IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF GERTRUDES JOSEFINA DEL PRADO, THRU HER NATURAL GUARDIAN CORAZON ADOLFO CALDERON, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPP…

Del Prado versus Republic of the Philippines

The Case

This is a petition for a change of name brought by a minor child, Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, acting through her mother and natural guardian, against the Republic of the Philippines. The child asks that her surname "Del Prado" be changed to "Calderon," the surname of the man her mother later married and who supports her. The Republic, through the Solicitor General, opposes the change. The case matters because it fixes the standard for granting a change of name to a child — the best interest of the child — and because it holds that a change of name does not alter one's legal status or family relations.

Procedural History

The petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the Solicitor General, filed an opposition, and later a supplemental opposition, to which the petitioner replied. After hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the petition and directing the change of name from "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon," with the express caveat that the order shall not operate to deprive the petitioner of her status, rights, and obligations as recognized by law. The Provincial Fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, appealed that order directly to the Supreme Court.

Facts

Gertrudes Josefina del Prado was born on March 17, 1956, an illegitimate child of Manuel del Prado and Corazon Adolfo, as a result of their bigamous marriage. That marriage was annulled on July 18, 1957, after Manuel del Prado was convicted of bigamy on December 5, 1956.

On December 26, 1957, Corazon Adolfo married Romeo C. Calderon. The child has since lived with her mother and her foster father, Romeo C. Calderon, who is the one supporting her. Romeo C. Calderon declared in open court his consent to the child's adopting his surname.

On July 23, 1959, the child, through her mother as natural guardian, filed the petition for change of name. She alleged that the surname "Del Prado" is a stigma of illegitimacy, that she has become the subject of unfair comments, and that the surname would be a handicap in later years and a cause of constant irritation in her social relations. The trial court granted the petition, finding the reasons valid and in the best interest of the minor, who after all is not at fault for having come into this world as an illegitimate child.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court's order granting the change of surname is based upon proper and reasonable cause as required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
• Whether or not the desire to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy, and thereby to appear as if the child were the daughter of her foster father, is a motive that can justify a change of name.
• Whether or not the child's status as a natural child by legal fiction, who under the law shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, bars her from taking another surname.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 5. Proper and reasonable cause. — The court may grant or deny the petition for change of name, as the facts may warrant, and may, in its discretion, allow the petitioner to use the name asked for, if it finds that there is a proper and reasonable cause for the change.

This is the very standard the Court applies in testing the trial court's order.

Article 367 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 367. A natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father.

The Solicitor General invokes this provision to argue that the child must bear the surname of Manuel del Prado.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court's order rests on proper and reasonable cause. A petition to change the name of an infant should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. Here the mother had in mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child, considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon supports the child and is agreeable to the child's using his surname. The Court saw in the foster father's generous attitude an opportunity to promote the personality and enhance the dignity of the daughter by eliminating the stigma of illegitimacy.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the Solicitor General's view that the purpose of concealing illegitimacy cannot be motivated by good faith. The Court refused to countenance the idea that a child born illegitimate must bear that stigma for life. Justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing, so long as in doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.

On the third issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that while the law provides that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, this does not prohibit the child from taking another surname with the latter's consent and for justifiable reasons. If a legitimate child may secure a change of name upon a showing of proper and reasonable cause, there is no reason why a natural child cannot do the same. The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his best interests. The Court also dispelled the apprehension that the child, being of tender age, might be prejudiced in her rights, quoting its own pronouncement that a change of name does not by itself define or affect a change in one's existing family relations, nor alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship — what is altered is only the name.

Doctrine

A petition to change the name of an infant should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. The grant or denial of a petition for change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court, exercised under the proper and reasonable cause standard of Section 5 of Rule 103. The desire to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy is a legitimate and justifiable reason, for justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as he does not cause prejudice or injury to the State or to other people. The rule that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally enjoy the surname of the father under Article 367 of the Civil Code does not prohibit the child from taking another surname with the father's consent and for justifiable reasons. Finally, a change of name does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship, nor does it affect existing family relations or the rights and duties flowing therefrom; what is altered is only the name.

Disposition

The order appealed from was affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs; the change of name from "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon" stands, without depriving her of her status, rights, and obligations under the law.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: a change of name alters only the name, never one's legal capacity, civil status, or family relations, and for a child it is granted only where clearly for the child's best interest. Examiners like to use this case on the proper and reasonable cause standard under Rule 103, on the stigma of illegitimacy as a justifiable ground, and on the rule that a change of name does not change status.