INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORP. AND/OR LORENZO TANGSOC, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CONCORDIA DOS PUEBLOS AND LOLITA SANCHEZ, RESPONDENTS.

In the earlier case of Industrial Timber Corporation v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 83616,^[1]
this Court affirmed the finding of the NLRC that the petitioners are the
employers of private respondents and remanded the case for a determination of
the validity of the quitclaim allegedly signed by the latter.

In its resolution dated February 3, 1992,^[2] the
NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado M. Solamo on
February 26, 1987, ordering the petitioners to reinstate the private
respondents (complainants therein) without loss of seniority rights and
privileges, and to pay them back wages, ECOLA, 13th month pay, holiday pay,
vacation and sick leave pay in the amount of P24,300 each, moral and exemplary
damages of P10,000 each, and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total
award.

In view of the lapse of time since the promulgation of the
decision, the NLRC likewise directed the petitioners to pay the private
respondents severance benefits equivalent to one month pay for every year of
service computed from the date of their employment up to the promulgation of
the resolution should reinstatement of the private respondents to their former
position be no longer possible.^[3]

This resolution became final and executory on March 9, 1992, and
entry of judgment was made on March 25, 1992.

The private respondents meanwhile had filed on March 20, 1992, an
ex parte motion for issuance of a writ of
execution with manifestation that from February 26, 1987, up to the present,
they have not been reinstated and thus were entitled to back salaries for the
said period and until actual reinstatement shall have been made.

Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez thereupon directed the
Fiscal Examiner of the Arbitration Branch to compute the actual amount that the
private respondents should receive. In
a report dated March 22, 1992,^[4]
Fiscal Examiner Renrico N. Pacamo found that each of them was entitled to
P175,964.84, representing three years back wages, ECOLA under Wage Order No. 6,
13th month pay, legal holiday pay, vacation and sick leave pay and other
privileges under the collective bargaining agreement likewise for a period of
three years. In addition, the private
respondents should also be awarded moral and exemplary damages of P10,000 each
and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award. In sum, the petitioners were held liable to
the private respondents for the total amount of P387,122.65.

Both the petitioners and the private respondents filed their
respective objections to this computation. Meanwhile, the Executive Labor Arbiter transferred the case to Labor
Arbiter Leon P. Murillo, who thereafter issued an order dated November 19,
1992,^[5]
concurring with the computation of the Fiscal Examiner Pacamo.

The Commission, on appeal of the computation, only made a slight
modification of the amount of the award and directed the petitioners to pay the
private respondents the sum of P375,795.20.^[6] The
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners through JRS-Butuan, a
private letter-forwarding company, reached the NLRC a day late and was denied
on August 31, 1993, mainly for tardiness.^[7]

In this petition now before us, the NLRC is faulted with grave abuse
of discretion for merely modifying the award of damages and denying the motion
for reconsideration.

On the first issue, the petitioners submit that the NLRC decision
of February 3, 1992, which affirmed in
toto the order of
Arbiter Solamo and remanded the case for immediate execution need not be
recomputed because the monetary awards due the private respondents had already
been determined and fixed in the said order. It is argued that to allow the decision of Arbiter Murillo to prevail
and sizably increase the monetary award to the private respondents would in
effect allow an arbiter to change a decision of the Commission that has become
final and executory. Arbiter Murillo’s
duty, it is stressed, is limited to the ministerial act of executing the NLRC
decision.

We disagree.

It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory,
it can no longer be modified or otherwise disturbed. However, this principle admits of exceptions, as where facts and
circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust and it
therefore becomes necessary, “in the interest of justice, to direct its
modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing
circumstances.”^[8]

The general rule is indeed, that once a judgment becomes final and
executory, said judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. That principle, however, admits of
exceptions as in cases where, because of supervening events, it becomes
imperative, in the higher interest of justice, to direct its modification in
order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances
(Seavan Carrier Inc. vs. GTI Sportswear Corp., 137 SCRA 580) or whenever it
is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual vs. Tan, 85 Phil
164; Central Textile Mills vs. United Textile Workers Union, 94 SCRA 883). In the case at bar, the modification of the
judgment, rendered by the Labor Arbiter on 4 May 1993, is warranted by the fact
that the Bank had been placed under liquidation thereby permanently foreclosing
the possibility for the Bank to resume its business. Reinstatement of Galindez, as Cashier, therefore was rendered
inappropriate considering the Bank’s eventual closure. (Emphasis supplied).^[9]

Applying this exception to the case at bar, we note with approval
the following observations of the Solicitor General:^[10]

It may be true that the amount of backwages and other benefits due
to the private respondents as recomputed, is not in harmony with the literal
import of the dispositive portion of the decision subject of execution. However, sight must not be lost of the fact
that at the time the recomputation was made in 1992, five (5) years had
already elapsed from the time the Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on
February 26, 1987. Thus, a
recomputation was necessary to arrive at a just and proper determination of the
monetary awards due the private respondents.

Indeed, the back wages and other benefits awarded by Arbiter
Solamo to each of the private respondents in the amount of P24,300.00
correspond merely to the period between their illegal dismissal on April 26,
1986, up to the time of the rendition of the decision on February 26,
1987. There is no dispute that from
April 26, 1986, to this date, the private respondents have not been reinstated
nor has payment of the monetary awards decreed by the NLRC been made to them.

A similar action was taken in the recent case of Sampaguita
Garments Corporation v. NLRC,^[11]
where this Court upheld the nullification of a decision of the NLRC ordering
the reinstatement of an employee after her conviction of the same offense of
which she was absolved in the administrative case.

On the issue of the timeliness of the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, we find that the NLRC correctly applied the rule that where a
pleading is filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial service, it is
deemed filed on the day it is actually received by the court, not on the day it
was mailed or delivered to the messengerial service.

As this Court held in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC:^[12]

The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a
private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing
thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the
court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date
of filing of that pleading.

The 10th day for filing the motion
for reconsideration was June 26, 1993, which fell on a Saturday. The last day for filing would have been the following business
day, June 28, 1993, which was a Monday. The petitioners’ counsel claims he was able to deliver the pleading to
JRS-Butuan on June 26, 1993, but the motion for reconsideration reached the
Commission on June 29, 1993, or a day late.

At any rate, the respondent Commission noted that the motion
contained no substantial matters to warrant the reconsideration sought and
could have been denied just the same on that ground.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions of the respondent NLRC dated
May 31, 1993, and August 31, 1993, are AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason,
and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
169 SCRA 341, January 20, 1989.

^[2]
Cited in the Petition, Rollo, p.
9.

^[3]
Ibid., p. 10.

^[4]
Petition, Annex D, Rollo, p. 35.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 43-49.

^[6]
Resolution, May 31, 1993, Rollo,
pp. 26-29.

^[7]
Resolution, August 31, 1993, Rollo,
pp. 30-31.

^[8]
Seavan Carrier, Inc. v. GTI
Sportswear Corp., 137 SCRA 580; Lee v. Hon. de Guzman, 187 SCRA 276.

^[9]
Galindez v. Rural Bank of Llanera,
Inc., 175 SCRA 132, pp. 138-139, July 5, 1989.

^[10]
Ibid., p. 92.

^[11]
G.R. No. 102406.

^[12]
209 SCRA 55, May 18, 1992.