THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. EFREN MIRANDA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On January 2, 1958, Efren A. Miranda, postmaster of the municipality of
Cantillan, province of Surigao, was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Surigao with the crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents in that on five different occasions and dates, during the
period from May 19, 1955 to February 29, 1956, the accused allegedly falsified
and made alterations in his records of collections and payments and official
cash books, to make it appear that more sums were paid out by him on telegraphic
transfers and money orders to certain persons than those actually disbursed, and
then misappropriated and converted the difference to his own use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the national government in the amount of P3,684.8l
(Criminal Case No. 2379).

On August 21, 1959, the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
within 24 hours after the discovery of the supposed malversations, he reimbursed
or made good the missing amounts, thereby negativing criminal intent on his
part, and furthermore, that whatever criminal liability he had incurred under
the circumstances was extinguished by such reimbursements. The trial court
sustained the motion and dismissed the case under the following order:

“ORDER

The accused is charged with malversation of public funds thru falsification
of public documents. The attorney of the accused has filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that as the accused made good the amount supposed to have been
lacking in his account even before the filing of the information, no crime was
committed by the accused.

The Court was also informed that in a similar case, the accused was prevailed
upon by the Auditor’s Office to reimburse the amount found short in his account
on the promise that he would not be prosecuted anymore. In this present case,
the accused had also been promised by the Auditor’s representative that if he
made good the amount found short in his account, he would mot be prosecuted
anymore. As it turned out, he has been prosecuted but the other fellow was note
To say the least, this is unfair to the accused, as it shows favoritism for the
other fellow and discrimination against this accused. This Court will not permit
such actuation by any public official.

In the case of People vs. Tolentino, the Supreme Court has laid down
the doctrine that the only difference between estafa and malversation is that in
estafa, the object is private property whereas in malversation, it is public
funds, In that case, the person who was accused returned to the respective
owners the money that he had solicited before the information was filed. The
Supreme Court held that there was no damages caused to the supposed offended
parties because the corresponding amounts solicited were returned to them and
the return of the money in that case was made during the investigation by the
police agencies and before the information against the accused was filed by the
Provincial Fiscal.

Wherefore, for the foregoing, the Court hereby orders the dismissal of this
case with costs de oficio. The bail bond filed by the accused for his
provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled.”

The assistant provincial fiscal moved to reconsider the above order of
dismissal, arguing that granting that there was no malversation, there was still
the charge of falsifications of public documents embodied in the same
information wherein damage is not an essential element; but the lower court
denied the motion to reconsider, hence this appeal by the government.

We agree with appellant that the information should not have been
dismissed.

In the first place, it is too well-settled for any serious argument that
whether in malversation of public funds or estafa, payment,
indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise tis to, the amounts or funds
malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, affects only
the civil liability of the offender but does not extinguish his criminal
liability or relieve him from the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
committed, because both crimes are public offenses against the People that must
be prosecuted and penalized by the Government on its own motion, though complete
reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended parties
(U.S. vs. Mendezona, 2 Phil., 353; U.S. vs. Ongtengco, 4 Phil.,
144; U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil., 153; People vs. Leachen, 56
Phil., 737; Javier vs. People, 70 Phil., 550; Camus vs. C.A. and
People, 92 Phil., 85; 48 Off. Gaz., No. 9, 3898; Bacsarpa, et al. vs.
C.A., 99 Phil., 112; 53 Off. Gaz., [8] 3967; People vs. Gervacio, 102
Phil., 687; 54 Off. Gaz., [9] 2898; People vs. Benitez, 108 Phil., 921).
Assuming, therefore, that the accused Miranda had indeed fully reimbursed or
returned the amounts he is supposed to have malversed, still his criminal
liability is not extinguished thereby and he must still account and be
prosecuted for any malversations he has committed.

Secondly, while Miranda alleged in his motion to quash that his having
returned the amounts missing in his accounts before the filing of this case
negatives criminal intent on his part, and that the falsifications and
malversations charged against him are actually nothing more than honest mistakes
or errors in the entries or computations made by him in his books and records,
such facts constitute at most a defense against the charges against him
which he must prove at the trial; but does not constitute any valid ground for
the dismissal of this case at a stage when trial has not even begun and the
prosecution has not yet started presenting its evidence.

Thirdly, the lower court appears to have relied on a case decided by the
Court of Appeals and cited in the motion to quash of the accused Miranda (People
vs. Gatmaitan, C.A.-G.R. No. 14127-R, September 26, 1957, although in the
order, the trial court erroneously attributes the doctrine to our ruling in
People vs. Tolentino, 69 Phil., 715) as authority for the proposition
that the return to the offended party of the amounts misappropriated before the
filing of an information against the offender exculpates the latter from all
criminal liability. Apart from the fact that this Court can not be bound by any
decision rendered by a court of lower category, especially if such decision
conflicts with the established rule laid down by us in similar cases, we have
read the decision cited in its entirety and have verified therefrom that the
Court of Appeals acquitted the accused therein, not because he returned the
money he was supposed to have misappropriated before criminal action was taken
against him, but because that Court found, on the whole of the evidence, that
there was absolutely no criminal intent on the part of the accused, shown, among
other things, by his voluntary return to the complainants of their money even
before he was formally charged with the crime of estafa.

Fourthly, the trial court, in dismissing this case upon the motion to quash
of the accused Miranda, also seems to have been greatly influenced by the fact
that in a similar case, another government employee who was supposed to have
committed the same offense as herein charged was not prosecuted after he had
returned the funds supposed to have been malversed by him, and the trial court
considered it highly discriminatory and unjust that after the herein accused had
made reimbursements of the amounts missing from his accounts because the same
authorities had promised him that he would not be prosecuted any more if he made
such reimbursements, the present case was still filed against him. Suffice it to
say on this point that the neglect, laxity, or complacency of government
officials in taking legal action against one erring employee does not justify
the dismissal of any criminal action taken against another erring employee. If
the court a quo had really wanted to equalize justice and avoid
discrimination in the two cases, it should have ordered and directed the
prosecution of the other government employee who is allegedly guilty of a
similar offense, instead of dismissing the present case against the accused
Efren A. Miranda.

Fifthly, as correctly pointed out by the assistant provincial fiscal in his
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, even assuming that the
reimbursements made by the accused Miranda had extinguished any criminal
liability he might have incurred for malversation, there is still the charge of
falsification of public documents embodied in the same information. It is clear
enough that even if Miranda is able to show that he committed no malversation,
he may still be found guilty of the lesser crime of falsification of public
documents, which is necessarily included in the complex crime of malversation
through falsification of public documents charged in this case. This is another
salient reason why the dismissal of the information against Miranda by the lower
court before trial was improper and premature.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is reversed and set aside,
and the lover court is ordered to proceed with the trial of this case on the
merits. Costs against the accused Efren A. Miranda.

Bengzon, C.J.,
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and
Natividad, JJ., concur.