Prado,
a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Co­razon Adolfo Calderon,
filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Davao, praying that her name “Gertrudes Josefina del Prado”
be changed to “Gertrudes Jose­fina
Calderon.” It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an
illegitimate child, born on March 17, 1956, out of a bigamous marriage
contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo;
that the surname “Del Prado” which the
petitioner carries is a stigma
of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has become the sub­ject of unfair
comments; that the surname which the pe­titioner carries would constitute a
handicap in her life in later years, and would give cause for constant irri­tation
in her social relations with other people; that petitioner is living with her
mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and that it is the
desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed from “Del Prado” to “Calderon” which is the surname of
her foster father, the husband of her mother.

The publication of
the order for the hearing of the petition was duly made.

On July 11, 1960, the Provincial Fiscal of Davao,
representing the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the petition upon
the ground that the change of sur­name of the petitioner is unwarranted,
considering that said petitioner was born out of a bigamous marriage and as
such she has the status of an acknowledged natural child by legal
fiction and under the law she should bear the surname of her father Manuel del Prado;
and that the change of the surname of the petitioner would be preju­dicial to
the rights and interest which she has by vir­tue of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 2272 of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
annulling the marriage of her mother, Corazon Adolfo, to Manuel del Prado, and would also be prejudicial to her right as
conferred upon her by law.  Counsel for
the petitioner filed a reply to the opposition, the provincial fiscal filed a
supplemental opposition, and counsel for the petitioner filed a reply to the supplemental
opposition.

After hearing the court a quo issued an order, under date of July 28, 1960, granting the petition and ordering
the change of the name of the petitioner from “Gertrudes
Josefina del Prado” to “Gertrudes
Josefina Calderon.” The dispositive portion of
the order of the court further states: 
“This order, however, shall not operate to deprive the petitioner
of her status, rights and obligations as recognized by law.”

From the above-mentioned order the provincial fis­cal,
representing the Solicitor General, appealed to this Court.

In this appeal the
Solicitor General contends^[1] that the lower court erred in finding as
proper and rea­sonable ground for the change of the surname of the peti­tioner
the reason that petitioner’s present surname car­ries the stigma of
illegitimacy, and^[2] that the lower court erred in declaring
“that although the law is spe­cific that petitioner shall principally use
the surname of the father yet it does not follow that petitioner is prohibited from using other surnames when justified.”

The issue to be
resolved in the present case is whether
the lower court’s order granting the petition is based upon “proper and reasonable cause” as
required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the new Rules of Court.

The lower court found that petitioner Gertrudes
Josefina del Prado was born on March 17, 1956, an
ille­gitimate child of Manuel del Prado and Corazon
Adolfo as a result of their bigamous marriage which was an­nulled on July 18,
1957, after a judgment of conviction of said Manuel del Prado
on the complaint for bigamy on December 5, 1956; that subsequently, on December
26, 1957, Corazon Adolfo, mother of the petitioner, got mar­ried to Romeo C.
Calderon; that the petitioner is living with her mother and her foster father;
and that Romeo C. Calderon declared in open court his consent to the
petitioner’s adopting his surname, especially so because he is the one
supporting her.  The lower court says,
“In the opinion of the Court the reasons adduced by the pe­titioner are
valid and will redound to the best interests of said minor who after all is not
at fault to have come to this world as an illegitimate child.”

We agree with the court a quo.  A petition to change the name of an infant,
as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is dearly for the best
in­terest of the child.  When the mother
of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind what she be­lieved
was for the best interest of her child consider­ing that her husband Romeo C.
Calderon is the one sup­porting
the child and that he is agreeable to the child’s using his surname.  The other had considered the gene­rous
attitude of her husband as an opportunity
for her to promote the personality, and enhance the dignity, of her daughter,
by eliminating what constitutes a stigma of illegitimacy which her child would
continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate father.

The Solicitor General, in his brief, avers that the evident
purpose of petitioner in seeking a change of her surname is to conceal her status
as an illegitimate child and that any attempt to conceal illegitimacy cannot be
motivated by good faith and an honest purpose. 
The Soli­citor General further alleges that to authorize the change of
the name of the petitioner would be to sanction a mis­representation because
the petitioner wants to appear as if she is the daughter of Romeo C.
Calderon.  We cannot agree with the view
of the Solicitor General.  The Solicitor
General seems to support the idea that since the petitioner has the misfortune
of being born illegitimate she must bear that stigma of illegitimacy as long as
she lives.  That idea should not be
countenanced.  Justice dictates that
every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social
standing as long as in so doing he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.

The Solicitor General also contends that the status of the
petitioner is that of a natural child by legal fic­tion and under Article 367
of the Civil Code she shall principally enjoy the surname of the father.  We agree with the lower court when it said
that “While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by
legal fic­tion as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of
the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law from
taking another surname with the latter’s consent and for justifiable
reasons.” If under the law a legitimate child may secure a change of his
name through judicial proceedings, upon a showing of a “proper and
reasonable cause”, We do not see any reason why a natural child cannot do
the same.  The pur­pose of the law in
allowing a change of name, as contem­plated by the provisions of Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, is to give a person an opportunity to improve his
personality and to promote his best interests. 
We are satisfied that the facts and circumstances as borne out by the
record amply justify the change of the surname of the petitioner as ordered by
the lower court.  We have held that the
matter whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the
sound discretion of the court, and in the present case we believe that the court a quo had exercised its
discretion in a judicious way when it granted the petition.

The Solicitor General expresses an apprehension that because the petitioner here is of tender age, who cannot as yet understand
and appreciate the value of the change of her name, may be prejudiced in her
rights under the law.  This apprehension is
dispelled by the pronounce­ment of this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Makalin­tal, as
follows:

“x x
x But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or
affect a change in, one’s existing family re­lations, or in the rights and
duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new
family rights and duties where none before was exist­ing.  It does not alter one’s legal capacity, civil
status, or citizenship.  What is alter­ed
is only the name, which is that word or com­bination of words by which a
person is dis­tinguished from others and which he bears as a label or
appellation for the convenience of the
world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596).” (In Re Petition for the Change of
Name of Joselito Yu, Juan S. Barrera v.
Republic of the Philippines, L-20874,
May 25, 1966)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is
affirmed, without pronouncement as to the costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez,
and Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1] As quoted from the second assignment of
error.

^[2] Uy v. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965.