RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ARSENIO SANTOS, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On August 15, 1958 Benigno Musni and others filed a complaint with the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications against Ricardo M. Gutierrez
alleging therein, inter alia, that the latter had illegally constructed dams,
dikes and other obstructions across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and
communal fishing grounds located in Barrio San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga. They
prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, the said
obstructions be ordered removed or destroyed. The original complaint was
subsequently amended by adding six more to the streams or waterways mentioned
therein.

On December 13, 1958 Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon
the ground that the proceedings to be held before Julian C. Cargullo, the
investigator appointed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
would be void because Republic Act 2056 was unconstitutional as it conferred
judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. This motion
was denied and the investigator set the case for hearing on December 19 and 20,
1958.

On December 15, 1958 Gutierrez filed with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga a petition for prohibition—which was subsequently amended twice—against
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Florencio Moreno, the
Department investigator, Julian C. Cargullo, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, Benigno
Musni and his complainants, to prevent the carrying out of the investigation
referred to above. Main contentions of petitioner were: firstly, that Act
2506 was unconstitutional because it granted judicial powers to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, and secondly, that the nature and
character of the streams and waterways subject of the complaint lodged with the
Department of Public Works and Communications was already res judicata
having been the subject of an agreement between the Zobel Family—former owners
of petitioner’s fishponds, and the Municipality of Macabebe. Said case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1520 and was assigned by lottery to Branch I of said
court, presided by the Hon. Arsenio Santos.

The Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Department
Investigator filed their answer to the petition for prohibition alleging therein
several affirmative defense. Respondent Rogelio de la Rosa adopted said answer
in toto as his own, while the other respondents filed a separate pleading
invoking virtually the same defense pleaded by their co-parties.

On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the
Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying and deciding the case, upon the ground that
sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like the
petitioner Gutierrez, in an administrative investigation involving the same or
at least similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in the course of
said investigation prejudicial or adverse to the contention of the respondents
in the pending case. Petitioner Gutierrez objected to the motion aforesaid upon
the ground that there was no legal ground upon which Judge Santos could be
disqualified under the provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

After due hearing on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an order dated
April 15, 1959 disqualifying himself and endorsing the case to the Second Branch
of the court, for reasons stated as follows:

“Meanwhile, the new respondent, in his motion dated February 24, 1959, is
seeking the disqualification of the presiding judge from sitting in the instant
case on the ground that, before his appointment to the bench, he has been
counsel for some fishpond owners, “like petitioner herein”, as evidenced by
photostatic copies of two (2) communications, annex A and annex B (par. 2 of the
motion); and that under section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, “no judge
shall sit in a case in which he has been a counsel” (par. 4, same motion).

The motion is being objected to by the petitioner for reasons stated in his
written opposition dated March 14, 1959. A perusal of the legal provisions,
invoked by said respondent, does not show that the presiding judge is included
in any of their prohibitions, because he is not pecuniarily interested in the
case; he is not related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity; he has not been an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or
counsel; neither has he presided in any inferior court, whose ruling or
decision being the subject of review (sec. 1, Rule 126, supra).

It is true that while in the practice of law as a member of a law firm, the
presiding judge, in behalf of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de
Guzman, wrote the then Secretary of the Interior a letter dated June 1, 1948,
annex A of the motion, requesting that the proposed lease, in public bidding, of
certain streams listed in resolution No.26, series of 1948 of the municipal
council of Macabebe, Pampanga be held in abeyance until after the Committee on
Rivers and Streams, created under Administrative Order No. 32 issued by the
President of the Philippines, would have determined their nature, whether
private or public.

But, nowhere in the letters, annex A and annex B, could be found any showing
that the presiding judge has ever appeared as counsel for Ricardo Gutierrez, the
herein petitioner, contrary to the contention of the respondent, Senator Rogelio
de la Rosa. Had he been his counsel, the presiding judge should have
disqualified himself from sitting in the present case even without a motion, as
he did in a case pending in the second branch of this court, wherein Manuel
Borja is the petitioner.

On the other hand, in the petition, annex 1 of the re-amended petition, filed
by Benigno Musni and others on August 15, 1958, they stated that the respondents
named therein, one of them being Ricardo Gutierrez, “constructed dams, dikes and
other works in public navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing
grounds in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga”; and that such navigable
waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds are those specified in
the list, annex A of the said petition, annex 1 of the re-amended petition.

A reading of this list shows that some of the streams mentioned in Resolution
No. 26, series of 1948 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, included
in the fishponds of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de Guzman,
were the ones, which the presiding judge, then law practitioner, contended in
his letrter, annex A of the motion, to be private and not public; and
that the said streams, as shown by the plan, Exhibit A—De la Rosa, were more or
less similar to those included in the fishpond or fishponds of the petitioner,
Ricardo Gutierrez, which were being investigated by Mr. Julian C. Cargullo, upon
order of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Such being the case, the presiding judge is inclined to grant the motion by
disqualifying himself to sit in this case, not because he has been a counsel for
the above named petitioner, which is entirely false, neither because of
“extremada delicadeza”, but because his opinion given in the aforesaid letter
might, some way or another, influence on his decision in the case at bar. While
this would be a too remote possibility, yet it is the duty of the court to
administer justice without any suspicion of bias and prejudice, otherwise a
party-litigant might lose confidence in the judiciary that must be avoided as
much as possible for the purpose of preserving its dignity.”

Petitioner Gutierrez filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order
mentioned above, but the respondent Judge denied said motion in his order of
August 11, 1959 where the following is stated:

“While it is true that presiding judge was not counsel for the petitioner,
yet in his letter dated June 1, 1949, attached to the record, as then a private
law practitioner and as counsel for Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of
Proceso de Guzman, he informed the then Secretary of Interior that the streams
and rivers, intended to be leased at public auction by the municipal council of
Macabebe, Pampanga, in its Resolution No. 26, were private and not public.

In his same letter, the presiding judge even stated that copies of Resolution
No. 26 were furnished the persons mentioned therein, one of them being Ricardo
Gutierrez, the herein petitioner, because the streams and rivers subject of the
instant petition were among those to be leased. In other words, the interests of
Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman were identical to
the interests of the herein petitioner Ricardo Gutierrez, so much so that
whatever may be the resolution of the Secretary of the Interior then would
benefit the interests of the said petitioner.

Under these circumstances, the presiding judge believes that he has no other
recourse but to disqualify himself from sitting in this case.”

On August 22, 1959 Gutierrez commenced the present action for mandamus
against the Hon. Arsenio Santos, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Department Investigator and the parties who filed the
complaint against him, for the purpose of compelling the aforesaid Judge “to
proceed, continue with the hearing and take cognizance of Civil Case No. 1520 of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.”

Petitioner, invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, argues that the case of the respondent Judge does not fall under any one
of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein.
Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied
upon justifies petitioner’s contention to a certain degree, it should not be
forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot
disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a
judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial
judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact, that due process
of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and
that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of
rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not
arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge.
Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law—stated in general
terms—that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because—

“* * * However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest
inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or
prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect
unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed
unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated
at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can
shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that the
human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it knows, but
which it should forget in that process.” * * * (Ann. Cas. 1917A, p.
1235)

In the present case the respondent, judge himself has candidly stated that
the opinion expressed by him in a letter dated June 1, 1948 addressed by him as
counsel for Manuel Borja and others to the then Secretary of the Interior,
attached to the motion for disqualification as Annex A, “might, some way or
another, influence (on) his decision in the case at bar” (order of April 13,
1959). The fear he has thus expressed—of not being able to render a truly
impartial judgment—does not appear to be capricious and whimsical, having in
mind particularly that in his order of August 11, 1959 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, His Honor reiterated that in the aforesaid, letter
he informed the Secretary of the Interior that the streams and rivers to be
auctioned, for lease purposes, by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga,
were private and not public streams and rivers; that the streams and rivers
subject of the petition for prohibition filed by herein petitioner were among
those that he considered as private in nature; that, therefore, the
interests of Borja and his other clients “were identical to the interests of the
herein petitioner etc.” In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to
agree with His Honor that the opinion thus expressed by him years ago “might,
some way or another, influence his decision” in the case before him.

Wherefore, the petition for mandamus under consideration is hereby denied,
without costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.