POMPENIANO ESPINOSA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. AURELIA BELDA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao dated May 28, 1960 dismissing the plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint under
Civil Case No. 2951 entitled “Pompeniano Espinosa, et al., vs. Aurelia Belda, et
al.”

In a cadastral decision rendered on August 10, 1940 by the Court
of First Instance of Davao sitting as a cadastral court under Case No. 6
G.L.R.O. 540, Lot No. 214 of
the Guianga Cadastre was subdivided in­to three lots: Lots Nos. 214-A, 214-B
and 214-C.  Lot No. 214-A was awarded to
Abon (Bagobo), while Lot No. 214-B was adjudicated to Aguana.  Lot No. 214-C was declared public land.  On October 1, 1952, the said court issued the
following order in connection with the above?mentioned decision:

“The decision rendered by this Court in the above-entitled
case under date of August 10, 1940 having become final, the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office is here­by directed to issue the corresponding
decree of registration for the following lots adju­dicated by said decision:

‘Se adjudica el lote No. 214-A con las mejoras existentes dentro del
mismo a numbre de Abon (Bagobo), 60 años de edad, Filipino, viudo, residente en
Tagakpan, Ciudad de Davao; y el lote No. 214-B con las mejoras existentes
dentro del mismo, a favor de Aguana (Bagobo), 65 años de edad, filipino, viudo,
residente en Tagakpan, Ciudad de Davao.'”

Thus, on February
26, 1954, the Chief of the Land Registration
Office issued the final decree of registration for Lot No. 214-A.  On March 15, 1954, the corres­ponding
Original Certificate of Title, O.C.T. No. 0-41, was issued to Abon (Bagobo).

On the very day that Lot No. 214-A was titled to Abon, who had by then
died already, his heirs executed in favor of Francisco Otto (Bagobo), one such
heir, a special power of attorney to sell the land covered by O.C.T. No.
0-41.  On April 6, 1954, Francisco Otto
sold the said land to Francisco Belda for P10,000.00 and on account of the said
transaction, O.C.T. No. 0-41 was cancelled and a new one, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-5250 was issued and registered in the vendee’s name.

On May 26, 1954, the herein appellants, together with several
others, filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, for the review
of the aforementioned issuance of the original certificate of title to Abon
(Bagobo).  In this petition, docketed
with the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. 15441-R, the petitioners urged the
cancel­lation or revocation of O.C.T. No. 0-41 on the grounds that the same was
secured through fraud and that the de­cision of August 10, 1940, which
authorized its issuance, had not been final or executory.  In a decision rendered on December 6,
1957, however, the Court of Appeals re­jected the above contentions and affirmed the validity
of O.C.T. 0-41.  This decision likewise
specifically found that insofar as Francisco Belda was concerned, there was
absolutely no evidence of fraud.  In
other words, it pronounced Francisco Belda as a purchaser in good faith.

Long after the above decision of the Court of Appeals had become
final, or on February 20, 1959, the herein appellants, the same petitioners in
CA-G.R. No. 15441-R, filed with the Courts of First
Instance of Davao the complaint at bar praying for the cancellation of T.C.T.
No. T-5250.  In the main, the said
plaintiffs-appellants alleged that the said title, as well as O.C.T. No. 0-41, were acquired
through fraud and to the prejudice of the said plaintiffs who were the
occupants of the property covered by the said title.

On motion of the defendant, the surviving wife of Francisco
Belda, the trial court dismissed the aforemen­tioned complaint on the grounds
of failure to state a cause of action and res judicata.  Hence, this appeal.           

The plaintiffs-appellants take direct issue with the aforestated ruling of the trial court that their
com­plaint states no cause of action and that the same is barred by a prior
judgment.  They maintain that their
allegations of fraud in the acquisition of the title over the land in dispute,
Lot No. 214-A, suffice to sustain a cause of action.  Moreover, they claim that res judicata
is inextendible to their complaint under consideration because the elements
therefor do not obtain.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

The appellants themselves, in their complaint under Civil Case
No. 2951, recite or allege that they entered into the land in dispute
“knowing fully well that the said land is part of the public domain.”  (Par. 20, Complaint).  They explicitly admitted therein that they
were merely petitioners “with the Bureau of Lands for the al­location in
their favor [of] their respective occupations inside said land.”  (Idem, sub-par. 2).  To be sure, in the very complaint sought by
them to be sustained in this appeal, they assert no right of theirs over the
land in question other than they have filed therefor Homestead Applications to
cover “their respective portions which are considerably developed by them with houses and plant­ations of
coconuts, fruits and others.” (Idem, sub-par. 4) With all these
admissions, the trial court indeed could not have correctly entered a ruling on
the said complaint other than the order of dismissal subject of this
appeal.  Since they do not only admit but
avow as well that they are not the owners of the property covered by T.C.T.
5250, then no right of their could have been transgressed by the issuance of a
title to the said land to somebody else.  As a matter of
fact, in their homestead applications with the Bureau of Lands, they firmly
rendered the following commitment:

“I understand that this application conveys no right to clear
the land until this application is approved.  Furthermore, I recognize that the land
covered by homestead application is of public do­main and any and all rights I
may have in respect thereto by virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation,
are hereby relinquished to the Gov­ernment.”

Without a right to enforce or protect, no
action, of course, can be sustained. 
(Rule 2, Sec. 1, Rules of Court) Nor may a cause of action be claimed upon a
complaint which recites no such right.  A
legal right of the plaintiff is an essential element of a cause of action.  (Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Judge
Barrios, 79 Phil. 666)

Our reading and examination of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 15441-R disclose that all the elements of res judicata are present in this case. 
The said decision had long been final and executory prior to the filing
of the complaint at bar.  It was a
decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.  The par­ties in, causes of action and subject
matters of, the said decision and Civil Case No. 2951 are identical.  Thus do we sustain and affirm too the other
ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the said complaint.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the order of the trial court dated May 28, 1960, dismissing
Civil Case No.
2951, is hereby affirmed.  Costs against
the appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Bengzon,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makalintal,
JJ., took no part.