NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 12, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, RESPONDENT.

JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12,
San Jose, Antique, is administratively charged by District Public Attorney
Napoleon A. Abiera with grave abuse of discretion and misconduct relative to a
civil case^[1]
pending before respondent judge, and with gross dishonesty and inefficiency in
deliberately falsifying his certificates of service, and failing to decide
cases submitted for decision within the reglementary period prescribed by the
Constitution.

The charge of grave abuse of discretion and misconduct stemmed
from the Order of 20 December 1990 issued by respondent judge suspending
complainant from the practice of law.

It appears that both counsel of the parties previously agreed to
set Civil Case No. 2119 for hearing on 20 to 22 August 1990. On 20 August 1990, however, complainant
requested the Court Interpreter for a second call of the case because he would
first attend the trial of another case in Br. 11 of the same court.^[2]
At 11:15 that same morning, after waiting for complainant in vain, Civil Case
No. 2119 was called for the second time. However, neither the complainant nor his clients appeared. As a result, respondent judge declared in
open court that plaintiffs were deemed to have waived further presentation of
their evidence.

On 21 August 1990, upon being informed of the Order of 20 August
1990, but before receiving a copy thereof, complainant verbally explained to
respondent judge that his non-appearance at the hearing was due to the lengthy
cross-examination of a witness in Crim. Case No. 3839 then being heard before
Br. 11. On the basis thereof, he moved
for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Respondent judge denied the motion. Subsequently, complainant requested that the proceedings be suspended in
order that he could secure a copy of the Order of 20 August 1990, but the same
was also denied. Thus, the hearing of
Civil Case No. 2119 proceeded with the presentation by defendants of their
evidence. Complainant participated
fully in the proceedings by raising objections and cross-examining defendants’
witness.

On 23 August 1990, complainant received the Order of 20 August
1990. On 5 September 1990, he filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order of 20 August 1990 praying that the
proceedings of 21 August 1990 be canceled and that plaintiffs be allowed to
finish the presentation of their evidence.^[3]

On 7 December 1990, respondent judge not only denied the motion for
reconsideration of complainant but also ordered him –

x x x to show cause in writing within five (5) days from today or
not later than the close of office on December 12, 1990 why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or otherwise disciplinar(ily) dealt with for abusing
the court in participating and agreeing in the reception of evidence for the
defendants on August 21, 1990 but only to ask maliciously later for its
nullification and why no other liability should attach to him by reason of the
heretofore described acts and/or omission of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct.^[4]

On 17 December 1990, complainant filed his Compliance within the
extended period by registered mail posted in Manila. However, respondent’s court received the same only on 26 December
1990. Earlier, on 20 December 1990,
respondent judge already issued an order suspending complainant from the
practice of law.

Complainant questioned the validity of the Order of 20 August
1990 before this Court through a petition for certiorari.^[5]
On 26 August 1991, we vacated this order upon a finding that complainant was
not afforded procedural due process and ordered the records of the case
returned to the sala of respondent judge, who may, if he was so minded, refile
the proceedings for the suspension of complainant by following the procedure
prescribed in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.^[6]

Upon receipt of our resolution, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent judge.

In his first cause of action, complainant claims that respondent
judge acted in bad faith in issuing his Order of 20 December 1990. He asserts that respondent’s
perception that he (complainant) feigned ignorance of the Order of 20 August
1990 is disproved by the record of the proceedings. He further argues that his participation in the trial of 21
August 1990 was not a waiver of his objections to the Order of 20 August 1990;
that he could not file his written motion for reconsideration as respondent
judge declared him in contempt in another case and ordered his detention; and,
that the motion for reconsideration was formalized during his detention and
filed only on 5 September 1990.

He further posits that respondent’s words “machination x x x
made via a clever use of the filthy instruments of a devil’s advocate – wily
submissions and a smiling fox’s pleading x x x” used in the Order of 7
December 1990 are indecent and unbecoming a member of the judiciary. He concludes that the issuance of the Order
of 20 December 1990 was due to the intense dislike, or even hatred, of
respondent judge for complainant and his relative, Cong. Exequiel Javier of
Antique.

With regard to his second cause of action, complainant claims
that respondent willfully falsified his monthly certificates of service covering the periods from
February to September 1989, February to April 1990, and June to October
1990. He contends that respondent judge
certified that he had no pending unresolved civil and criminal cases when in
fact he had eight (8) civil cases
and ten (10) criminal cases unresolved within ninety (90) days from date of
their submission for decision. He
submits that such falsification enabled respondent to receive his salaries and
allowances.^[7]

Respondent judge, in his answer, asserts that he has been fair
and impartial to complainant, as evidenced by a list of cases where the latter
received favorable action. He however
maintains that complainant’s effort “to trifle with the judicial
proceedings in Civil Case No. 2119 must not be tolerated and should be
penalized to protect and uphold the integrity of the court.”

Respondent also avers that the initial hearing of Civil Case No.
2119 was set on 20 February 1987; since that date until 7 March 1990,
complainant had already obtained seventeen (17) postponements; in one case,^[8]
respondent had advised complainant to arrange his calendar to avoid any
conflict in schedules which already seemed to be his pattern; the hearing on 20
August 1990 was fixed by both counsel of the parties and respondent merely
adopted the same; while complainant had a scheduled hearing on the same date in
another sala, the conflict in schedules was not the making of respondent but
the fault of complainant who undertook to appear in two (2) branches of the
court at the same time; complainant neither required Atty. Rolando Vedeja, the
PAO lawyer assigned to respondent judge, to appear in his stead nor did he
direct his clients to attend the hearing; their absence was intentionally
planned by complainant to demean respondent and to make him wait for them; on
30 August 1990, complainant committed a contemptible “showboating”
towards the court in another case^[9] for
which respondent cited him for direct contempt and sentenced him to ten (10)
days imprisonment; in his written motion for reconsideration of the Order of 20
August 1990, complainant made the impression that he learned of the order only
when he received copy of the same on 23 August 1990 and the written motion was
formalized while he was under detention; such impression showed complainant’s
bad faith; the motion for reconsideration could not have been formalized during
complainant’s detention because it is dated 24 August 1990, six (6) days before
his imprisonment; his motion for reconsideration prayed for the nullification
of the entire proceedings not of
20 August but of 21 August 1990 where he participated as fully as he could
until the Galera spouses completed the presentation of their evidence; when the
defendants were given time to submit a written offer of their evidence,
complainant offered no objection; complainant purposely withheld the filing of
his motion for reconsideration until his receipt of a copy of the written Offer
of Exhibits by counsel for defendants; and, such actuations are wily, dilatory
and obstructive.

On the second cause of action, respondent judge states that most,
if not all, of the subject cases mentioned in the complaint were inherited from
his predecessor. He adds that on 14
January 1989, during the 11th Judicial Conference in Libertad, Antique, then
Chief Justice Fernan granted him an extension to deal with all the cases then
pending decision in his sala. Respondent also points out that on 30 August 1990 and 25 September 1990,
this Court granted him an extension to decide twenty-eight (28) cases.^[10]
Again, on 23 April 1991, he was granted an extension to decide a set of
thirteen (13) newly-filed cases.^[11]
Respondent claims that all cases mentioned by complainant were part of the
twenty-eight (28) cases decided by him within the extended period granted him.

Finally, respondent judge contends that the complainant filed
this case “not only out of resentment and hate against (him) but it is
(also) what your respondent has earlier branded as complainant Abiera’s wily
submission and smiling fox’s pleading.” Respondent judge further states
that, in contrast, the greater sector of Antique has favorably recognized his
judicial actuations as shown by his receipt of several plaques of appreciation.^[12]

On 4 June 1992, the Court En Banc referred
the case to Associate Justice Jaime N. Lantin of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.^[13]

On 3 August 1993, the investigating justice submitted his report.^[14]
On the first cause of action, i.e., grave abuse of discretion and misconduct,
he states that he concurs with our resolution in G.R. No. 96636 holding the
suspension Order of 20 December 1990 null and void for non-observance of the
prescribed procedure, adding that –

x x x there was nothing contumacious in complainant Abiera’s
conduct as would warrant his suspension from the practice of law. The participation by Abiera in the hearing
of August 21, 1990 should not be taken against him. Under the circumstances, where the verbal motion to suspend proceedings
were denied, the most that could be expected of complainant Abiera was to
participate and scrutinize the evidence presented by his opponent as a measure
to protect the interest of his clients, and such participation did not bar him
from subsequently questioning the Order of August 20, 1990, considering that at
that time, he was not yet formally served a copy of the written order of August
20, 1990. It is the right and duty of
complainant to exhaust all possible and available processes and/or remedies
provided by law to protect the interest of his clients. Moreover, it would appear that the Order of
August 20, 1990, constituted a violation of plaintiffs’ right to due process
considering that plaintiffs were deprived of their right to present further
evidence.

Time and again, courts are
reminded to use their contempt power with restraint and only in case of a
clearly contumacious conduct. Contempt
of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flaunting, or arrogant
belligerence, a defiance of the court and it is not clearly established in this
case.

x x x x

The suspension of complainant Abiera from the practice of law
through an improper and invalid exercise of the contempt power of the court and
in clear violation of the prescribed procedure for suspension, is unjust and
manifests a deliberate intent to do injustice — a grave misconduct for which
he should be held administratively accountable.

On the second cause of action, respondent judge is charged with
gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency predicated on various certificates of
service, particularly referring to those dated 6 February 1989 to 10 October
1990 (Exhs. “M” to “M-16”) allegedly falsified by him, and
for failure of respondent Judge to decide the eighteen (18) cases, subject
matter of the action, within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution. Complainant claims that
respondent Judge did not decide the criminal and civil cases enumerated in the
Resolution of the Investigator dated 17 May 1993 within a period of 90 days from
their submission for decision and, despite such failure, respondent prepared
and submitted falsified certificates of service so as he would be paid his
salaries. But, as the Investigating
Justice found –

x x x that respondent Judge upon his request was granted extensions
by the Hon. Supreme Court in its Resolutions of August 30, 1990, September 25,
1990 and April 23, 1991, all giving an additional period of 90 days from notice
within which respondent Judge shall decide the subject cases. And the facts would show that respondent
Judge resolved all the subject cases within the 90-day extension period. It is the view of the Investigator that the
said resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court had actually three effects. First, the resolutions gave respondent Judge
an additional period of 90 days from receipt of notice thereof within which to
decide subject cases. Second, the
resolutions constituted an implied retroactive extension from the lapse of the
original 90-day period. Third, the said
resolutions also constituted an implied condonation by Hon. Supreme Court on
the failure of respondent Judge to resolve subject cases within and after the
lapse of the original 90-day period. Necessarily, the charge for gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency
holds no water and, therefore, the respondent Judge should be exonerated
therefrom.

On the basis of the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice
recommends that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda be ordered to pay a fine
of P2,000.00 for grave misconduct in unlawfully suspending from the practice of
law District Public Attorney Napoleon Abiera; and, that he be exonerated from
the charge of gross dishonesty and serious inefficiency for allegedly failing
to decide cases within the prescribed period.

We cannot agree fully with the aforecited recommendations of the
Investigating Justice.

Let it be stressed that the Court does not condone the manner by which complainant was
suspended from the practice of law. This was made clear in our Resolution of 26 August 1991 in G.R. No. 96636 when we set aside the Order
of 20 December 1990 for being null and void as it failed to comply with Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Our
disapproval however should not be construed as an indication that respondent
judge’s erroneous order merits administrative sanction, otherwise, we would
have imposed the sanction then and there if in every proceeding for certiorari
we punish a judge for grave abuse of discretion.

As a general rule, the acts done by a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though erroneous.^[15]
These acts become subject to our disciplinary power only when they are attended
by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. A re-evaluation of the case at bar presents no occasion for us to depart
from the general rule.

The records show that Civil Case No. 2119 has long been pending
presentation of plaintiffs’ evidence. Yet, respondent judge has been very lenient in granting motions for
postponements to both counsel of the parties, more particularly to counsel for
plaintiffs. Of the twenty-seven (27)
motions for postponement granted, seventeen (17) of these were filed by
complainant as counsel for plaintiffs, four (4) by agreement of the parties,
one (1) by reason of the stenographic reporters’ strike, and five (5) by motion
of defendants.^[16]
Finally, upon prior agreement of both counsel for plaintiffs and defendants,
respondent judge set the case for hearing on 20 to 22 August 1990.

Given this factual backdrop, complainant’s non­-appearance at the
hearing despite his previous commitment and his personal request for a second
call of the case inevitably pushed the patience of respondent judge to the
limit. In his Order of 20 August 1990,
respondent tersely declared that “(t)he complaint in the case was filed on
18 June 1986 and plaintiffs have not even rested their case due to repeated
postponements asked by plaintiffs. This
Court cannot tolerate further delay in the proceedings of this case.”^[17]

A reading of the Order of 20 December 1990^[18]
discloses that respondent judge was not without reason in imposing a
disciplinary sanction against complainant. The latter’s proffered excuse of a protracted cross-examination in Br.
11 was a mere subterfuge. As we view
it, the fault indeed lies in his failure to keep a systematic record of his cases
set for hearing. As it happened,
complainant appears to have learned only on 19 August 1990 that on the
following day, 20 August 1990, he had to attend simultaneously to two (2) cases
in different branches of the court.^[19]
Faced with a conflict in schedules, complainant made no move to transfer the
hearing of either case. Perhaps he
thought he could cope with the situation.^[20]
Unfortunately, he was wrong. Obviously,
complainant’s predicament then was of his own doing. Therefore, the hearing of another case in Br. 11 could not be
made a shield for his blunder.

A hard look at complainant’s oversight also reveals that he was
unprepared for the trial on 20 August 1990. The plaintiffs who were then his clients were not even present in
court. As the Investigating Justice
correctly pointed out, readiness for trial is to be prepared with his witness
for that day.^[21]
In his testimony, complainant stated that plaintiffs were with him and that he
advised them to await the second call of the case.^[22]
For their part, plaintiffs claimed otherwise. They countered that “(they) would have been in court on August 20,
1990 to present further evidence had Atty. Abiera informed (them) of the
hearing but he did not.”^[23]

We are more inclined to believe the submission of plaintiffs. For, other than his testimony, complainant
presented no corroborating evidence. On
the other hand, logic dictates that if plaintiffs were indeed present,
respondent judge would not have issued the Order of 20 August 1990, otherwise,
had he done so, plaintiffs would have promptly protested against it, or
respondent judge could have asked them to call for their counsel who was in Br.
11. The whole incident plainly
underscores the truth, which eludes some lawyers, that an orderly schedule, a
punctual appearance at court hearings, and preparedness for trial highly
contribute to the speedy disposal of cases.

We also note that since complainant personally requested a second
call, courtesy demands that he should have at least informed respondent judge
of his predicament. But he did
not. Complainant’s reason that the
matter slipped his mind^[24] is
flimsy and clearly indicates a lack of respect not for the sake of the
incumbent judge but for the court owing to its importance.^[25]

In his Order of 20 December 1990, respondent judge deplored the
strategy of complainant in withholding the filing of his motion for
reconsideration until defendants filed their Offer of Exhibits on 5 September
1990. He claims that he could not file
his motion earlier because on 30 August 1990 he was detained by respondent
judge for contempt in another case so that he had to formalize his motion while
in detention.

Again, we are not persuaded. He is less than candid to the court. His argument is belied by his own motion for reconsideration which is
dated 24 August 1990. Evidently, it was
prepared six (6) days before he was detained. In this regard, respondent judge aptly observed –

The filing of the subject motion for reconsideration on the same
day, September 5, 1990, adverse counsel filed his formal written offer of
exhibits for defendants may truly be coincidental. But, holding on to the motion until September 5, 1990, or twelve
(12) days after its date of execution on August 24, 1990, is clearly a
coincidence purposely made to coincide. It should even become anomalous if it is considered that Atty.
Abiera received the two separate orders dated August 20 and 21, 1990 at the
same time at 3:00 P.M. on August 23, 1990 while adverse counsel received personally
his copy of the order dated August 20 the following day on August 21 and later
his copy of the August 21 order was received on August 22.^[26]

Moreover, respondent judge can hardly be blamed for taking
complainant to task for not being factual in his motion for reconsideration
when he states^[27]
–

1. That the undersigned counsel received the
order dated August 20, 1990 on August 23, 1990 at 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, declaring the plaintiffs to have waived presenting evidence in their
favor for failure of plaintiffs and counsel to appear in Court on August 20,
1990;

2. That on August 20, 1990 counsel for the
plaintiffs appeared together with the counsel for the defendants in Criminal
Case No. 3879 entitled, PP vs. Anselmo Pagunsan, et al., for Violation of RA 6455 before RTC,
Branch 11 as counsels (sic) for the accused and Capt. Zenaida Sinfuego of the
PCCL, Camp Delgado, Iloilo City, testified for the prosecution. The setting was earlier requested by Capt.
Sinfuego herself, appearing in the Order of the Honorable Presiding Judge given
in chamber last June 18, 1990;

3. That before the start of the session of
Branch 11, the undersigned counsel informed the Court Interpreter of Branch 12,
that he would request for a second call since he will (sic) appear in Criminal Case No. 3839 before Branch 11;

4. That unfortunately due to the lengthy direct
and cross-examination of the witness on the stand in Criminal Case No. 3839,
the second call requested for Civil Case No. 2119 was ahead a few minutes than
that of the termination of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3839 and the
reason why counsel was not around as well as the counsel for the defendants
when the second call for Civil Case No. 2119 was made x x x x

Apparently, the aforesaid motion creates the impression that
complainant had no knowledge of the Order of 20 August 1990 nor of the
proceedings of 21 August 1990 where he fully participated. The misleading statement in complainant’s
motion led respondent to rule that –

What stands out is an effort to trifle with judicial proceedings of
this court. Worse, the machination is
made via a clever use of the filthy instruments of a devil’s advocate – wily
submissions and a smiling fox’s pleading – executed with the use of legal
knowledge by an officer of the court, Atty. Napoleon Abiera, who is sworn to
protect and uphold the dignity and authority of the court.

Thus, Atty. Abiera submits – at least sub silencio – that he was
unaware of the August 20, 1990 order (received by him on August 23, 1990)
declaring his clients, the plaintiffs herein to have waived further
presentation of their evidence when he entered into trial on August 21,
1990. And, because of his lack of
knowledge of such order he did not object to the presentation of defendants’
evidence on August 21. Hence, the court
should cancel and nullify all the proceedings had on August 21, including his
own cross examination of Mrs. Floreta Pillo Galera and the court should also
set aside Exhibits “1” to “3” for the defendants and
Exhibits “C” to “E-3” for the Third Party Plaintiffs, inclusive,
even if such exhibits have all been previously identified in his presence and
without his objection.

x x x x

Granting that Atty. Abiera never learned of the order of August 20
but his appearance on August 21 for
the reception of evidence for the defendants must have adequately apprised him
that further presentation of evidence for his client was summarily terminated
and shut because defendants were allowed to present their evidence even before
he could close and offer the evidence for his clients.

Not only that, Atty. Abiera did not even raise a quibble when
adverse counsel asked in open court for time to file formal written offer of
exhibits for the defendants.

x x x x

The intention to manipulate in a hidden fashion a coated image of
innocence in counsel’s submission is all too clear as crystal to escape
notice. The conduct is not simply odd
but exhibits an effort to trifle with the court. Such conduct plainly makes a mockery of judicial proceedings and
makes a fool of this court.”^[28]

Indeed, candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of a
practicing lawyer.^[29]
Complainant’s aforequoted motion for reconsideration could barely measure up to
this criterion. The concealment of the
facts naturally did not earn sympathy for him.

In his Compliance with the Order of 7 December 1990, complainant
clarified his misleading statement. He
mailed his Compliance in Manila by registered mail on 17 December 1990. However, the same was received by respondent
court only on 26 December 1990. In the
meantime, respondent judge had already issued the order of 20 December 1990
suspending him from the practice of law.

Considering the foregoing circumstances, we find no malice in the
actuations of respondent judge. We perceive from his Order of 20
December 1990 the zeal to uphold the dignity of the court and the seriousness
with which he takes his task as dispenser of justice. His record at the Office of the Court Administrator attests to
his earnest efforts in reducing his heavy caseload and instilling discipline in
his court. As the aforesaid order
reveals, he would not tolerate any attempt at disrespect towards the court nor
permit the use of double talk from any member of the Bar. Such attitude may be severe and inflexible
at times but in the case at bench, his actuations do not constitute grave abuse
of discretion and misconduct to justify the imposition of an administrative
sanction.

On the other hand, complainant should be reminded of his primary
duty to assist the court in the administration of justice. It bears stressing that the relations between
counsel and judge should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation
by one of the duties of the other.^[30] It
is upon their cordial relationship and mutual cooperation that the hope of our
people for speedy and efficient justice rests.

As regards the charge of gross dishonesty and serious
inefficiency, we affirm the recommendation of the investigating justice that
the same should be dismissed for being baseless.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ
MACEDA, Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Antique, now detailed in Naval, Biliran,
Br. 16, for grave abuse of discretion and misconduct, gross dishonesty and
serious inefficiency, and failing to decide cases within the reglementary
period, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Cepeda v. Galera, Civil Case No. 2119.

^[2]
People v. Pagunsan, Crim. Case No. 3839.

^[3]
Exh. “D,” Complainant’s exhibits.

^[4]
Exh. “E,” id.

^[5]
Abiera v. Sanz Maceda, G.R. No. 96636.

^[6]
Id., First Division Resolution dated 26 August 1991.

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 1-5, 126-162.

^[8]
People v. Bertolano, Crim. Case No. 3455.

^[9]
People v. Boston, Crim. Case No. 4220.

^[10]
A.M. No. 90-2008-RTC-Re: Request for extension of time to decide
cases, Exh. “83,” Respondent’s exhibits.

^[11]
Exh. “84,” id.

^[12]
Rollo, pp. 61-111, 163-188.

^[13]
Id., p. 57.

^[14]
Id., pp. 189-217.

^[15]
See Libarios v. Dabalos,
A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, 11 July 1991, 199 SCRA 48, 55.

^[16]
Rollo, p. 65.

^[17]
Exh. “C,” Complainant’s exhibits.

^[18]
Exh. “A,” id.

^[19]
TSN, 22 September 1992, p. 15.

^[20]
TSN, 23 September 1992, pp. 70-71.

^[21]
Id., p. 83.

^[22]
TSN, 12 November 1992, p. 52.

^[23]
Exh. “28,” Respondent’s exhibits.

^[24]
TSN, 23 September 1992, p. 77.

^[25]
See Garcia v. Alconcel, Adm. Matter No. 2499-CCC (OCA­-101), 30 January 1982, 111 SCRA 178, 184.

^[26]
Exh. “A-4,” Complainant’s
exhibits.

^[27]
Exh. “D,” id.

^[28]
Exh. “A-3,” id.

^[29]
Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v.
King, G.R. No. 78252, 12
April 1989, 172 SCRA 60, 69; Canon
10, Code of Professional Responsibility.

^[30]
Romero v. Valle, Jr., Adm. Matter
No. R-192-RTJ, 9 January 1987, 147 SCRA 197, 201-202.