IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ADRIAN FONG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. ADRIAN FONG, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND A…

Petitioner seeks Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal. The petition is supported by the affidavits of
Gumersindo Garcia, a doctor of medicine, and Gerardo Florendo, a lawyer, who
testified as character witnesses.

In a decision rendered on December 7, 1958, the court found petitioner to
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by
law to become a Filipino citizen, and hence it ordered that he be issued the
requisite certificate of naturalization after he has taken his oath two years
from the date of the finality of the decision pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 531.

On January 9, 1959, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that, in the interest of justice, the case be reopened for the reception
of new evidence found by the government which would show that petitioner is
undeserving of becoming a citizen of the Philippines because he has circumvented
the provision of the Constitution prohibiting aliens from acquiring real
properties in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. And considering
the motion meritorious, the court, over the objection of petitioner, acceded to
it setting aside its own decision and setting the case anew for hearing in order
to give the government an opportunity to present the evidence it has discovered.
Thereafter, the government filed a formal opposition setting forth the reasons
on which the same is predicated. To this opposition petitioner filed his
answer.

After the new hearing, the court rendered a new decision finding this time
that petitioner is disqualified to become a Filipino citizen in view of the
evidence submitted by the government. Accordingly, it dismissed the petition.
Hence this appeal.

With regard to the procedural question raised by appellant in the sense that
the lower court erred in giving the government an opportunity to present new
evidence to the extent of setting aside its own decision in spite of the
different motions for postponement filed by its representative which were
granted but said representative nevertheless failed to appear when the case was
tried on the merits, we can only say that while the lower court was not without
reason in denying the government’s last motion for postponement which prevented
its representative from appearing on the date of trial, however, we find no
error when it reopened the case to give another chance to the government in view
of the new evidence it had discovered considering that the case on hand is one
which involves an important policy of the State. Since the question of whether
an applicant should be granted Philippine citizenship is merely one of privilege
or a sort of a gift that our government bestows upon an alien, it is of
importance that every opportunity be given to its representative to determine if
he is really deserving and qualified to become so beyond peradventure of doubt.
And so we are not prepared to hold that the lower court has committed an abuse
of discretion in acting the way it did in order that the government may be given
the last chance to present the evidence it has uncovered. In this sense we hold
that the trial court did not err in disregarding the vehement opposition of
petitioner to the motion for reopening.

It cannot be disputed that if we are to attain merely to the evidence in
chief presented by petitioner especially the testimony given by his two
character witnesses, Dr. Gumersindo Garcia and Professor Gerardo Florendo, it
can be said, as originally found by the trial court, that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law to acquire
Philippine citizenship. However, on the strength of the new evidence submitted
by the government, the trial court found the contrary and went to the extent of
reversing itself by denying the petition for naturalization. We are now called
upon to determine if it acted properly in reversing its own decision.

The ground on which the government has predicated its opposition to the
petition and which served as basis of the revocatory decision of the trial court
is as follows: that petitioner, from the report submitted by the NBI, made an
attempt to circumvent the provision of the Constitution which prohibits aliens
from acquiring private agricultural lands, including residential lands, by
purchasing a lot thru his mother-in-law, a Filipino citizen, when in fact the
purchase was intended for her own daughter who, because of her marriage to
petitioner, has herself become a Chinese citizen upon such marriage. This
attempt at circumvention of said prohibition is predicated on the following
facts:

“(a) Petitioner’s mother-in-law, at the time of the purchase of the
lot in question and when the house was constructed thereon, was already so old
over to think of building a house for her own residence after she had for many
years been always living with her daughter and son-in-law the petitioner
herein;

(b) The lot in question, together with the house build thereon, was
the very property allegedly given to petitioners wife as the latter’s share in
the properties of her mother, and notwithstanding that the properties given to
each of her two brothers and a sister were worth almost twice than her she made
no protest;

(c) The checks issued by the RFC representing installment of a loan
contracted by petitioner’s mother-in-law for the construction of the house on
the lot in question were issued mostly in the names of the petitioner and his
wife;

(d) The affidavit of one Ignacio Masangkay attached to the NBI report
as an integral part thereof, petitioner was allegedly pointed to as the person
who was to make payment of the lot in question. Although the affiant was not
presented to affirm his affidavit, because the subpoena for his appearance was
not served on him, his whereabouts now being unknown, there seems to be no
reason to doubt the veracity of his statement, he being, to all appearances, a
disinterested person.” (Brief of Appellee, pp. 5-6).

To rebut the evidence on which the government predicated its opposition,
petitioner called to the witness stand Gabriel A. Ambrosio, a realtor, Pacita
David, and her sister Virginia David, wife of petitioner, and from their
testimonies he sought to prove the following facts: that sometime in 1952 or
1953 Filomena David, mother-in-law of petitioner, out of her own funds, acquired
by purchase the rights of one Ignacio Masangkay over a lot of the Calero Company
situated in Sta. Lucia Subdivision (Little Baguio), San Juan, Rizal; that after
the purchase, Filomena David, with the. help of her daughter Virginia, and
son-in-law, Adrian Fong, secured a real estate loan for P17,000.00 from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation for the purpose of constructing a house on
said lot, and for convenience and expediency, Filomena David executed a power of
attorney in favor of her daughter Virginia to receive the releases from said
bank; that after the death of Filomena David her children agreed to assign that
house and lot to Virginia as the others had already received their respective
shares in the properties of Filomena David and her husband; that Pacita David
received a piece of land in Lubao, Pampanga, valued at P15,000.00, Diomedes, a
lot in Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, and Ruben, a parcel of land located in
Lubao, Pampanga; and that after the property in Little Baguio was adjudicated to
Virginia, she and her husband assumed the obligation with the bank and continued
with the payment of the monthly installments.

And to prove that her mother Filomena David had her own money with which to
pay the lot in Little Baguio and pay the monthly amortization, Virginia David
declared that during the lifetime of her father the latter was engaged in
business and owned a tractor which he sold at a high price the proceeds of which
were loaned to her husband Adrian Fong; that after the death of her father the
loan was paid by her husband to her mother by installments; and that, aside from
the savings of her mother, the latter received from her husband allowances
ranging from P100.00 to P200.00 a month in return for her keeping the house as
she could not do the housekeeping herself because of her teaching job.

The trial court, upon examining the evidence of both parties, made the
following comment:

“Contrary to the claim of Virginia David that her mother was the real party
in interest in the purchase of the right of Ignacio Masangkay over the lot in
question, the Court finds that it was the petitioner and his wife, Virginia who
actually were interested in the acquisition of the property. The testimony of
Virginia David that her mother had funds of her own with which to pay the lot
and the real estate loan of P17,000.00 is difficult to believe. Filomena David
in her old age was dependent for support and subsistence on her daughter
Virginia and her son-in-law, Adriano Fong, she had no business or enterprise of
her own nor did she have properties from which she derived a regular and fixed
income. The statements in the application for real estate loan, Exhibit ‘7-A’,
to the effect that Filomena David was a general merchant engaged in the food
stuffs and had an average yearly income of P9,600.00 were all false for the
truth was that her only occupation at the time was keeping house for her
daughter, Virginia, who in return gave her an allowance now and then. As a
matter of fact, the creditor Bank must have considered the financial condition
of the applicant, Filomena David, unsatisfactory so much so that the spouses
Adrian Fong and Virginia David had to signed for the loan as co-makers with the
applicant.

Another point to be considered is the fact that it was the wife of the
petitioner who actually took interest in the construction of the house on that
lot in Little Baguio. All the checks of the Bank were made payable to her (see
Exhs. ‘7-C-1’ to ‘7-H-1’) and she administered the construction as if the
property was her very own. After the house was finished, the Fong family lived
in the same and made it their home, and Filomena David continued to live with
them as she did in the past until she died in 1956. The alleged donation ‘mortis
causa’ executed by Filomena David in favor of Virginia David, which by the way
was not presented in Court, was a device by which the ownership of Virginia
David was confirmed.” (Record On Appeal, pp. 72-73).

After considering the arguments pro and con advanced by both parties in their
briefs, we are persuaded to agree to the above findings of the trial court.
Indeed, it is hard to believe that the lot in question was acquired by Filomena
David, mother-in-law of petitioner, out of her own money and has later
constructed thereon a house with money borrowed from the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation considering that at the time the transaction was made she was
already old as she had then the age of 65 years. In fact, she was 69 when she
died. At that ripe age it is indeed strange that she would still entertain the
idea of acquiring a lot and a house where she could reside considering that she
had been living with appellant and his wife for many years in their house after
she had become a widow.

One piece of evidence that is worthy of note is the affidavit of one Ignacio
Masangkay wherein appellant was indicated by him as the person who made the
payments of the price of the lot in question. Although Masangkay was not
presented to affirm his affidavit because the subpoena for his appearance was
not served on him, his whereabouts being unknown, there seems to be no valid
reason to doubt his veracity for appellant’s counsel, instead of choosing to
disregard said affidavit by insisting on its rejection as hearsay, directed
questions to his witness with regard to said affidavit thereby impliedly
admitting its competence as evidence. Certainly, if it is true that Filomena
David bought the lot in question out of her own savings, why did not appellant
present the bank statement or account to prove the same? If she had enough money
of her own why was she given a pension of one to two hundred pesos a month by
her daughter and son-in-law for keeping the house where they were residing? The
circumstances unfolded in this case leave in our mind serious doubt relative to
the acquisition of the lot in question which in keeping with our policy should
be resolved adversely to petitioner.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.